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Abstract 
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be published without Simon C. Parker's prior written consent and information 
derived from it should be acknowledged. 
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This thesis presents a theory of the consumption function called the 'Inter-
Generational Hypothesis' (IGH). The theory starts from the premise that individ-
uals derive utility not only from their own consumption, but also from the welfare 
of their offspring. Individuals are supposed to maximise an intergenerationally 
altruistic utility function subject to a lifetime budget constraint and so derive 
their optimal consumption and bequest plans. From these plans, it is possible to 
construct an individual's consumption function. This contains earnings and inher-
itance terms, and is non-linear in earnings; this is consistently aggregated over all 
living individuals to yield the aggregate IGH consumption function. A feature of 
this function is the rich set of intergenerational information hypotheses it is able 
to encompass; there are also several implications with respect to earnings redistri-
bution policy. The IGH function is estimated using 23 years of post-war UK data, 
and tested against rival consumption models, including Hall's (1978) REPIH. The 
principal finding is that the data do not appear to be consistent with either model 
, in their pure form; however, they support a hybrid consumption function where 
a proportion of the population behave according to the altruistic IGH, and where 
the rest behave according to the 'selfish' REPIH. An additional finding, necessarily 
tentative given the imperfections of the distributional data, is a failure to detect 
significant non-linearity in the aggregate consumption function. This result casts 
doubt on the usefulness of policies designed to redistribute incomes in order to 
affect aggregate consumption. 
3 
Contents 
Abstract ...... . 
Acknowledgments 
Part I Introduction 
... 2 
.. 6 
.7 
1 Introduction . . . . . . 8 
2 Background to the Theory: Some Recent Research on the 
Consumption Function . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 
2.1 The Euler Equation Approach of Hall . . . . . . . . . . 16 
2.2 The Hendry Modelling Methodology . . . . . 22 
2.3 Some Recent Work on the UK Consumption Function 26 
2.4 The Consumption Model of Boskin and Kotlikoff 34 
2.5 Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37 
Part II The IGH: Theory 40 
3 The IGH 41 
3.1 Assumptions of the Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41 
3.2 The Optimal Consumption Function of an Individual . . 4 7 
3.2.1 The Intergenerational Utility Function . . . . . . . . . . . 47 
3.2.2 The Optimal Consumption Stream of an Individual . . . 48 
3.3 The Optimal Bequest Function of an Individual . . . . . • 51 
3.3.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51 
3.3.2 The Davies Hypothesis (DH) and Bequest Function 52 
3.3.3 The Bevan Hypothesis (BH) and Bequest Function 54 
3.3.4 The Laitner Hypothesis (LH) and Bequest Function 56 
3.3.5 The Generalised Bequest Function . . . . . . . . . . 57 
3.4 Derivation of the Aggregate IGH Consumption Function 59 
4 Theoretical Implications of the IGH . . . . . . . . . 68 
4.1 Policy Implications of the IGH .......... . 
4.2 Implications of the Three Bequest Functions .. . 
4.2.1 Implications for Inequality . . . . . . . . ... . 
4.2.2 Implications for Ricardian Equivalence .... . 
4 
70 
80 
80 
82 
4.2.3 The Three Hypotheses Assessed . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84 
Pall."i HI 'I'l'ne IGH: Estimation and Conclusions . . . . 86 
5 Estimation. of the IG H Consumption. Function 87 
5.1 The Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87 
5.1.1 Real Aggregate Consumption . . . . . . . . . . 87 
5.1.2 Nominal Net Earnings with a Distributional Breakdown 88 
5.1.3 The Inheritance Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95 
5.2 Empirical Results 98 
16 CoJIAdusion.s 117 
Pall."i IV Appen.dices . 126 
A ]Lifetime Liquidity CoJIAstraints 127 
B 'I'he A!tell."n.ative View of Bequests as No.n~Altruistic 131 
C The Aggregate Consumption-Income Distll."ihution Literature 
135 
D Derivation of the IGH Consumption Function Using the Beta 
Distdbution ................................ 145 
Pall."t V Bibliogll."aphy ............................... 147 
5 
Acknowledgments 
I would like to thank my supervisor, Mr. John Ashworth, and all the staff at 
the Department of Economics at the University of Durham for their advice and 
encouragement. This thesis was written in two full time years and one part time 
year. It was purely self-financed, since no ESRC funding was received. 
Important Note 
Since this thesis was submitted, further development of the work contained 
herein has taken place. Whilst this does not alter the bulk of the theoretical and 
background material, the empirical results (section 5.2) have changed considerably, 
and Bevan's Hypothesis (section 3.3.3) has been generalised. The reader is referred 
to Parker (1992) for details. 
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Ch I. Introduction 
Chapter I 
Introduction 
This thesis presents a theory of the consumption function called the 'Inter-
Generational Hypothesis' (IGH). The theory starts from the premise that individ-
uals derive utility not only from their own consumption, but also from the welfare 
of their offspring. Individuals are supposed to maximise an intergenerationally al-
truistic utility function subject to a lifetime budget constraint and so derive their 
optimal consumption and bequest plans. From these plans, it is possible to de-
rive an individual's consumption function; this can be aggregated over all living 
individuals to produce a tractable aggregate consumption function. 
The last twenty years or so has seen the emergence and growth of intergen-
erational modelling in many areas of economic theory1 • However, this growth in 
the application of intergenerational concepts to mainstream economic issues seems 
largely to have bypassed the empirical aggregate consumption function. Almost 
without exception, theories of the aggregate consumption function start from the 
postulate that individuals are selfish, maximising their own utility and not di-
rectly caring about the welfare of their children. We attempt to fill this gap by 
constructing a theory which allows for parental altruism to children at the outset. 
It is perhaps worth noting that before undertaking this endeavour, the author was 
motivated by curiosity as to what such a consumption function would look like, 
and how it would perform empirically. On the latter point, the principal questions 
were: would it be capable of explaining consumption behaviour substantially bet-
ter than currently popular specifications? And would it be able to suggest that 
any empirical shortcomings of conventional consumption functions may be caused 
by their neglect of intergenerationally altruistic preferences? 
1 For example: in altruism and utility (eg Ray (1987), Hori and Kanaya 1989); resource distribution 
and inequality (eg Laitner (1979), Loury 1981); fiscal policy (Barro 1974, 1989); saving (eg Kotlikoff 
1989); intergenerational justice (Arrow (1973), Dasgupta 1974); and bequest behaviour (Davies 
(1982), Bevan (1979), Laitner 1979). 
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A particular consumption function to which the latter question is addressed 
1s that of Hall (1978). The literature relating to this consumption function is 
briefly reviewed in section 2.1 of chapter 2. Hall's function is derived from the 
assumption that households maximise a selfish utility function; the welfare of their 
children is not considered as a separate argument in their utility. Hall's theory has 
households choosing an optimal consumption stream over their lifetimes, in much 
the same manner as the Life-Cycle and Permanent Income hypotheses (Brumberg 
and Modigliani (1954), Modigliani and Ando (1963), and Friedman (1957), respec-
tively). The principal difference is that Hall develops a version of this framework 
in which households face uncertainty and form rational expectations about the 
future. 
Hall's model has been an extremely popular vehicle for applied and theoretical 
research into the consumption function. It forms an obvious point of comparison 
with an altruistic theory such as that developed in this thesis, because the util-
ity function it is based on is 'selfish' rather than 'altruistic', the latter type of 
function admitting the welfare of others as an additional source of utility to the 
individual. An argument central to the thrust of this thesis is that consumption 
theories predicated on selfishness alone may give misleading indications of actual 
consumption behaviour if people are also motivated by altruism. This possibility is 
especially pertinent given (a) the weighty body of evidence which has now accumu-
lated against both Modigliani's deterministic life-cycle model and Hall's stochastic 
version2 , and (b) growing evidence of the size and importance of intergenerational 
transfers3 • It also seems intuitively plausible that preferences, at least for some 
people, are moulded by altruism, and altruism towards children in particular. 
Altruistic preferences are in a sense a generalisation of selfish preferences. This 
is because altruistic utility functions invariably contain selfish as well as altruistic 
components, whereas selfish utility functions just embody selfishness. Altruists 
are presumed to have some concern about their own welfare: they are not just 
interested in the welfare of others. This might suggest that consumption functions 
built up from altruistic utility micro-foundations are bound to be generalisations 
2 For a listing of evidence against the former, see eg Kotlikoff (1989, p.27); for some evidence against 
the latter, see the references in chapter 2, section 2.1 of this thesis. 
3 See part B.4 of Appendix B. 
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of consumption functions predicated on selfishness. However, this does not follow 
if auxiliary assumptions used to construct consumption functions differ between 
selfish and altruistic theories. For example, it will become apparent in the thesis 
that the IGH function is not a generalisation of Hall's function, even though the 
former is built up from a more general utility function than the latter. The reason 
for the difference can be traced principally to a crucial asssumption about certainty: 
the IGH assumes that individuals possess perfect certainty about their futures, 
whereas Hall's model allows for uncertainty and unanticipatable stochastic shocks 
to the economy. Yet although the theories are not directly related to each other, 
they can be tested against each other. This is in fact a central topic of interest in 
the thesis, and tests of the two theories are conducted herein using UK aggregate 
time series data. 
The IGH itself starts by considering an intergenerationally altruistic individual, 
who is taken to solve a dual optimisation problem at the start of his lifetime. This 
dual problem consists of an intergenerational consumption allocation problem to 
determine how much to bequeath; and a lifetime consumption allocation problem 
to determine how the remaining resources are to be consumed over the individual's 
lifetime. The IGH 'micro' consumption function is then constructed by substituting 
the solution of the former problem into the solution of the latter problem to give 
a non-linear function. Consistent aggregation both preserves the non-linearity 
and introduces a distributional term into the aggregate consumption function. 
The redistribution policy implications arising from the presence of an earnings 
distribution term in the consumption function are of interest in their own right, 
and so are discussed separately at some length (see chapter 4, section 4.1). 
The consistency of the aggregation procedure suggests that the IGH may pro-
vide a suitable vehicle for rigorously testing the effect of the earnings distribution 
on aggregate consumption. This is an important testable prediction of the IGH. It 
will also be shown that the IGH is in principle capable of performing a second test: 
that of distinguishing empirically between three rival theories of intergenerational 
information. 
Another theme which runs throughout this thesis is a belief in the importance 
of testing theories, rather than searching for post-hoc rationalisations of empirical 
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phenomena. When sifting through the vast history of econometric results compiled 
on the consumption function this century, one is continually struck by the apparent 
willingness of the profession to tolerate the piling of new result upon result, with-
out making any effort to interpret the findings of the past. Apart from engendering 
confusion and inconclusiveness, this practice calls the credibility of 'economics as 
a science' into dispute, as Mayer (1972) has noted. The situation has only become 
even more confused in recent years, with the increasing popularisation of sophis-
ticated dynamic econometric modelling techniques. The cheapness of computer 
time superadded to continuing research effort in the field of consumer economics 
has swelled the compendium of econometric results yet further. This phenomenon 
has become increasingly serious with the rise of predominantly 'empirical' stud-
ies, and the decline of 'theoretical' work, at least in the UK. The divorce in these 
studies of empirics from rigorously constructed theory makes it hard to identify 
reasons for their breakdowns when these occur; hence yet more empirical studies 
are produced in an attempt to find them, and stacks of yet more econometric re-
sults are added to the thousands already in existence. This in turn generates yet 
more empirical studies, and so the depressing cycle goes on. 
One possible way of cutting out of this vicious circle is to go back to theory 
and build up models from sound theoretical underpinnings. Building consumption 
equations from rigorous theoretical foundations allows us in principle to test the-
ories and to identify weaknesses in them which may allow rectification. Not only 
does this add to our understanding- which may reduce our chances of following 
ultimately barren empirical avenues of research - but it also paves the way for 
explaining published results of other theories tested in the past. Thus the problem 
of trying to draw conclusions from an increasingly large and confusing literature 
may be tackled on two fronts: increased understanding of economic mechanisms, 
and greater knowledge about why previously published results were discovered. 
It is not enough to prescribe or preach a methodology; it is incumbent on the 
proseltyser to translate his words into action. Thus the attempt in this thesis is to 
design a rigorous theory from first principles; to test as well as to estimate it; and to 
try to explain ('encompass') other models using the theory. Particular care is taken 
in the choice of a data set for the empirical work. Another point which is made by 
Mayer (1972), yet which has received surprisingly little attention in applied work, 
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is the often cavalier way in which 'consumption' is measured for empirical purposes. 
Instead of recognising that optimising theories require a data series consistent with 
the notion of a stock yielding consumption services over time, much work in the 
applied arena has been content with utilising more readily available expenditure 
series. However, the latter is not congruent with the theoretical requirement of a 
consumption series. In our empirical work, we overcome this drawback by using a 
recently developed 'consumption' series; the empirical section discusses this issue 
further. 
As mentioned earlier, what we now know as 'the' consumption literature con-
sists of a huge and diverse array of studies. It is almost impossible to document 
it thoroughly. However, some discussion of the literature is required in a thesis 
such as this, for two important reasons. Firstly, description of the salient aspects 
of the literature is necessary as a sort of 'backdrop', in order to better understand 
the contribution of this thesis. Secondly, any theory which attempts to encompass 
others must be able to refer to the latter without ambiguity about their content. 
This necessitates the presentation of some summary material. We have decided to 
group all of this relevant material in chapter 2 of the thesis, which also describes 
the econometric technique of cointegration used later for the purpose of testing 
rival theories. 
The IGH itself is presented in a chapter of its own (chapter 3). The IGH is 
a relatively large theory, which sustains and develops a line of logic for some 25 
pages. In order to ease the burden on the reader, the chapter is broken down 
into four sections. For example, the optimisation problem is broken down into 
its life-cycle and intergenerational components in separate sections (3.2 and 3.3); 
they are only brought together in section 3.4. Considerable attention is paid in 
the chapter to the role and realism of the assumptions underpinning the theory -
they are discussed as they are presented in turn. An advantage of explicitly listing 
and discussing the assumptions is the ability to go back to them in order to assess 
their possible responsibility for empirical failures of the theory based on them. As 
Darnell and Evans (1991) argue, the examination and modification of auxiliary 
assumptions represents a sound way of testing theory and improving it in the face 
of empirical adversity. Indeed, we adopt this very practice later in the thesis. 
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The purpose of chapter 4 is to illustrate that the IGH is not just a theory 
which suggests a testable time series equation, but that it is also rich in theoretical 
implications. One of the most interesting of these implications relates to redistri-
bution policy- the idea that governments can redistribute earnings in order to hit 
a consumption target. The policy implications are set out in some detail, and nu-
merical examples are provided. Yet it would be wrong to give the impression that 
policy is the only rationale for discussing implications of the theory. The chap-
ter also deals with how the theory is related to various aspects of microeconomic 
behaviour. In particular, it is possible, at least in principle, to use empirical esti-
mates of the IGH consumption function in order to make inferences about 'deep' 
structural parameters including intergenerational earnings mobility. 
The empirical results themselves are presented in chapter 5; they are preceded 
by a relatively lengthy discussion about the data series used, their sources, con-
struction, and limitations. A programme of testing the IGH and rival specifications 
is undertaken; as intimated earlier, encompassing is a major objective here. The 
results are interpreted both in this chapter, and further in chapter 6, which draws 
the thesis to a close by offering some final overall conclusions. 
The precise layout of the thesis is as follows: 
• Chapter 2 (Background to the Theory). Sections 2.1 and 2.2 contain 
brief descriptions of the two dominant approaches to consumption modelling at 
the present time: section 2.1 looks at the model of Hall (1978), and section 2.2 
concentrates on the dynamic modelling approach of Hendry and others. Section 
2.3 briefly chronicles some other recent work on the consumption function at 
the time of writing. Section 2.4 focusses on a previous attempt (by Boskin and 
Kotlikoff 1985) to model aggregate consumption using an altruism hypothesis. 
Finally, section 2.5 draws some conclusions about the work covered in this 
chapter. 
• Chapter 3 (The IGH). Section 3.1 states and discusses the assumptions un-
derpinning the analysis which follows. Sections 3.2 and 3.3 set out and solve 
both parts of the altruistic individual's dual optimisation problem: those of 
computing the optimal lifetime consumption path and the optimal bequest, 
13 
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respectively. Both of these solutions are used to derive the individual's op-
timal consumption function in section 3.4: this function is then consistently 
aggregated to yield the aggregate IGH consumption function. 
• Chapter 4 {Theoretical Implications of the IGH). Section 4.1 sets out 
the parameter restrictions suggested by the IGH, and considers some of the 
theoretical implications arising from the IGH consumption function, including 
the scope for government redistribution policy. Some important caveats are 
also mentioned. Section 4.2 discusses some additional theoretical implications 
of the three bequest functions examined in Section 3.3. 
• Chapter 5 (Estimation of the IGH Consumption Function). Section 
5.1 describes the data sources, and Section 5.2 presents the econometric results. 
• Chapter 6 (Conclusions). This chapter draws some final conclusions from 
the theoretical and empirical work. Several promising avenues for future re-
search are also suggested. 
There are also four appendices, which are aimed at providing incidental or dis-
cursive material not central to the thrust of the IGH, but necessary as background 
information. These appendices may be omitted without in any way jeopardising 
the reader's grasp of the IGH and any of its implications. 
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Chapter II 
Background to the Theory: Some Recent Research on the 
Consumption Function 
The purpose of this chapter is to describe the broad outline of recent work 
in the consumption literature which gives the basis for later developments. The 
immensity of the consumption literature means that only a limited discussion is 
possible; for more extensive overviews of the consumption literature, the reader is 
referred to the surveys by Fisher (1983), Hadjimatheou (1987) and Speight (1990). 
The task of presenting recent work on the aggregate consumption function 
is simplified by the fact that most research since 1978 can be divided into two 
categories: 1) the 'Euler equation' model of Hall (1978); and 2) the dynamic 
modelling methodology commonly associated with Hendry (drawing from Davidson 
et al (1978) and hereafter labelled 'the Hendry approach'). The salient aspects of 
these two approaches are briefly discussed in Sections 2.1 and 2.2 respectively. 
Section 2.3 examines some more recent empirical work undertaken in the U. K., 
and Section 2.4 describes a previous attempt to model aggregate consumption 
using an altruism hypothesis. Section 2.5 draws some conclusions. 
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2.1 The Euler Equation Approach of Hall 
In a landmark paper, Hall (1978) set out what is now known as the 'Euler 
equation' model of consumption. It is also known by other names, including REPIH 
(the Rational Expectations Permanent Income Hypothesis); RELCH (the Rational 
Expectations Life Cycle Hypothesis); and the 'random walk' model. This is one 
of the most important pieces of theoretical work in the consumption literature 
since the 1950's, the decade that saw the emergence of the Life Cycle Hypothesis 
(LCH) and the Permanent Income Hypothesis (PIH) 1 . Despite the sound micro-
foundations of these two theories, theoretical. and empirical objections to them 
have mounted steadily over the years (see eg Hadjimatheou 1987). Indeed, it was 
one of these criticisms, Lucas (1976), which prompted Hall to develop his Euler 
equation model. 
The essence of Lucas's criticism is that econometric relationships such as con-
sumption functions are unstable over time if their arguments contain expectational 
elements which are incorrectly modelled. Ideally, models should recognise that ex-
pectations are moulded by the policy regime currently in force, so that changes 
in policy regime alter expectations and so also behaviour. It can be shown that 
models which ignore this point may suffer from chronic structural instability. 
Lucas's criticism applies to the LCH and PIH because these theories stress that 
future incomes as well as current incomes determine consumer behaviour. Under 
uncertainty, agents must form expectations about future incomes, expectations 
which must be modelled as fully rational (in the sense of using all available infor-
mation) if Lucas's critique is to be overcome. The recognition of Lucas's argument 
is apparent in Hall's REPIH model. 
Hall considered a representative household operating in an uncertain environ-
ment, and solved for its optimal consumption plan given a period-by-period budget 
1 These two great contributions crystallised the insight of the early theorists (such as Fisher (1907), 
Ramsey (1928) and Hicks (1939)), that people take consumption decisions with respect to total 
lifetime resources, not simply present income receipts in the manner envisioned by Keynes (1936). 
The LCH and PIH are neoclassical consumption theories, which derive consumption functions from 
the premise that rational households choose consumption plans which maximise their (selfish) utility 
subject to a lifetime budget constraint. According to these theories, bequests can only arise from 
selfish motives or as a result of in1perfect information (see Appendix B). 
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constraint. Mathematically, the household seeks to maximise 
(2.1) 
subject to 
~ ( 1 ~ r) s ( Ct+s - Yt+s) = At 
where Et is the expectations operator (conditional on all information at time t ); 
6 and r are discount and interest rates respectively (both assumed constant); u(-) 
is the (strictly concave) instantaneous utility function; Ct is consumption; Yt is 
earnings; and At is physical assets. Hall solved the above problem to derive the 
following 'Euler equation': 
(2.2) 
where Et u'(ct+l) is the household's expectation of period t + 1 marginal utility of 
consumption formed in period t. Apart from studies which use instruments to try 
to estimate (2.1) directly (see below), most applied work follows Hall (1978), who 
postulated a quadratic utility function together with rational expectations. These 
assumptions yield the regression equation 
where 1 is a constant, and Et is a random error term. When the discount and 
interest rates coincide, 1 = 1, and consumption follows a random walk. 
A feature of the above equation is that only last period's consumption should 
help to predict current consumption; no other regressors placed on the right-hand 
side of a consumption equation should be significant. This is a strong proposition, 
tests of which are called 'exclusion tests'. That the clear majority of such tests 
reject the proposition, by finding all sorts of additional variables to be significant 
determinants of consumption, is widely acknowledged to be a decisive empirical 
failing of the REPIH (Speight (1990) and Hall 1989). In the words of Hall: "It is 
reasonably well established that the simple conclusion from the rational expectations 
17 
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permanent income model with constant expected real interest rates is inconsistent 
with the data: the rate of change of consumption can be predicted by past values 
of real income and past values of a number of financial variables" (p.172). Two 
examples, one taken from the US and the other from a UK study, may be quoted 
to illustrate the failure of the REPIH by exclusion tests. The US example is taken 
directly from Hall's (1978) seminal study itself, in which lagged values of the per 
capita market value of corporate stock, s, are added to the right-hand side of a 
real per capita consumption equation. Hall reported the result 
Ct = -22 + 1.012Ct-1 + 0.223st-1- 0.258st-2 + 0.167st-3- 0.120st-4 
(8) (0.004) (0.051) (0.083) (0.083) (0.051) 
1948(1)-1977(!); R2=0.999; se=14.4; DW=2.05. 
In the above, standard errors are given in parentheses; se is the standard error 
of the regression; and DW is the Durbin-Watson statistic2 • Clearly, lagged s values 
are significantly different from zero in this equation, so overturning the pure version 
of the REPIH. However, Hall rationalised these results by appealing to the idea 
that the lagged s values capture news-induced revisions to permanent income. 
This rationalisation can be sustained because the REPIH is based on the idea 
that last-period consumption embodies all systematic information about current 
consumption; if further information exists which is not picked up in Ct-1, then 
the REPIH may be modified by including variables in which the extra information 
inheres3 • 
There are many other studies which report exclusion test failure for the REPIH, 
as the surveys of Hadjimatheou (1987), Hall (1989), and Speight (1990) confirm4 • 
An early example from the UK is Daly and Hadjimatheou (1981 ), who added lagged 
and differenced values of income and assets, and also lagged values of consumption, 
to the right-hand side of the consumption autoregression. Three regressions were 
2 Which is not actually valid in this regression since a lagged dependent variable is used- Durbin's 
h-statistic is relevant here. 
3 See also Nelson (1987) concerning this rationalisation. 
4 See also Davidson and Hendry (1981) using UK data, Cuddington (1982) for Canada, and Johnson 
(1983) for Australia. 
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reported in which the additional variables were found singly and jointly to be sig-
nificant determinants of aggregate consumption. One example of these regressions 
is (with standard errors again in parentheses): 
Ct = 0.819Ct-1 + 0.219Ct-2 + 0.120Yt-1 - 0.149Yt-2 
(0.1) (0.1) (0.04) (0.04) 
1956(I)-1978(IV); R2=0.995; se=1.986; F(3,87)=4.66. 5 
In addition to these results, Daly and Hadjimatheou examined the variation 
of the autoregression coefficient 1 over different sample periods. Instability of this 
parameter casts further doubt on Hall's model. 
Exclusion tests are only one way of testing the model. Two other approaches 
which use time series data and which have proven popular include 'excess sensi-
tivity tests', and tests which estimate 'deep' (structural) parameters of the Euler 
equation (2.2). Excess sensitivity studies test an implication of the REPIH which 
suggests that anticipated changes in income are already captured by the autore-
gression process, and should therefore exert no influence on consumption over and 
above this. Investigations of this hypothesis typically d~compose 'anticipated' and 
'unanticipated' incomes from an autoregressive moving average representation of 
real income. Consumption is then regressed on both, and its sensitivity to the 
anticipated element is assessed. Studies typically find that, in contrast to REPIH, 
anticipated income plays a significant role in predicting consumption. Two early 
examples are Bilson (1980) and Flavin (1981 ), although Bilson uses questionable 
measures of income and consumption, and rather arbitrarily tacks on additional 
variables in the exclusion test regression. An interesting result in Flavin's paper is 
the marked divergence between observed consumption and that predicted by the 
REPIH. 
The third speCies of time senes REPIH test attempts to estimate directly 
parameters of the Euler equation (2.2) (ie without imposing restrictions on the form 
of the utility function u(ct)). The pioneering paper here is Hansen and Singleton 
5 The F-statistic tests the significance of extra parameters, against the null that they are insignifi-
ciantly different from zero. This F-statistic rejects the null. 
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(1982), which has since been followed by Mankiw, Rotemberg and Summers (1985) 
and Bean (1986), amongst others. Hansen and Singleton proposed a non-linear 
instrumental variables procedure, which is applied directly to the first order Euler 
condition. REPIH restrictions implicit in this condition are rejected by these 
authors. A similar result was obtained by Mankiw et al, who also tested whether 
the auxiliary REPIH assumption of consumption-leisure separability might be to 
blame for the negative results. Mankiw et afs conclusion was that this did not 
appear to be the case, hence suggesting that the empirical problems with REPIH 
go somewhat deeper. Bean also produced evidence rejecting REPIH restrictions. 
Tests of REPIH have also been undertaken using panel data, although these 
studies are not so numerous. Two examples here are Hall and Mishkin (1982) and 
Bernanke (1984). The idea behind Hall and Mishkin's study was to estimate the 
interest rate consistent with the consumption and income behaviour of members of 
the panel. A notable result was that unrealistic rates (for example, as high as 20%) 
were obtained, which suggests that problems with REPIH exist. A simple exclu-
sion test finding lagged differenced income a significant determinant of differenced 
consumption confirmed suspicions about problems with the REPIH. 
All of the evidence mentioned above tends to point to serious and pervasive 
problems with the REPIH. However, King (1985) has pointed out that tests of the 
REPIH are also tests of the modeller's choice of preference parameterisations. An 
example of the latter is the chosen form of the utility function. King's point is that 
it is possible that Hall's model is being rejected not because it is fundamentally 
wrong, but because it is being inappropriately specified. This point has been taken 
up by a large number of theorists, especially in the USA, and consequently several 
avenues of development have been actively explored. These include the modelling 
of information lags (Holden and Peel (1985), Wickens and Molana 1984), uncer-
tain, variable and stochastic interest rates (Wickens and Molana (1984), Mankiw 
1981); durability (Mankiw 1982); seasonality (Miron 1986); non-separability of 
preferences (Bernanke (1985), Mankiw et al (1985), Koenig 1990); transitory con-
sumption (Holden and Peel 1985 ); and liquidity constraints6 • However, the results 
of these studies tend to show that REPIH test failure cannot be easily blamed on 
weakness or inapplicability of auxiliary assumptions (see also Speight 1990, p.121 ). 
6 For an explanation and discussion about liquidity constraints, see Appendix A. 
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The overall conclusion must point towards problems which go to the heart of the 
REPIH. 
One problem which has not been much investigated 1ll empirical work is the 
limited nature of the REPIH utility function with respect to altruistic preferences. 
Hall specifies this as a (selfish) lifetime function, without any additional facility to 
render altruistic concern for descendants7 • However, if individuals are motivated 
by altruism, then the Euler equation model will be fundamentally mis-specified, 
because Hall's entire analysis is built up from his initial utility function. No amount 
of tinkering with auxiliary assumptions can overcome this problem since it does 
not address the fundamental cause of the mis-specification. The performance of 
the altruistic theory developed in this thesis may therefore hold some additional 
interest for researchers working within the Euler equation framework. 
7 Even if utility in Hall's model is summed to an infinite horizon, the model cannot sustain a con-
vincing intergenerational interpretation. Two parameters are required to weight future utilities, 
one for the individual and the other for his or her descendants. Hall only has one discount rate, 
and it is not feasible to suggest that this can perform a dual role. Setting the rate of tin1e prefer-
ence, {), equal to zero is unrealistic in an infinite horizon context, since it implies that individuals 
place practically no weight at all on their own utility relative to the combined utility of all of 
their ancestors. And with {) > 0, problems of intergenerational inconsistency arise in the sense of 
Kurz (1985). This is because discounting of descendants' utilities by an individual is unlikely to 
find favour with these same descendants - this engenders intergenerational conflict, and, in Kurz's 
terminology, an absence of a generationally consistent equilibrium. In any case, Hall's model under 
any interpretation cannot represent the distinctive aspect of intergenerational utility maxinlisation 
whereby mortal and partly selfish individuals form overlapping and interdependent dynastic chains. 
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2.2 The Hendry Modelling Methodology 
In an influential paper, Davidson et al (1978) presented a 'data-based' strategy 
for modelling consumer expenditure. This paper- the forerunner of a whole series8 
- espoused an approach which has come to be associated with the name of David 
Hendry in particular: in the following, this will be referred to as 'the Hendry 
approach'. 
The approach starts by positing that economic theory usually suggests long-run 
relationships between sets of key economic variables. However, it is assumed that 
data do not describe these relationships because consumers tend to be temporarily 
off their equilibrium paths: hence the data describes a disequilibrium manifestation 
of a presumed underlying pattern of behaviour. The novel feature of the Hendry 
approach is that the data themselves are used to estimate the precise form of the 
disequilibrium adjustment process. The econometrician is, at the outset, agnostic 
about both the variables of greatest explanatory importance and the lag structures 
which best describe the data. Initially, the econometrician must start with a rel-
atively large9 set of candidate explanatory variables in current and lagged form10 • 
A regression run at this stage, and regressions run at all subsequent stages of the 
process, are used by the researcher in the Hendry approach to identify the variables 
which are statistically insignificant determinants of the dependent variable: these 
variables are then be dropped and· re-estimation commences with the new set of 
explanatory variables. This process is called 'testing down'; and the entire search 
procedure is known as 'General to Specific modelling'. The final 'preferred' regres-
sion equation which emerges from this modelling exercise should ideally satisfy a 
list of criteria expounded in some detail by Hendry and Richard (1982): these in-
clude data coherency, parameter stability, consistency with the broad suppositions 
of underlying economic theory; and encompassment of previous studies and hence 
an explanation of their results11 • 
8 eg Davidson and Hendry (1981), Hendry and von Ungern-Sternberg (1981), von Ungern-Sternberg 
(1981), Hendry and Richard (1982), Hendry (1983). 
9 Large relative to the number of observations, for example. 
10 This set may also include lagged values of the dependent variable. 
11 In practice, however, it is not always to be expected that preferred equations satisfy all of these 
criteria; see McAleer et al ( 1985 ). 
22 
Ch II. Background to the Theory 
Davidson et al used quarterly data from 1958-1970 to estimate the UK con-
sumer expenditure ( Ct) function. The following is their 'parsimonious' preferred 
equation: 
(OLS: 1958(1)-1970(IV); R2 =0.77; s=0.0061; DW=1.80); where12 Yt is income; Pt 
is the implied consumption deflator; and Dt is a dummy variable for 1968(11). The 
above specification is an example of an Error Correction Model (ECM): this type of 
model allows agents to diverge from their 'long run' (equilibrium) plans in the short 
run, but has them continually adjusting towards their desired equilibrium paths. 
The term capturing the short run disequilibrium in the above is ln( C /Y)t-4; the 
presumed long run equilibrium (or steady state) relationship is Ct = kyt, where k 
is a constant. 
A somewhat arbitrary feature of the above equation is the presence of the 
inflation terms. The authors justify their inclusion on the basis of the improvement 
they make to empirical performance; they also appeal to the possibility of money 
illusion in the manner of Deaton (1977). However, this argument would tend 
to undermine the claims to a sound rationale which Davidson et al employed in 
constructing their ECM equation. 
It is important to note that the ECM is not the only admissable disequilibrium 
specification. A popular alternative (eg Hendry and von Ungern-Sternberg (1981), 
von Ungern-Sternberg 1981) is the 'integral correction mechanism' (ICM), which 
assumes consumers wish to maintain a given asset-income ratio, so being continu-
ally prepared to devote some portion of their current income to maintain the real 
value of their asset holdings. The term capturing the short run disequilibrium in 
this case is ln(W /Y), where W is assets. The ICM together with the ECM ensures 
that consumers always move towards stock as well as flow equilibrium. The von-
Ungern-Sternberg studies find that an ICM specification tends to be preferable 
to the ECM. This finding is supported by Carruth and Henley (1990) in a recent 
12 The standard errors for the regressors are, respectively, 0.04, 0.05, 0.02, 0.003. 0.07, and 0.15. 
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study: it is discussed briefly in the next section, where an example of an ICM is 
g1ven. 
Some additional work has been done on extending the ECM/ECM-ICM speci-
fications, eg treating capital gains and losses more thoroughly (Pesaran and Evans 
1984); stripping out non-household income from the measure of income used in the 
empirics (Borooah and Sharpe 1985); including proxies for constrained or uncertain 
income (Bean 1978); and allowing for distributional effects (Borooah and Sharpe 
198613 ). There has also been some work explicitly recognising potential observa-
tional equivalence between ECM and REPIH models. For example, Blinder and 
Deaton (1985) nested both models within a generalised specification, which also 
included a string of additional variables. In searching for the most acceptable con-
sumption function, variables were decomposed into anticipated and unanticipated 
components in the manner of REPIH 'excess sensitivity' tests (see the previous 
section). Some support was found for REPIH relative to the ECM-ICM model, 
although these results are sensitive to the decomposition technique and so may 
best be regarded as tentative. Bean (1986) adopted a different encompassing tech-
nique, and found that both models were special cases without either being entirely 
satisfactory on their own (see also Davidson and Hendry 1981). 
It is fair to say that, despite subsequent modifications of the sort mentioned 
above, and despite some empirical setbacks, the general Hendry approach has 
gained widespread support in this country, especially with forecasting bodies like 
the London Business School. The philosophy of data-based specification searches 
seems to have established itself quite widely, a trend which may come to be 
strengthened further with the advent of cointegration techniques (see the next 
section). However, acceptance of the Hendry approach has not been unanimous, 
on both methodological and empirical grounds. The empirical shortcomings of the 
approach are mentioned briefly in the next section, in the context of recent U. K. 
work on the consumption function. The rest of this section discusses some of the 
methodological objections which can be levelled at the general Hendry approach. 
In a recent paper, Darnell (1989) launched a powerful attack on the methodol-
ogy of the Hendry approach. A central point made by Darnell is that the Hendry 
13 Using annual data. 
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approach is 'verificationist' not 'falsificationist ': that is, evidence is used not to test 
theories, but theories are used to account for empirical results. Apart from adding 
nothing to our understanding about which theories explain the world best14 , this 
approach is open to the charge of 'measurement without theory'. The role of theory 
according to the Hendry approach is either to provide a post-hoc rationalisation 
of results, or to suggest candidates for the opening list of explanatory variables. 
There is a substantial element of subjective judgement in the specification of the 
'starting variables', something which tends to be overlooked by followers of the 
Hendry approach. This would not perhaps be so troublesome were it not for the 
fact that it is critical to the whole approach in that the starting point in general to 
specific searches tends to determine the finishing point (ie the preferred equation). 
The concealment of judgment used to select the starting variables is but one 
example of hypotheses being 'present in disguise and not directly tested'. Other ex-
amples include the 'testing down' process, which also involves making judgements 
which are not fully explained; the choice of lag lengths on explanatory variables; 
and the chosen balance between unlagged explanatory variables and lags at the 
start, for any given number of degrees of freedom. Furthermore, Darnell criticises 
the use of lags on at least two separate grounds. Firstly, the inclusion of lags 
in the general-to-specific process may conceal the influence of certain explanatory 
variables whose importance becomes apparent later on in the modelling. Secondly, 
and perhaps more fundamentally, the entire hypothesis of consumer disequilibrium 
- which underpins the Hendry approach - is assumed but never directly tested. 
Even if the assumption is accurate, it is still not clear that the inclusion of lags 
into macroeconomic regression equations is a satisfactory way of modelling it. Far 
better would be a rigorous and above all testable economic theory of optimisation 
in a disequilibrium setting. 
In this thesis, we follow Darnell's prescription of avoiding a data-based ap-
proach to consumption. We do this by constructing and testing a model based 
purely on economic theory. Following Darnell's methodology, our search for im-
provements to the model can be directed by sound theoretical considerations rather 
than ad hoc econometric experimentation. 
14 The approach also cannot rigorously explain why particular equations work or break down. 
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2.3 Some Recent Work on the UK Consumption Function 
It was argued in the previous section that the theoretical foundations of the 
Hendry methodology are so loose that sound empirical performance is the principal 
justification for the preferred equations it generates; a factor which is investigated 
below. At first, diagnostic tests run on error correction equations seemed to indi-
cate data coherency both within and outside the sample period (see eg Davidson 
and Hendry 1981 ). However, a number of more recent studies have begun to cast 
doubt on the empirical success of the ECM approach. This section briefly considers 
a few of these studies. 
The studies can be assorted into two mam categories. The first type use 
standard econometric diagnostic statistics to test if the simple ECM model ex-
hibits parameter stability and forecasts well outside its sample. The second type 
utilises recently developed cointegration techniques to test whether the 'equilib-
rium' manifestation of the Davidson et al model is supported by the data - ie 
whether consumption and income cointegrate. We first briefly discuss examples of 
the first type of studies, and then proceed to explain the ideas behind cointegration 
and two studies which use it. We spend some time explaining the econometrics 
of cointegration because, apart from being necessary for the understanding of the 
studies discussed in this section, it is utilised later in this thesis for testing the 
IGH. 
Of the studies using standard diagnostic testing procedures, two important re-
cent examples are Carruth and Henley (1990) and Currie, Holly and Scott (1989a). 
Carruth and Henley observed reasonable tracking behaviour for a standard ECM 
equation until the late 1980's, when the unpredicted and sustained decline in the 
U. K. personal savings ratio occurred. These authors also observed that the dra-
matic and prolonged divergence of consumption growth from income growth raised 
fundamental questions about the feasibility of an ECM which proposed transience 
of consumer disequilibrium. This doubt was borne out in tests of ECM equations 
which failed standard empirical stability tests based on data from these years. 
For example, a forecast x2(8) test statistic relating to the Davidson et al model 
was found by Carruth and Henley to take a value of 46.9, which lies considerably 
above the tabulated x2 statistic at 5% with 8 degrees of freedom. Carruth and 
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Henley first tested a Currie Holly and Scott (1989a) specification, which suggested 
that empirical failure of ECM equations might be caused by omitted variables, 
including the post-tax interest rate, the real value of the housing stock, and the 
age distribution15 • Carruth and Henley found that the Currie Holly and Scott 
specification did not perform satisfactorily, and so searched elsewhere for potential 
sources of improvement. They ultimately recommended the use of a Hendry and 
von-Ungern Sternberg (1981) ICM model, where real net wealth (which includes 
housing wealth) rather than liquid assets appears in the integral correction term. 
The following is their favoured equation16 : 
~Ct = 0.0284 + 0.5772~Yt- 0.2486~ 2Yt- 0.2360(c- Y)t-1 
0.0213(w- Y)t-3- 0.0298~rrt + 0.1339~Wt-2 + 0.0240~d7301 
- 0.0246~d7901 
OLS 1969(11)-1985(IV); R2=0.6833; DW=2.11; x2(12)=10.80; FI(12,54)=0.69; 
F2(7,40)=0.10; H(16,37)=1.497. 
In the above17 , lower case letters indicate logarithms; y is income adjusted for 
capital gains/losses; w is real wealth; rr is the real post-tax rate of interest; and 
the tld terms are dummy variables. Of the diagnostic tests, x2 is a Chow forecast 
test; F1 is a Chow parameter stability test; F2 is a test for residual autocorrelation; 
and H is a test for heteroschedasticity. The latter three test statistics are all dis-
tributed as F. The performance of this specification is clearly excellent; a similarly 
good one was derived for unadjusted data. Carruth and Henley concluded that 
breakdowns in performance of Hendry-type equations may not therefore require 
completely new specifications: existing specifications are capable of explaining 
consumer expenditure, even in the singular years of the late 1980's. 
Apart from Carruth and Henley and Currie Holly and Scott, other authors 
have attempted to rectify poor empirical performance within a standard dynamic 
modelling framework. Much of this work echoes Currie Holly and Scott's belief that 
15 where the latter factor is measured by the decline in the proportion of the population in the 45-64 
age group. 
16 This is based on seasonally adjusted data; they also produced a regression using unadjusted data. 
17 standard errors of the coefficients are, in turn, 0.01, 0.09, 0.06, 0.09, 0.01, 0.01, 0.02, 0.01, 0.01. 
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omitted variables may be the cause of diagnostic test failure of existing Hendry-
type equations. For example, Hendry et al (1989) have proposed adding further 
variables to the consumption function, including liquidity constraints, a measure 
of the increased fungibility of (especially illiquid) assets resulting from financial 
deregulation in the 1980's, and changes in expectations about permanent income 
in this decade as a consequence of sustained real growth and cuts in tax rates. And, 
as we shall shortly see, Drobny and Hall (1989) have followed the same route within 
a cointegration framework. It would probably be fair to conclude our discussion 
of these studies by noting that searching for omitted variables in this way is likely 
to continue to be a popular avenue for future research. 
We turn now to the cointegration studies, of which Drobny and Hall (1989) and 
Molana (1991) are the two most prominent recent examples in the UK. Broadly 
speaking, the basic idea behind cointegration (Engle and Granger 1987) is that 
an equilibrium relationship between a set of variables means that these variables 
should track each other closely over time, with no tendency for them to diverge. It 
does not matter whether these variables are trended over time (ie nonstationary), 
or stationary; what matters is that the 'equilibrium error' of the regression of these 
variables is stationary. A stationary variable is said to be integrated of order zero, 
written I(O); if stationarity is only induced after first differencing a variable, then 
that variable is said to be I( 1). This idea generalises to higher orders of integration. 
The first task of the applied researcher in this framework is to examine the time 
series properties of the data. If the variables hypothesised to form the equilibrium 
relationship do not trend in the same way over time, then the idea of a stable 
relationship between them becomes hard to sustain. Hence the first task is to 
test whether all of the variables are integrated of the same order. If they are, a 
regression - called a cointegrating regression - is run on these variables, and the 
error term is tested for 1(0). The rationale for this second task is that it is quite 
possible for variables to trend in the same way, but not to hold together over time. 
The 1(0) test of the residuals tests whether the variables do hold together over 
time. If 1(0) residuals are found, the variables in question are said to cointegrate. 
The above two tests can be easily implemented in practice. The tests are 
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structured as follows: for any variable X, the t-statistic of 1ro in the regression 
1s compared with critical values tabulated by Fuller (1976) ( Ut is a stochastic 
error term). This statistic is called a Dickey Fuller (DF) statistic; if its absolute 
value exceeds the tabulated critical value, then the null hypothesis of X being 
nonstationary is rejected. This test is usually supplemented by the augmented 
regressiOn 
p 
~Xt = 1l"QXt-1 + L 1ri~Xt-j + Ut' 
j=l 
where p lags of the first difference of X are added when the system displays marked 
serial correlation. The test statistic corresponding to this regression is called an 
augmented Dicky-Fuller statistic (ADF). The DF statistic is less powerful than 
the ADF when the lags in the latter are significant; however, it is more efficient 
when they are not. When conducting a unit root test, ie a test of the order 
of integration of a single variable, the tabulated values of the DF and the ADF 
statistic are identical. However, when investigating whether the error term of a 
cointegrating regression is 1(0), the tabulated critical values differ, depending on 
the number of variables in the regression 18 • 
An example relating to the UK consumption function should help to fix these 
ideas. In a recent paper, Drobny and Hall (1989) used cointegration techniques to 
re-evaluate the performance of the favoured Davidson et al (1978) equation. The 
authors first demonstrated the failure by this equation of a standard forecasting 
test over the first five years of the 1980's; they then went on to show that the set 
of variables used by Davidson et al do not cointegrate over the period in ques-
tion (1966(IV)-1985(IV) ). ADF statistics for cointegrating regressions including 
log income, differenced log income, differenced log prices and a constant, failed to 
reach their critical values. In fact, excluding the constant term as in Davidson et 
al (1978), the ADF statistic was found never to exceed -2.06 - compared with a 
critical value of about -4.00 at 5% significance when four variables comprise the 
18 Other tests to investigate integration and cointegration also exist, including those of Phillips ( 1987) 
and Johansen (1988). These were not available to the author in a computer package at the time 
the thesis was submitted: see my note on page 6 and Parker ( 1992). 
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cointegrating regression19 . Hence the regression residuals were not 1(0), and so 
cointegration did not hold. Drobny and Hall took this to suggest that an im-
portant determinant of consumption had been omitted. A factor whose inclusion 
restored the property of cointegration to the equation was the income distribu-
tion20 as proxied by a tax differential variable, called TAX. Their most successful 
regression, which also included wealth, W, and a dummy variable D for announced 
VAT changes, was 
lnCt = 0.962ln yt + 0.061ln(W/Y)t + 0.244TAX + 0.005D. 
OLS: 1966(IV)-1985(IV); R 2 =0.977; CRDW=1.57; DF=-6.92; ADF=-3.3521 . 
Since there are five variables in this regression, the Engle and Yoo (1987) tables 
give the 5% critical values for DF and ADF with a sample size of 100 as -4.58 and 
-4.36 respectively. Hence the DF statistic suggests cointegration, although the 
ADF does not. However, the CRDW statistic exceeds the critical value of 0.28 
(also published in Engle and Yoo 1987), which supports the case that the above 
model exhibits cointegration. Finally, Drobny and Hall exploited a result known 
as Granger's 'Representation Theorem' (Engle and Granger 1987), which shows 
that a cointegrating regression always has a valid ECM representation. Drobny 
and Hall generated an ECM equation from their cointegrating regression, which 
exhibited parameter stability and fitted the data well. 
Drobny and Hall (1989) is therefore another example of a study which follows 
the recent trend of identifying mis-specification of earlier ECM equations, and 
then rectifying the problem by suggesting a hitherto omitted variable. The power 
of the cointegration framework for conducting this sort of exercise derives from 
its ability to avoid complex dynamic lag structures of the type produced by the 
Hendry methodology, which may conceal omitted variables (see the discussion at 
then end of section 2.2, with reference to Darnell1989). To be sure, it is possible to 
19 See Engle and Yoo ( 1987). 
20 See Appendix C. 
21 CRDW is the cointegrating regression Durbin-Watson statistic, which is another cointegration test 
statistic. A CRDW significantly greater than zero implies stationary residuals; unfortunately, tabu-
lated critical values are sparse. Standard errors are often not reported for cointegrating regressions 
because normal hypothesis testing is invalid with non-stationary series. 
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go on and use the residuals of a successful cointegrating vector in an ECM model, 
as the Granger Representation Theorem establishes; but the dynamic search which 
results has a valid equilibrium model underlying it, which is not necessarily present 
if the modeller constructs an ECM model without testing for cointegration first. 
The second example of the application of cointegration techniques to the UK 
consumption function is a paper by Molana (1991 ). This study is of additional 
interest to us in this thesis, because it is one of the models against which the 
IGH is ultimately tested (albeit with a different functional form). Molana argued 
that the utility function may contain wealth, w, as an argument as well as con-
sumption: that is, the utility function is u( c, w) rather than just u( c) of equation 
(2.1). The argument here is that wealth may be desired for its own sake, as well 
as for facilitating consumption purchases. Reasons for this may include the role 
of wealth in reducing anxiety about uncertain future labour income and liquidity 
constraints. In much the same way as Hall, Molana derived an Euler equation 
for his generalised model, in which consumption is no longer a random walk but 
accepts wealth as a determinant. Molana's model also difers from ECM equations 
since his model suggests wealth rather than income, which ECM equations tend 
to regard as the principal independent variable. 
The problem for Molana was to show that consumption cointegrates with 
wealth, which would support his model, and not income, as in Davidson et at's 
model. We have already seen how Drobny and Hall discovered that consumption 
and income do not cointegrate; this Molana confirmed using the (puzzlingly short) 
sample period 1966(IV)-1981(IV): 
In Ct = 0.969 + 0. 734ln Yt 
OLS: 1966(IV)-1981(IV); R2 =0.860; CRDW=2.30; DF=-8.77; ADF=-2.17. 
The ADF statistic suggests I(1) residuals and hence no cointegration. Interest-
ingly, Molana also found initially that consumption and wealth do not cointegrate: 
ln Ct = -0.662 + 0.690 ln Wt 
OLS: 1966(IV)-1981(IV); R2 =0.390; CRDW=0.83; DF=-3.42; ADF=-1.22. 
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That this result is so destructive to Molana's theory would seem to cast con-
siderable doubt on it (a similarly negative result is also derived in chapter 5 of this 
thesis). However, Molana went on to search for other ways of testing for cointe-
gration, until he found one, due to Campbell (1987), which supported his theory. 
An ADF statistic of -3.54 was produced which suggests cointegration between con-
sumption and wealth. An acceptable ECM (disequilibrium) relationship based on 
this was also generated; hence Molana concluded that the evidence supported his 
model. 
There are actually several awkward questions thrown up by Molana's empirics, 
including the surprisingly short sample period given the availability of nearly a 
decade more data at the time of the submission of his final typescript. Hence 
further tests of Molana's model need to be carried out to see if his results are sample 
specific. Furthermore, his choice of ignoring the negative result he obtained in the 
OLS cointegrating regression is somewhat disturbing. Johansen (1988) has recently 
developed a technique for examining multiple cointegrating vectors: it is possible 
to show that in a bivariate model such as Molana considers, the OLS cointegrating 
vector is unique: multiple cointegrating vectors will not occur. Yet this is precisely 
what Molana suggests is happening when he adopts another approach designed to 
maximise the absolute value of the ADF statistic. Hence the failure of Molana's 
OLS cointegrating regression is a damaging result, which requires explanation. 
So what do all these recent empirical studies tell us about the UK consumption 
function? They are all fairly positive in outlook, insofar as they suggest new 
specifications which correct some empirical shortcoming, and which all seem to 
satisfy the diagnostic testing of their originators. However, it is hard not to be 
dismayed by the apparent fragility of many of these econometric specifications. The 
tendency of models to break down in the face of new phenomena not anticipated 
by their creators is no doubt largely responsible for the vogue of suggesting new, 
hitherto omitted, variables for inclusion in 'standard' consumption regressions. 
The fact that the 'standard' also varies over time is another worrying feature of 
modern applied work on the consumption function. Perhaps twenty years ago, 
the standard, or 'conventional' model would include one or more of (permanent) 
income, wealth, inflation, and assorted other terms, with only limited dynamics; 
following the seminal Davidson et al (1978) study, it became increasingly associated 
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with dynamic ECM specifications. Now the ground seems to be shifting again, with 
growing interest in cointegration techniques. What this prolonged state of flux may 
be telling us is that we are still no nearer to possessing a definitive function relating 
consumption to a few important independent variables. 
It is important to bear in mind, however, that the studies discussed in this sec-
tion are almost entirely empirically based. This begs the question of the reliability 
of the data used in specification searches. However, only relatively little attention 
has been paid to this issue. A notable exception is Borooah and Sharpe (1985), 
who observed that whereas economic theory relates to the individual, published 
CSO data refers to the entire personal sector, which includes unincorporated busi-
nesses, and life assurance ~nd pension funds as well as households. They noted that 
the behaviour of unincorporated companies, for instance, cannot be expected to 
match that of households. So there appears to be a risk of applying faulty data to 
(possibly correct) theory, with the consequent risk of mis-specification bias. How-
ever, this argument did not stand up to an investigation by Currie et al (1989b), 
who could only attribute a part of the decline in the personal sector's saving ratio 
to the activities of the non-household sector. And the effect of mismeasurement 
was found in the same paper to be of marginal importance. However, the problem 
of poor or questionable data sources will be one which will occupy much of our 
attention in the empirical work in this thesis. 
Another point to note about the recent studies considered here is that they all 
relate to the case of the UK. Given the continuing emphasis on testing the REPIH 
in the USA, it is tempting to suggest an Atlantic divide in emphasis, with British 
research tending to focus on empirical structure, and American research tending to 
concentrate on a (particular) theoretical basis. The limitations of the REPIH have 
already been mentioned in section 2.1; these include the neglect by that model of 
altruistic motives. It therefore seems appropriate for us to turn our attention to 
an unique model which attempts to remedy that neglect. 
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2.4 The Consumption Model of Baskin and Kotlikoff 
An attempt to model aggregate consumption using an altruism hypothesis 
has been undertaken by Boskin and Kotlikoff (1985)22 • These authors' model of 
altruism is based on that of Bernheim and Bagwell (1985, 1988)23 , which postulates 
that ties of blood and marriage can bond seemingly disparate and unconnected 
altruists together in large groups or 'clans'. Boskin and Kotlikoff take this idea to 
its logical conclusion, by suggesting that an entire economy may be regarded as 
one utility-maximising clan, with a single objective function and budget constraint. 
The latter is described by the period-by-period evolution of the private sector's 
total net worth; the former is written as 
oo D 
Ut = Et 2:: 2:: Cl.7 Pt+r,a8au( Ct+r,a), 
r=Oa=O 
(2.3) 
where a is a discount factor; D is maximum longevity; P is the number of family 
members of age a ; 8a are age-specific utility weights; and T indexes generations. 
The government may be endogenised by adding the government budget constraint 
to that of the private sector. 
Boskin and Kotlikoff's optimisation problem is essentially quite similar to that 
of Hall (1978) (compare (2.1) and (2.3)), with the obvious difference that what is 
taken as a family member by the latter is regarded as an entire economic group 
in the former. Retaining Hall's assumption of stochastic earnings and using a 
stochastic interest rate, the authors derive 1) a stochastic Euler equation for con-
sumption; and 2) a dynamic equation for the economy's total net worth. These 
two equations describe the evolution of private sector consumption and assets over 
time, but they do not give rise to an analytical representation of consumption as 
a function of net worth. That is, Boskin and Kotlikoff cannot derive a tractable 
consumption function from their analysis. Instead, they have to use the technique 
of dynamic programming to solve for numerical values of consumption 'one by one' 
over time. They do this by exploiting the fact that a particular value of consump-
tion implies a particular value of total net assets, and vice-versa; by picking a point 
22 See also Auerbach, Cai and Kotlikoff (1991 ), who adapt this model in order to simulate the US 
economy. 
23 See also Kotlikoff (1989). 
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in time far in the future, a particular configuration of consumption and assets can 
generate previous-period consumption and assets sequentially all the way back to 
the present day. In fact, Baskin and Kotlikoff's estimates of the former, denoted 
Ct, provide the following means for testing their altruism hypothesis. 
If Baskin and Kotlikoff's model is correct, then a regression of actual consump-
tion values Ct on their estimates C't should produce a unit coefficient on the latter 
and no intercept. Furthermore, variables proxying the possible effect of the age-
income distribution should not be significant regressors, because the altruistic clans 
of Bernheim and Bagwell are hypothesised to react to any distributional changes 
by effecting offsetting transfers. Therefore, if Si ( i = 1, ... , m) are the age-income 
shares of age groups i, and if the regression 
m 
E( Ct) = !31 + f32Ct + L Ai Si,t (2.4) 
i=l 
is run, Baskin and Kotlikoff require /31 = 0, /32 = 1, and V>.i = 0. However, when 
Baskin and Kotlikoff estimated (2.4) on annual US data (1968-1984), they found 
that all of these restrictions were violated. 
Although this result would seem to reject the Baskin and Kotlikoff model, there 
might be other, less damaging, explanations. Baskin and Kotlikoff were quick to 
point out that it was the precise specification of their model rather than the hy-
pothesis of altruism per se which could be rejected. For instance, their treatment 
of uncertainty could have been at fault: specifically, they assumed that current 
and future populations and age distributions are known with certainty. They also 
modelled earnings and the interest rate as a simple bivariate lagged structure with 
stochastic components: it is quite possible that this too could give misleading re-
sults. However, while these drawbacks may have had some role to play, there must 
be considerable doubt about the realism of the underlying Bernheim-Bagwell altru-
ism hypothesis. The suggestion that agents are both altruistic and well-informed 
enough to form large and well-behaved clans was felt by Bernheim and Bagwell 
themselves to be so far-fetched that they used it as a critique of Barra's (1974) 
Debt Neutrality Proposition24 • 
24 Specifically, they asked: If agents can offset distributional changes by intergenerational altruism 
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To conclude, the Baskin and Kotlikoff model is an imaginative attempt to test 
the 'super altruism' hypothesis of Bernheim and Bagwell. However, this model 
evidently suffers from some important drawbacks. These include, principally, its 
failure to produce a tractable, 'closed form' consumption function and the fact 
that it is based on an unrealistic altruism hypothesis. As will be seen below, the 
IGH expounded in this thesis claims to be able to produce a tractable consumption 
function, derived from a widely accepted hypothesis of altruism, and based on a 
rigorous treatment of intergenerational preferences. 
(as in Barro), can they not offset distributional changes int.ragenerationally as well via an extended 
type of altruism? The 'super neutrality' this would give rise to, as well as the type of altruism 
suggested, appear to be so intrinsically unrealistic, that this forms the core of their critique. See 
also Barro (1989) for a criticism of the clan hypothesis. 
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2.5 Conclusions 
This chapter has summarised several recent developments in the consumption 
literature. A wide variety of studies have been discussed, ranging from the purely 
theoretical to the purely empirical. The purpose of the chapter was to provide 
a brief description of the current state of knowledge in the field, as well as to 
introduce concepts and models which will be referred to later in the thesis. Of 
the modelling techniques to be used later, cointegration is the principal example; 
Hall's pure REPIH and Molana's wealth-augmented REPIH are the most impor-
tant studies to be considered and tested in the thesis. 
Having provided a brief description of the current state-of-the-art, what over-
all conclusions (if any) can be drawn from it? Opinions here vary, but many 
researchers would surely concur with Speight who summed up a recent survey of 
the consumption literature thus: 
"The resurgence of theoretical and empirical interest in consumption determination and the 
consumption function that followed the publication of Hall (1978) and Davidson et al (1978) con-
tinues. However the question of the theoretically appropriate and empirically valid representation 
of consumption behaviour is probably as unanswered as at any time in the history of thought 
on the issue. In short, the REPIH is strongly theoretically founded but lacks sufficient empirical 
support to be accepted without modification, while the ECM approach has a strong empirical 
foundation but a rather loosely-specified, non-commital theoretical basis. This contrast reflects 
a difference of purpose, the ECM approach being geared towards the tracking and forecasting of 
aggregate consumption behaviour, the REPIH seeking to 'explain' consumption determination 
theoretically, and appealing to empirical evidence for support." (1990, p.186) 
The difference in purpose to which Speight alludes makes for a rather confusing 
and inchoate state of affairs. Judging by the content of the continuing output of 
research in the field, there seems to be a distinct lack of unity and direction. With 
a few notable exceptions, work tends to be grouped into a few broad, and almost 
mutually exclusive, categories corresponding roughly to the breakdown into the 
sub-sections of this survey chapter. Thus, one tends to find papers concerned with 
modifying Hall's REPIH (section 2.1); or applying data-based techniques to search 
for data-coherent empirical specifications (section 2.2); or applying cointegration 
techniques to examine the long-run properties of established models (section 2.3). 
There are also new theoretical models, although these are rarer - an example is 
the Baskin and Kotlikoff model discussed in section 2.4. The few exceptions to 
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the current practice of specialising in one of these categories tend to heed Hendry 
and Richard's (1982) injunction to comparatively test models and search for new 
ones which encompass them (ie account for their past success or failure). Studies 
conducting nested tests of this sort between the REPIH and ECM models were 
briefly mentioned in section 2.2: they include Blinder and Deaton (1985) and Bean 
(1986). There is also a study by Muellbauer and Baver (1986) which tries to link 
these two models theoretically. However, it should be stressed that these studies 
are definitely exceptions to the general rule of proceeding to generate new results 
without trying to account for studies grounded in a different approach. 
In the UK, the trend of producing purely empirical studies seems to be gaining 
strength. As noted in section 2.3, studies of this sort tend to augment Hendry-type 
equations with omitted variables. The author would like to make two comments 
here. Firstly, he llotes the lack of unanimity about the perceived usefulness and 
robustness of specifications which include previously omitted variables. Secondly, 
he observes this overall empirical trend with no little disquiet. Several method-
ological objections to the Hendry approach have already been rehearsed in section 
2.2: these include the replacement of falsificationism with verificationism; the sec-
ondary role of theory in the approach; and the presence of hidden, but potentially 
powerful, hypotheses. Of these, the author regards the subjugation of theory to 
empirics as the most invidious feature of the approach, and believes it to be re-
sponsible for its documented failure on its own (ie empirical) grounds (see section 
2.3 for evidence). We believe its empirical failings arise from its choice of replac-
ing understanding of economic processes, via theory, with mechanical econometric 
search routines. For example, Darnell (1989) argues that it is quite possible for 
econometricians using the Hendry approach to concoct a specification which passes 
whole batteries of diagnostic tests but which does not recognise a genuine break-
down in the underlying hypothesised relationship. This author believes that the 
best and most enlightening way forward is to return to theoretical basics, with an 
emphasis on the generation of testable, ie falsifiable, hypotheses. In presenting the 
IGH, this thesis aims to follow just this course. 
What of the technique of cointegration, described in section 2.3? This tech-
nique provides, on one hand, an unusually powerful and efficient means of testing 
and falsifying theories. Later, in chapter 5 of the thesis, it is used for this very 
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purpose. However, in common with Darnell and Evans (1991), the author believes 
that there is also a darker side to the technique, in that it can be used like other 
test procedures in the Hendry style to verify rather than falsify theories. Some 
authors are quite candid about their use of the technique in this manner, eg Hall 
et al (1990) in their modelling of UK monetary aggregates. Thus the procedure of 
searching for equation specifications with minimal reference to theory looks set to 
continue, at least in the UK. 
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Chapter III 
The IGH 
3.1 Assumptions of the Model 
The exposition of the IGH commences with a list of assumptions, given below. 
The assumptions, which are stated and evaluated one by one, are arranged in 
two groups. Members of the first group are commonly invoked by a variety of 
optimising models, especially those relating to consumer behaviour. Members of 
the second group are more specific to the IGH, although many of these have also 
been used in other consumption theories. 
Group I: General preliminary assumptions 
1. Individuals are rational utility maximisers. Although this assumption is 
fairly standard in most areas of economic theory, some economists regard it with 
scepticism. The (somewhat limited) evidence on its realism is mixed. Johnson 
et al (1987), for example, found that many of their human experimental subjects 
were unable to make coherent and consistent consumption planning decisions when 
they were placed in an hypothetical life-cycle environment. This suggestion of ir-
rationality backs up earlier work by Diamond (1977), which suggested that elderly 
Americans persistently under-save for retirement, thereby exhibiting irrationality1 • 
The rationality assumption is maintained in the IGH because of the current dearth 
of alternative assumptions which are as simple and convenient to work with. One 
such alternative worth mentioning is due to Thaler and Sheffrin (1981 ), who hy-
pothesise that individuals have essentially dual personalities. That is, a 'higher 
order' self recognises the advantages of acting as a utility maximiser; but a 'lower 
order' self, more mindful of the benefits of immediate gratification, hijacks the 
ambitions of the higher order self. A self-control problem then ensues (see also 
Etzioni (1987), Schelling (1984) and Elster (1982), for example). However, as this 
1 However, Kotlikoff et al (1982) were able to overturn Diamond's findings empirically. 
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sort of modelling deserves a thesis in its own right, the standard assumption seems 
reasonable here. 
2. Two-stage budgeting exists, whereby individuals allocate expendi-
tures to a single 'composite good' in the first instance, and then to 
individual 'goods' or sub-groups of goods. At this second stage, sub-
utility functions are weakly intertemporally separable. This assumption 
also tends to be invoked by most aggregate theories, not just the IGH. Abstrac-
tion from issues such as the composition of consumption and the relative prices 
of individual goods and services sacrifices detail for both greater simplicity and 
tractability. 
3. Individuals' 'own' intertemporal utilities are strongly (additively) 
separable. A common functional form applies to all individuals of all 
generations: that is, tastes and preferences are homogenous and con-
stant over time. The real subjective rate of time preference (which is 
positive) is denoted p and is also common to all individuals of all gener-
ations. This assumption is also fairly standard: it facilitates the use of a simple 
utility function from which (given suitable additional assumptions) optimal plans 
can be readily solved. The restriction of constant tastes simplifies the analysis 
considerably, though at what cost is uncertain; it does however seem intuitively 
likely that tastes do not remain fixed over lifetimes, but develop and evolve en-
dogenously. Unfortunately, models of endogenously changing tastes2 are as yet 
insufficiently developed to bear direct application to a theory such as the one de-
veloped below. A further interesting possibility in the context of this thesis is that 
altruism itself has changed over time. For example, Auerbach and Kotlikoff (1989) 
have suggested that the decline of the family in the US since the Second World 
War may have reduced peoples' tastes for bequests. 
4. Leisure not defined by the consumption of goods and services IS 
ignored. This assumption is intended to simplify the analysis of decision-making, 
admittedly at some cost to realism. A more general theory would recognise that 
rational individuals not only aim to allocate their resources optimally over their 
lifetimes, but that they also aim to allocate their time optimally between work and 
2 See, for example, Hammond (1976), Peleg and Yaari (1973). 
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leisure. Since resources are related to the amount of work undertaken, there will 
in practice be some interdependence between consumption and work decisions3 . 
5. A single 'perfect' financial asset exists, which bears a single, constant, 
and non-negative real interest rater, which applies for both borrowing 
and lending. The intragenerational capital market for this asset is per-
fect: there are no liquidity constraints over individuals' lifetimes. This 
assumption appears regularly in neoclassical consumption models. Concerning the 
constancy of the interest rate, there is some debate in the context of Hall's (1978) 
Euler equation model4 about whether this assumption is a reasonable one. The 
evidence on this question (reviewed by Hall 1989) is mixed. However, most im-
portantly, Blinder (1974) has demonstrated that extending a generalised life cycle 
optimisation model to include a time-variable interest rate does not substantially 
alter any of the results derived with a fixed interest rate. It may therefore be fair 
to conjecture that a constant interest rate will also do little damage to the IGH. 
Rather less satisfactory is the assumption of perfect intragenerational capital mar-
kets. Imperfections range from post-tax wedges between lending and borrowing 
rates5 , to the existence of liquidity constraints. The latter phenomenon in partic-
ular (which is explained and discussed more fully in Appendix A) has attracted a 
great deal of interest in the literature to date. 
6. Labour income is exogenous: labour supply is constrained at some 
fixed level. Hence individuals make decisions about their consumption paths only; 
their earnings paths are fixed. This assumption conveniently removes any possible 
interdependence between consumption and work decisions (see Assumption 4). 
Group II: Specific IGH assumptions 
7. Individuals derive utility not only from their own consumption, but 
also from the utility of their offspring. However, they do not derive 
utility from the welfare of other friends or relations; and their utility is 
3 For evidence against consumption-leisure separability, see eg Deaton and Muellbauer (1980, chapter 
5) and Mankiw, Rotemberg and Summers (1985). 
4 See Section 2 .1. 
5 Flemming (1973), Pissarides (1978), King (1986), Altig and Davis (1989). 
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also unaffected by government expenditure, or by the mere possession 
of wealth. The altruistic utility function assumed here belongs to the 'one-way 
non-paternalistic' class. This is the most common type of altruistic utility function 
in general usage. 'One-way' in this context means that parents derive satisfaction 
from the utility of their children, even though this regard is not reciprocated6 • By 
'non-paternalistic' is meant that the utility rather than the resources or consump-
tion of others promotes happiness in the altruist. In defence of this specification 
of the utility function, it may be remarked that non-paternalistic functions seem 
intuitively more plausible than paternalistic functions (Ray 1987); there may also 
be problems of dynamic consistency with the latter (Goldman 1980). Furthermore, 
the one-way form has definite advantages of tractability over more complicated two-
way7 and multi-altruist8 forms. It is also the case that the one-way parent-to-child 
form captures a particularly important class of transfer9 ; hence the particular one-
way utility function used in the IGH may be a reasonably happy trade-off between 
tractability and a realistic representation of altruistic preferences. Another feature 
of the assumption is the non-appearance of government spending in individuals' 
utility functions. This is the rule rather than the exception in the consumption 
literature10 and seems reasonable for our purposes. The treatment of inter vivos 
gifts to friends is a little more troublesome. Inter vivos gifts must be treated as 
a form of consumption, motivated by selfish impulses. This is perhaps not com-
pletely satisfactory in view of the evidence of Cox and Raines (1985), who claimed 
that this class of transfer is the predominant form of familial transfers among 
adults. However, there seems little alternative to this assumption without sacrific-
ing the convenience of the one-way utility function; note also the counter-evidence 
of Japelli and Pagano (1989) disputing the importance of gifts inter vivos. 
6 The other obvious one-way function has children behaving altruistically towards their parents 
without reciprocity. If only one altruistic channel could be chosen, it would be likely that the child-
parent channel would be rejected, for reasons associated with the Selfish Gene thesis of Dawkins 
(1989). According to this thesis, gene maximisation in many anin1als requires investment in children 
by parents rather than vice-versa (p.107). Note further that 'forced' child-parent transfers have 
been progressively reduced in most western countries by the simultaneous decline of the extended 
family and the rise of the Welfare State (so relieving many children of the burden of looking after 
their parents in old age). 
7 eg Carmichael (1979), Burbidge (1983), Kimball (1987). 
8 eg Bernheim and Bagwell (1988). 
9 See eg Cox and Raines (1985). 
10 But see eg Aschauer (1985), Djajic {1987) and Ihori (1990). 
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8. Perfect certainty applies over all individuals' lifetimes; intergenera-
tional information is, however, imperfect. The hypothesised imperfection of 
the latter seems reasonable; however, the former is undeniably strong, and goes 
against the trend of much recent theoretical work on the consumption function 
(see section 2.1 of the previous chapter). However, an assumption of this sort is 
not uncommon in intergenerational models. 
9. The unit of analysis is the individual, who unfailingly reproduces 
asexually by having one child. Children are non-earners and depend on 
parental consumption for survival until they reach adulthood. At this 
point they are assigned 'economic age' zero (henceforth, 'age' will be 
taken to mean 'economic age', unless otherwise indicated). All individ-
uals die T years later. This hypothesised social structure also follows much 
intergenerational theory dealing with optimisation over several generations. It is 
obviously highly stylised, and vulnerable to the criticisms that it specifies the date 
of death as fixed and certain; and that it ignores important sources of heterogeneity 
in the population. Nevertheless, it does facilitate an analytical treatment of over-
lapping and finite-lived generations. Several versions of this assumption appear in 
the literature, which tend to retain the individual rather than the family as the 
logical unit of observation11 • One variant (Bevan 1979, p.382) views families as 
consisting of one head who works; who has taken a spouse by perfectly assortative 
marriage12 ; and who has n composite children. This sort of married couple can 
effectively be treated as a composite single individual. 
10. Bequests of (non-human) capital are made by the adult at an age 
J; children inherit immediately at an age"'· Bequests cannnot be nega-
tive. An implication of the latter is that, given the absence of 'reverse' child-parent 
transfers implied by Assumption 7, intergenerationalliquidity constraints may ex-
ist. That is, parents wishing to will debt to their children will be constrained from 
effecting such a 'transfer'. This seems reasonable in view of the fact that "cur-
rent estate law will not fully enforce liabilities in excess of assets in estates. One 
cannot 'will' bankruptcy to one's heirs. Nor does it seem there is any way a pri-
vate individual can force liabilities on his children". (Drazen 1978, p.5-6, footnote 
11 This has the advantage of obviating consideration of household dynamics. 
12 Which means individuals only marry those who receive the same inheritances as themselves. 
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1 ). Unfortunately, the assumption that all individuals come into their inheritance 
when they are of (economic) age 'fJ is less satisfactory. It conflicts with evidence 
assembled by Lansing and Sonquist (1969) from the 1963 Survey of Consumer Fi-
nances (USA), which showed that ages of inheritance displayed marked variation. 
This finding might not be too damaging in practice if 'fJ is regarded as an 'average 
age of inheritance'. The Swedish data of Blomquist (1979) suggest that the typical 
(human, not economic) age of inheritance is about 50. 
11. All variables are measured in real terms and net of tax, where ap-
propriate. Bevan (1979) has described this assumed role for taxation as 'emas-
culated': he also made the point that the taxation of inter-vivos gifts must be 
aligned with the taxation of inheritances such that individuals do not have a zero 
incentive to leave bequests. Note also that money illusion (Branson and Klevorick 
1969) is ignored herein. 
46 
Ch III. The IGH 
3.2 The Optimal Consumption Function of an Individual 
3.2.1 The Intergenerational Utility Function 
The one-way non-paternalistic utility function of Assumption 7 takes the fol-
lowing as its simplest form: 
ug = ug(cg, ug+I), (3.1) 
where ug 13 and cg is the total utility and total lifetime consumption respectively of 
a member of generation 9; and where UQ+l is the maximised total lifetime utility 
of the offspring. 
Assuming separability, function ( 3.1) takes the form 
ug = v(cg) + AUQ+l 0 <A< 1, (3.2) 
where v( cg) is the personal 'utility from consumption' function, and where A is the 
intergenerational weighting factor. Assumption 10 rules out negative bequests: 
hence a generation g individual must maximise (3.2) subject to his or her lifetime 
budget constraint. This is 
wg =~kg + loT cg(s)e-rs ds, (3.3) 
where w denotes lifetime wealth; s denotes (economic) age; and where ~k is the 
present value (at age zero) of a bequest k given at age a; ~ = e-ru > 0. In words, 
equation (3.3) simply states, in present value terms, the fact that an individual's 
lifetime wealth is equal to the discounted sum of his outlays, which are of course 
bequests and lifetime consumption. The individual's lifetime wealth itself has two 
sources: inheritance and lifetime earnings: thus we have 
wg = 'lj;kg-1 + f;g, (3.4) 
13 The function ug is strictly non-decreasing and concave (ug(·) > 0, ug(·) < 0); to rule out 
corner solutions, the conditions ug(O) = 00 and ug( 00) = 0 are imposed. 
47 
Ch III. The IGH 
where f;g is lifetime earnings (ie the present value of the individual's flow of labour 
income over his lifetime); and where 'lj;kg-1 is the present value of the parental 
bequest inherited at age TJ; 'lj; = e-rry > 0. 
The separability of the utility function (3.2) allows optimal intra-generational 
consumption and optimal inter-generational bequest plans to be examined sepa-
rately. We first analyse the former, assuming for the time being that the individual 
has determined his optimal breakdown between bequests and total consumption 
(the optimal breakdown itself is derived in section 3.3.). 
3.2.2 The Optimal Consumption Stream of an Individual 
Given the discount rate p, the total 'selfish' utility from consumption of an 
individual is 
. T 
v(c) = fo v[c(s)] e-ps ds (3.5) 
(the subscript g is temporarily supressed since there is no ambiguity about which 
generation is being considered). That is, total selfish utility is the discounted sum 
of utilities from consumption accruing over the individual's lifetime. 
In the following, we need to give the general function v[c( s )] a specific func-
tional form. A popular choice in the consumption literature is the iso-elastic (see 
Blinder (1974, p.31-2), who discusses a rationale), which is written as 
c(s)l-,8 
v[c( s )] = ---'--'--
1-{3 0 < {3 1- 1, (3.6) 
where {3 can be interpreted as the elasticity of the marginal utility of consumption. 
Now the optimal consumption stream (which is simply the pattern of consumption 
over the individual's lifetime) is given by the solution of the maximisation of (3.5) 
subject to (3.3) g·iven some optimal bequest k. In order to solve this problem, we 
set up the following Lagrangean: 
T T 
A[c(s)] = fo v[c(s)Je-P8 ds+J.L[w-~k- fo c(s)e-r8 ds], 
where J.L is the Lagrangean multiplier. The first order condition is 
&A 
8c( s) = v'[c( s )] e-ps - J.L e-rs = 0. 
48 
Ch III. The IGH 
The solution to this equation, given the specific functional form (3.6), is 
(3.7) 
'Initial' consumption at age zero, ie c(O), is derived by putting s 
hence 
0 in (3.7): 
c(O) = f.L- 11(), 
so that ( 3. 7) can be re-expressed as 
c(s) = c(O)eT 8 • (3.8) 
Equation (3.8) takes us some, but not all of the way towards our desired 
solution. The problem with (3.8) as it stands is that it does not tell us how initial 
consumption c(O) is derived. This matter can be rectified by returning to the 
budget constraint, and substituting (3.8) into (3.3) to get 
Hence if we define the constant 
(loT - [ !l1.:±..P..=.!:] s ) - 1 ¢ = e f3 ds 0 
(r/3 + p- r)/{3 
1- exp{ -(r/3 + p- r)//3} 
for notational ease14 , we have 
c(O) = cp.(w- ~k). (3.9) 
Substituting (3.9) into (3.8) yields 
!:..=.£. 
c(s) = cp.(w- ~k)e f3 8 , (3.10) 
which is the final form of the individual's optimal consumption stream15 • 
14 By inspection, cp > 0 unless by some fluke {3 is such that r/3 + p - r = 0. This latter case is 
degenerate since it makes cp undefined: it will be assumed not to apply in the following. 
15 This increases over the lifetime if p < r and decreases if p > r. 
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However, note that equation (3.10) describes the optimal consumption stream 
assuming that the optimal value of k has been decided. The task of the next section 
is to derive the optimal value of k (strictly kg) under three different hypotheses 
about intergenerational information. 
Before turning to address this task, it is appropriate here to derive one more 
result which we will need in the next section. This is the maximal total utility 
v(c) associated with the optimal consumption stream (3.10). This is found by 
substituting (3.10) into (3.6) and then into (3.5) to yield 
v(c) = - 1-[¢(w- ~k)]l-;1 {T e[T(r-p)-p]s ds 
1- f3 lo 
= L(w- ~k) 1 -11, (3.11) 
where 
L = _'+'__ e[-j-(r-p)-p]s ds -+..1-;1 loT ~ 
1- f3 0 
is a constant. 
50 
Ch III. The IGH 
3.3 The Optimal Bequest Function of an Individual 
3.3.1 Introduction 
In the previous section, the first of the individual's two optimisation problems 
was solved: that of choosing the optimal stream of consumption over his lifetime. 
This section deals with the second problem, that of determining his optimal be-
quest. 
The task here is in many ways more complex, because it involves modelling the 
behaviour of individuals who are concerned about what happens to their descen-
dants, many generations into the future16 • This poses several obvious difficulties, 
including tractability and sensitivity to assumptions about the stock of intergener-
ational information. The problem of tractability arises from the inter-relatedness 
of the actions of all generations in a dynasty. Specifically, in choosing a bequest, 
an individual of one generation affects the resources and so the bequests of in-
dividuals in the next generation; resources and beqeusts of the generation after 
that are likewise affected; and so the causal chain goes on to affect, ultimately, 
all future generations. If perfect integenerational information were assumed, then 
rational individuals would have to be modelled as taking every interdependency 
into account when solving their optimal bequest problem. 
A scenario where intergenerational information is perfect is clearly neither very 
realistic nor conducive to tractability. For these reasons, we assume in the IGH that 
intergenerational information is imperfect and that agents form expectations about 
their descendants. Currently, the author is aware of only three well-developed hy-
potheses of imperfect intergenerational information and bequest behaviour in the 
literature. Each of these hypotheses differs with respect to both the way agents are 
presumed to form expectations about the future, and about the way lifetime earn-
ings evolve over time. Although each hypothesis is capable of producing what is 
called a 'bequest function' (which is the relationship between desired bequests and 
16 Note, however, that this is only true if individuals are altruists. If they are not, then bequests will 
be motivated by other factors; for the sake of completeness, some alternative (mainly life cycle) 
theories of bequests are reviewed in Appendix B. 
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a number of explanatory variables17 ), the particular form of the bequest function 
differs between the hypotheses. 
The bequest functions are the central objects of interest to us in this section. 
The fact that none of the information hypotheses giving rise to them are a priori 
more plausible than any other means that, for maximum generality, the various 
bequest functions must be nested inside a general structure, with parameter re-
strictions for each of the special cases being explicitly stated. As will be seen later 
in the thesis, the parameters of an estimated aggregate IGH consumption function 
can be interpreted in such a way as to make it possible to distinguish empirically 
between the three hypotheses. 
Sub-sections 3.3.2, 3.3.3, and 3.3.4 contain an explanation of each hypothesis; 
sub-section 3.3.5 nests the three resulting bequest functions inside a generalised 
bequest function and outlines the special case parameter restrictions. 
3.3.2 The Davies Hypothesis (DH) and Bequest Function 
The first hypothesis is due to Davies (1982), who assumed that individuals be-
lieve their offspring will not desire bequests. The individual chooses kg to maximise 
discounted expected intergenerational utility 
00 L >..i E v(cg+i), 
i=O 
where from equation (3.11), v(cg) = L(wg- ~kg) 1 -(3 (recall that Lis a constant). 
Hence the individual seeks to maximise 
00 L >..iE (wg+i- ~kg+i/-(3, (3.12) 
i=O 
assuming that the condition kg ~ 0 holds in practice. Since Davies assumes that 
individuals do not expect their offspring to leave bequests, E( kg+i) is kg for i = 0 
17 Although this definition is the norm, Menchik ( 1979) has alternatively defined the mechanical 
relationship between bequests left by one generation and bequests received by the beneficiaries as 
a 'bequest function'. Also, what has been called the bequest function in this thesis has been termed 
the 'intergenerational savings function' by Pryor (1973). 
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and zero otherwise. Hence only the first two terms of the above sum are relevant. 
Substituting in (3.4), the expression (3.12) can therefore be re-written as 
Differentiating the above expression with respect to kg (for A > 0) and setting to 
zero for a maximum yields the result 
or 
Re-arrangement yields the optimal bequest function 
where 
131 = ~-l/f3(e-1/f3 + 'lj;l-l/f3_\-1/f3)-\ 
!32 = f31(U.\7f;) 11f3, 
(3.13) 
are positive constants. Notice, incidentally, how the above bequest rule implies a 
breaking of the non-negative bequest constraint for poor individuals (low wg) with 
high-earning offspring (high Y9+d· 
We now proceed to convert (3.13) into a more manageable form for IGH pur-
poses. A well-known earnings rule in the human capital literature (Becker 1967, 
1981) hypothesises that log childrens' lifetime income is a linear function of log 
parental lifetime income. A variant of this rule, used by Davies in his simulations 
(though not his bequest function), uses lifetime earnings rather than income, in 
the following way: 
- h -"Y Y9+1 = ·Yg 
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Here, 1 is the (constant) elasticity of childrens' lifetime earnings with respect to 
parental lifetime earnings, and h is a constant18 , 19 . 
Substituting (3.14) into (3.13) yields the optimal DH bequest function 
(3.15) 
where /32 = f32h. Thus the optimal bequest rule under the DH (though not de-
rived by Davies) is non-linear, reflecting the non-linearity of the intergenerational 
earnings rule. 
3.3.3 The Bevan Hypothesis (BH) and Bequest Function 
Like the DH, the hypothesis due to Bevan (1979) utilises an intergenerational 
earnings rule, although it differs from the one used by Davies. Unlike the DH, in-
dividuals in Bevan's world accept that their offspring may desire to leave bequests; 
they also use the earnings rule explicitly in their optimisation exercise. Bevan's 
earnings rule (which, like the DH, allows regression to the mean) is 
0 ::; A ::; 1, 
where r.p is the intergenerational growth factor in earnings; A is the parameter de-
termining the speed of regression to the mean; and MQ+i = r.pi Mg is the perceived 
mean to which the regression proceeds. Ignoring the interest rate for simplicity, 
the individual maximises discounted expected intergenerational utility 
18 The human capital rationale for Becker's specification is that family background effects and genetic 
factors link generations' income-generating capabilities. Whilst Becker's specification is probably 
better than (3.14) in capturing a family background effect, it is probably worse than (3.14) in 
portraying a genetic linkage. This is because childrens' genetic endowments are uncorrelated with 
parental choices about life cycle patterns of investment income accruals. 
19 We would normally expect to observe 0 < 1 < 1, which is consistent with regression of lifetime 
earnings to the mean; this is indeed the finding of studies which estimate (3.14) as a regression 
equation (see sub-section 4.2.1 of sect.ion 4.2). 
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with respect to lifetime consumption cg, subject to the earnings rule and his budget 
constraint. The latter is, in present value terms, 
A broad similarity between Bevan's and Davies's set-up is that both conform 
to the general pattern of maximising the expected value of discounted intergen-
erational utility subject to an earnings rule and a budget constraint. Both also 
assume that optimal bequests are non-negative20 • Apart from differing over the 
hypothesised type of expectations about descendants' bequest behaviour and the 
role of the earnings rule in the optimisation exercise, the two hypotheses also differ 
with respect to how they maximise intergenerational utility. It was seen in the 
previous sub-section that Davies maximised utility with respect to bequests them-
selves, solving optimal bequests from the first order maximisation condition. The 
earnings rule was then substituted into the solution to re-express the DH bequest 
function in terms of parental inheritance and lifetime earnings. In contrast, Be-
van maximises utility with respect to consumption, substituting his earnings rule 
directly into the optimisation maximand. This explicit use of the earnings rule is 
apparent from Bevan's Lagrangean 
When the solution from the above is substituted into the budget constraint, the 
following linear bequest function is derived (see Bevan (1979, p.385-6) for details): 
Here, the v's are positive constants. Assuming that lifetime earnings are expected 
to regress to the generation's actual lifetime earnings mean Yg, the linear bequest 
function becomes 
20 Bevan went on to consider implications of the constraint binding, which included disruption of the 
formulation of infinite-horizon plans. 
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Unfortunately, this function cannot, as it stands, be used in the development 
of the IGH. This is because Yg cannot be measured using aggregate time series 
data. Only a large series of longitudinal (panel) data could be detailed enough to 
isolate, at every point in time, a coherent 'generation' whose overall mean lifetime 
earnings could be calculated. In order to overcome this problem within a time 
series framework, the following strong simplifying assumption is invoked: that the 
average lifetime earnings of all generations are in a steady-state equilibrium. That 
is, we assume that f;g = Yg = g = constant : VQ. Thus the BH bequest function 
becomes 
(3.16) 
where vo = g( v2- v3) is a constant, which may be less than, greater than, or equal 
to zero. 
Arguably, the simplifying steady-state assumption removes much of the power 
of Bevan's bequest function. Indeed, the assumption weakens the BH function 
considerably in times of continuing economic growth. These matters are discussed 
further in section 4.2, sub-section 4.2.3, where the three information/bequest hy-
potheses are compared, contrasted, and critically evaluated. Meanwhile, we turn 
to consider the third hypothesis of intergenerational information and bequests. 
3.3.4 The Laitner Hypothesis (LH) and Bequest Function 
The third hypothesis, due to Laitner (1979), differs quite considerably from 
the others. The principal difference is that Laitner operates in a stochastic rather 
than in a deterministic world. According to Laitner's hypothesis, each individual's 
total lifetime earnings is an independent sampling from a given random variable, 
whose distribution remains unchanged over time. The distribution has a density 
function p(·) such that p(y) is continuous on an interval [fJL,fJu]; p(y) = 0 for 
fJ ti [fJL, :Yu], and 
{ p(y)dy > 0 
}[fJL,z] 'liz> YL· 
Importantly, even if parents subsequently observe their children to have a particular 
value of lifetime earnings, they are unable to revise planned bequests in the light 
of this evidence. 
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In his paper, Laitner was more interested in establishing various general prop-
erties of the bequest function arising from the above framework than in deriving 
a specific functional form for such a function. Working with an iso-elastic utility 
function, and restricting bequests to be non-negative, Laitner first proved the ex-
istence of an unique utility-maximising general bequest function kg(-). This proof 
is complex and need not concern us here - the interested reader is referred to Lait-
ner's paper for more details. Importantly from our perspective, Laitner then went 
on to show that kg ( ·) is non-decreasing, continuous, and in general a non-linear 
function of the lifetime wealth of the benefactor. However, Laitner's analysis was 
presented purely in general notation: no specific form of the bequest function was 
suggested. 
Since we require a specific functional form in order to derive the IGH consump-
tion function, we suggest our own (admittedly rather ad hoc) specification as an 
approximation to the Laitner scenario. This is the following non-linear function: 
(3.17) 
This is not an ideal representation of Laitner's function kg( wg_I) because it in-
cludes only the lifetime earnings component of parental lifetime wealth in the 
non-linear term: the inheritance component is ignored. However, the former com-
ponent is invariably much the greater of the two21 , which gives us reason to believe 
that the above approximation may not be too unsatisfactory. 
3.3.5 The Generalised Bequest Function 
The simplest bequest function which nests the DH, BH and LH functions 
(3.15), (3.16), and (3.17) as special cases of a generalised form is clearly 
(3.18) 
21 Blinder (1973, p.609); also, survey evidence suggests that the majority of individuals do not receive 
an inheritance of material wealth (Lansing and Sonquist (1969), Blomquist (1979), Menchik 1980). 
Furthermore, numerous other studies indicate that a sizeable proportion of the population have low 
or negative asset holdings (Diamond (1977), Diamond and Hausman ( 1983), Zeldes (1986, 1989), 
Hubbard and Judd 1986). 
57 
Ch III. The IGH 
The Davies hypothesis suggests zo = 0; z1, z2 > 0; Z3 < 0; E > 0; the Bevan 
hypothesis suggests Zl > 0; z2 = Z3 = 0; and the Laitner hypothesis suggests 
zo, z1, z2, Z3 ~ 0; E > 0. Some of these parameter restrictions are preserved through-
out the construction of the aggregate IGH consumption function: these will be 
stated as the consumption function is developed. This takes place in the next 
section. 
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3.4 Derivation of the Aggregate IG H Consumption Function 
In this section, the aggregate IGH consumption function is derived. This in-
volves bringing together the bequest analysis of the previous section and the op-
timal lifetime consumption analysis of section 3.2. These analyses are brought 
together by substituting the generalised bequest function (3.18) and the lifetime 
wealth equation (3.4) into the consumption function (3.10), to yield 
(3.19) 
This equation may be re-cast into a more convenient form by working with indi-
viduals' post-tax earnings at various (economic) ages, denoted yg( s ). Assume the 
following general earnings profile: 
yg( s) = yg(O).f( s ), 
where f ( s) describes the age-earnings profile. The functional form of f (-) does not 
need to be specified in what follows: the principal and crucial restriction on f( ·) 
is that it is independent of yg(O). 
Since f;g is the present value of net earnings flows, we have 
where 
yg = yg(O) loT f( s) e-rs ds 
= b.yg(s)f-1(s), 
is a positive constant for all individuals of all generations. 
Substituting (3.20) into (3.19) yields 
(3.20) 
cg( S) = ¢[k(;-1 ( 7/J- ez1) + b.yg( S )f-l( S )(1- ez2)- e(zo + Z3.bE yg( S )E ~-E ( S ))] e z:.rs 
(3.21) 
as the consumption function for an age-s individual of generation g. The forth-
coming aggregation, which is performed over all living individuals irrespective of 
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their age and the generation they belong to, now allows us to dispense with the 
generational and age indices. 
Assume that the age distribution (denoted a( s)) and the size of the adult 
population (denoted N) are constant over time22 •23 • This is an important joint as-
sumption because it simplifies the aggregation of ( 3.21) considerably. By ensuring 
that variations in s amongst individuals do not cause variations over time in the 
terms f- 1( s ), f-£ ( s) and /7/-s, aggregation over the population leaves the aggre-
gates of these expressions as constants. Hence the only variables in ( 3.21) whose 
aggregation deserves further attention are inheritances kg _1 and earnings yg ( s). 
The inheritance term is straightforward to aggregate because it enters (3.21) lin-
early: defining It as the sum of bequests received, or to be received, by all those 
alive at t, we have LVQENt kr;;-1 = ft. The same is true of the earnings term yg( s) 
(but not yg( s )E), because it too enters in a linear fashion. Hence defining Yt as 
aggregate earnings at t, we have LVQENt YQ,t = yt. Unfortunately, however, yg(s)£ 
is less straightforward to aggregate because it enters (3.21) non-linearly. In order 
to aggregate this term, we must consider the frequency distribution of earnings, 
which we denote by h(yt; Bt)· This distribution operates over the range H*; Bt is a 
vector of parameters at time t. Hence aggregate consumption is 
where 
f3o = -¢ezo JN /ifsa(s) ds, 
fJ1 = ¢('1j;- ez1) JN eT8 a(s) ds, 
fJ2 = ¢b(1- ez2) JN f- 1(s)eT 8 a(s) ds, 
( = ¢ez3bE jNf-E(s)eT 8 a(s)ds, 
(3.22) 
22 This might not be too restrictive an assumption in practice. Although several authors have recog· 
nised the potential role of the age distribution in explaining consumption (e.g. Ducsenberry (1949), 
Friedman (1957), Modigliani and Ando (1963) and King 1985), the empirical evidence suggests that 
its impact is fairly weak (Hendershott and Peak (1984), Heien (1972), and Boskin (1978)- but see 
also Curry, Holly and Scott 1989a). Auerbach and Kotlikoff (1989) have also demonstrated how 
demographics are unable to explain post-war U.S. savings patterns. 
23 Combined with the assumption that all individuals live to age T with certainty, this must mean 
that the age distribution is uniform over the range [ 0, T]. 
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are constants. We now briefly consider what these constants mean with respect to 
the DH, BH and LH. 
We know from our earlier analysis that ¢ > 0 (section 3.2, sub-section 3.2.2, 
footnote 14); we also know that ~and '1/J are greater than zero (sub-section 3.2.1), 
and that b > 0 (this section). All of the age integrals are also positive: therefore 
the signs of the (3's and ( in (3.22) depend on the values of the z's, which in turn 
depend on the bequest hypotheses of the previous section. Taking f3o first, recall 
from sub-section 3.3.5 that zo = 0 according to the DH. From the equation of f3o, 
the DH therefore suggests f3o = 0. In contrast, the BH places no restriction on f3o 
(since it places no restriction on vo and zo- see sub-sections 3.3.3 and 3.3.5). The 
LH, by having zo ~ 0 from 3.3.5, suggests f3o ::; 0. For /31 and /32, the DH imposes 
no restrictions, because although z1 and z2 are both restricted to be greater than 
zero (from 3.3.5), /31 and f32 multiply them by the 'sign ambiguous' terms ('lj;-~z1) 
and ( 1- ~ z2) respectively. The same indeterminacy also applies to the LH for these 
coefficients, for the same reason: this is also true for the BH with respect to f31· 
However, the BH suggests that z2 = 0 from 3.3.5, which from the equation of 
/32, means that /32 > 0. The restrictions on ( implied by the hypotheses may be 
obtained from sub-section 3.3.5 in the same way. The DH has z3 < 0 which implies 
( < 0; the BH has Z3 = 0, which implies ( = 0; and the LH has z3 ~ 0, which 
implies ( ~ 0. 
We now proceed to evaluate the integral in (3.22). This requires, firstly, that 
the distribution h(yt; Bt) be given a specific form. There are a vast number of 
distributions in everyday use, of which there are several popular candidates for 
representing the income distribution. These include the beta, Singh-Maddala, 
lognormal, gamma, Wei bull, Fisk, exponential, and several generalised forms24 • 
The relative performance of the distributions are usually compared by fitting them 
to published income distribution data (usually in grouped form) and examining 
goodness-of-fit statistics. Two consistently good performers in empirical exercises 
of this type are the two parameter gamma (used by e.g. Salem and Mount 1974), 
24 See, for example, Thurow (1970), Metcalf (1972), Salem and Mount (1974), van Doorn (1975), 
Singh and Maddala (1976), Kloek and van Dijk (1978), McDonald (1978), McDonald and Ransom 
(1979), McDonald (1984), and Atoda et al (1988). 
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and the three parameter beta (see e.g. Thurow (1970), McDonald 1978)25 • Both 
of these distributions have a functional form conducive to evaluating the integral 
in (3.22): we now proceed to discuss them further. 
The two-parameter gamma distribution belongs to the Pearson Type III family 
and has a density function of the form 
where 
h(y;JJ.,a) 
N 
a, JJ. > 0; y ~ 0, 
is the gamma function (f( a) = (a - 1 )!). Recall that N is the population; note 
that in terms of our former general notation,() = (JJ., a) and H* = (0, oo ). The pa-
rameter a can be interpreted as measuring the degree of inequality in the earnings 
distribution: 'equality' varies in direct proportion to a. 
The beta distribution belongs to the Pearson Type I (or II) family and has a 
density function of the form 
where 
h(y;p, q, w) 
N 
1 yP-1(w _ y)q-1 
B(p, q)" wP+q-1 
B( ) = f(p)f(q) 
p, q f(p + q) 
p,q > 0; 0 ::; y ::; w, 
is the beta function. Note that () = (p, q, w) and H* = ( 0, w) for this distribution. 
Perfect income equality is approached as p --7 oo and q --7 oo; perfect inequality 
is approached as p --7 0 and q --7 0. 
Both the gamma and the beta are flexible distributions, as the diagrams on 
the next two pages illustrate. Either distribution can be used to evaluate (3.22); 
however, only the gamma is developed and estimated in the text of this thesis. 
This is chiefly because the parameters of the gamma distribution, being fewer 
than those of the beta, prove easier in practice to estimate. This property was 
25 These distributions tend, not surprisingly, to be outperformed by generalised specifications, such 
as the generalised gamma (eg Atoda et al19BB) and the generalised beta (McDonald 1984). 
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confirmed by a series of experiments undertaken by the author using several years 
of British income distribution data. Furthermore, the parameters of the gamma 
also exhibited greater stability than the parameters of the beta. The parameters 
of both distributions can only be estimated by optimisation methods (such as grid 
search or gradient techniques); the gamma parameter estimates always converged 
quickly and were relatively robust to starting values. In contrast, the beta param-
eter estimates often took hours to converge, and sometimes did not converge at 
all. They were also invariably found to be sensitive to starting positions. Finally, 
and perhaps surprisingly given the greater apparent flexibility of the beta distribu-
tion, the differences between the beta and gamma goodness-of-fit statistics usually 
tended to be minimal. 
Thus the gamma is the chosen distribution for this thesis. However, because 
of the possibility that, in the future, data from different countries and/ or different 
time periods may suggest the beta instead of the gamma, it may also be of interest 
to derive the aggregate consumption function using the beta distribution. For the 
sake of completeness, this derivation is presented in Appendix D. Interestingly 
it shows that, with the exception of the structure of the distributional term, the 
aggregate consumption function is mathematically identical whichever distribution 
is used. 
We now evaluate the integral in (3.22). Using the gamma density, this integral 
becomes 
-( N {00 yat+E-1 e -yt/ Itt dy . 
Jiftr(at)lo t t, (3.23) 
the temporal subscripts on the earnings distribution parameters indicate how these 
parameters may be time-variable. 
Euler's Second Integral establishes that 
Jlft+E f( at + c) 
Jlft r( at) 
E f( at+ c) 
= Jlt r(at) . 
Hence (3.23) becomes 
-(Nr(at+c) E 
r(at) Jlt· 
65 
(3.24) 
(3.25) 
Ch III. The IGH 
However, average aggregate earnings is defined as 
(3.26) 
using the gamma distribution. The right-hand side of equation (3.26) is clearly 
a special case of the left-hand side of (3.24) where c = 1: hence (3.26) may be 
evaluated by putting c = 1 into the right-hand side (result) of (3.24). This yields 
Therefore, Yt = f.ltCXt, or, since Yt = Yt/N (where yt is aggregate earnings), 
N f.lt at = Yt. Hence 
E ( yt )E 
f.lt = N O:t ' (3.27) 
and so, substituting (3.27) into (3.25), 
(3.28) 
Now putting (3.28) into (3.22) yields the aggregate IGH consumption function 
(3.29) 1 
where 
(constant) and where 
(3.30) 
is the W function, which contains the time-variable shape parameter of the earn-
ings distribution. As Appendix D demonstrates , the aggregate IGH consumption 
function derived using the beta instead of the gamma distribution is identical to 
(3.29), except that w(o:t,c) is replaced by 'W(pt,qt,c), where 
•T•( ) _ f(Pt + qt)f(pt +c) (Pt + qt)E 
'J.' Pt, qt, c - f( ) ( ) Pt f Pt + qt + c Pt (3.30') 
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(recall that p and q are the beta distribution's shape parameters). 
This completes the derivation of the IGH aggregate consumption function. 
All that remains now is to complete the guide to the IGH parameter restrictions 
implied by the bequest functions of section 3.3. The coefficients f3o, f3I, f32 and ( 
have already been discussed in the present section; we therefore only need to discuss 
f33. However, f33 merely changes the sign of ( and re-scales it by a population 
factor, so it is a simple matter to derive the DH, BH, and LH restrictions for this 
parameter. The DH suggested ( < 0, which implies f33 > 0. The BH had ( = 0, 
which implies !33 = 0. And the LH had ( ~ 0, which implies !33 :::; 0. Finally, 
note that c takes the same restrictions as it did in sub-section 3.3.5 - aggregation 
has not changed this parameter at all. Thus the DH and LH both have c > 0 
(this parameter is not defined for the BH). Various implications of c under each 
hypothesis are discussed in the next chapter, which also contains a table concisely 
summarising all of the parameter restrictions derived in this section. 
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Chapter IV 
Theoretical Implications of the IGH 
The purpose of this chapter is threefold: to state the parameter restrictions 
which can be used to distinguish between the three information hypotheses of 
Section 3.3; to describe the scope of government policy for altering aggregate con-
sumption by redistributing incomes; and to discuss various implications of the 
three information hypotheses. At this stage, the discussion of the policy implica-
tions will be at a purely theoretical level. The empirical findings reported later in 
the thesis will add a practical dimension to this discussion (in addition to their 
role of testing the IGH theory). 
Section 4.1 interprets the IGH consumption function parameters in terms of 
the information hypotheses of Section 3.3. This simply consists of a summary of 
parameter restrictions in tabular form. The section also considers how aggregate 
consumption is related to the distribution of income, and how governments can 
exploit this relationship in order to achieve some consumption target. It should be 
noted that the resulting policy implications only apply if the DH holds, because 
the DH is the only hypothesis which does not assume that individuals' incomes 
are in a steady state; income redistribution is inconsistent with all individuals' 
incomes being in a steady state. In this section, we concentrate exclusively on the 
consequences for consumption of income distribution: other aspects of redistribu-
tion policy (ethical, social and political) will not be considered. Governments will 
be assumed to be both able and willing to redistribute incomes1 (by means of, say, 
its control over the tax-benefit system2 ' 3 ). 
1 See eg the Effects of Taxes and Benefits on Household Income articles published in 
Economic Trends for a demonstration of the redistributive power of governments in the UK 
(the most recent example, for 1988, appears in the March 1991 issue of Economic Trends). 
Note however that in a broader context, there is a danger that deployment of this power may be 
inhibited by self-serving and self-perpetuating ruling elites -see eg Bell (1974). 
2 Governments should in this case be assumed to be able to translate directly changes in income 
distribution parameters into changes in the tax-benefit system. 
3 The tax-unit data used to estimate the IGH consumption function (see Section 5.1) has the un-
forseen advantage of conforming to the standard unit of observation in tax-benefit work. This is 
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Redistribution implications of the IGH are important, but are not the sole 
topic of interest. Section 4.2 discusses various implications of the information 
and bequest hypotheses of section 3.3 with regard to inequality and Ricardian 
Equivalence. The realism of these hypotheses is also assessed, which gives us some 
idea of what empirical parameter restrictions to expect from the applied work of 
chapter 5. 
principally because the benefit system still treats married couples and single people as single units; 
the abolition of joint taxation in April 1990, however, removed this method for the tax system. 
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4.1 Policy Implications of the IGH 
Having derived the aggregate IGH consumption function in section 3.4, we now 
seek to interpret its parameters f31, f32, f33 and E. As stated in Section 3.3, the values 
taken by these parameters may also be used to distinguish between the three infor-
mation/bequest hypotheses proposed by Davies, Bevan and Laitner. Furthermore, 
the parameters also suggest some precise implications for redistribution policy. We 
discuss each of these issues in turn. 
Table 4.1 overleaf sets out a taxonomy of the IGH consumption function restric-
tions. This table summarises restrictions established during the construction of the 
IGH consumption function in section 3.4. It is apparent from the table that each 
bequest function is associated with an unique set of restrictions on the parameters 
of the IGH consumption function. Any applied work on the IGH consumption func-
tion should first estimate the parameters of the function (by non-linear regression 
analysis), and then compare them with the restrictions summarised in the table. 
In this way, the most appropriate information/bequest hypothesis may be empir-
ically determined. A bequest hypothesis can only be accepted with confidence if 
all of the relevant restrictions are satisfied; if no hypotheses can be accepted, then 
either the IGH, the data-set, or the estimation process must be flawed. 
It can be seen from Table 4.1 that a key parameter which distinguishes between 
the three information hypotheses is f33. However, f33 = 0 is consistent with both the 
LH and the BH4 ; and in practice, a value of f33 insignificantly different from zero 
engenders problems of distinction between all three hypotheses. Hence testing 
decisively between the three hypotheses in practice may be less straightforward 
than Section 3.3 implies. 
The presence of the ll!-function in the aggregate IGH con$umption function 
means that the distribution of earnings is a potential determinant of aggregate 
consumption. Distributional effects in general depend on the marginal propensity 
to consume out of earnings (henceforth mpc) being non-constant (Stoker 1986). A 
variable mpc exists when f33 f. 0 and E f. 0, 1; a constant mpc exists when f33 = 0 
orE= 0,1 (see Table 4.1). 
4 Although the fact that the LH bequest function is non-linear in general militates in favour of the 
BH in this instance. 
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TABLE 4.1 
IGH PARAMETER RESTRICTIONS 
Each of the below corresponds to a special case of the IGH consumption function 
THE DAVIES HYPOTHESIS (DH) 
f3o = 0, f33 > 0, c>O 
0 < E < 1 c=1 E > 1 
Decreasing mpc Constant mpc Increasing mpc 
THE LAITNER HYPOTHESIS (LH) 
f3o :S o, f33 :S 0, c>O 
0 < E < 1 E = 1 E > 1 
Increasing mpc Constant mpc Decreasing mpc 
THE BEVAN HYPOTHESIS (BH) 
f32 > 0, 
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The policy implications of the IGH consumption function are that, in the case 
where the mpc decreases with earnings5 , an equalisation of the earnings distribu-
tion tends to increase aggregate consumption; conversely, in the case where the 
mpc increases with earnings, an equalisation of the earnings distribution tends to 
reduce aggregate consumption; and in the case when the mpc is constant, aggre-
gate consumption is independent of the distribution of earnings. These predictions 
can all be verified by a few simple calculations, which are not repeated here for 
brevity. The calculations simply involve choosing some c:, and then computing 
lll( a, c:) for several arbitrary values of a (in varying a, it is remembered that in the 
case of the gamma distribution, equality is approached as a --t oo, and inequality 
is approached as a --t 0). The way that ll1 changes when a changes therefore tells 
us how changing inequality in the distribution affects aggregate consumption (since 
the latter is related directly to ll1). These calculations are repeated for different 
values of c: corresponding to different mpc's. 
The obvious policy suggestion arising out of the foregoing discussion is that 
the earnings distribution may constitute an additional policy instrument for de-
mand management (Borooah and Sharpe 1986). That is, for any set of coefficient 
estimates for the IGH consumption function, a government could in principle vary 
redistribution programmes so as to hit a desired consumption target. Thus Table 
4.1 may in principle allow a government to tailor its redistribution policy accord-
ing to the world it finds itself in, ie according to the mpc (determined by {33 and 
c:) and the prevailing intergenerational information structure (ie appropriate be-
quest hypothesis). The variability of ll1 with respect to a plays a central role in the 
effectiveness of such a policy, since it would avail the government nothing if, for ex-
ample, ll1 (and hence C) were completely insensitive to any changes in the earnings 
distribution. Figures 4.1 and 4.2 overleaf illustrate the relationship between ll1 and 
the relevant shape parameter( s) of the earnings distribution for a range of values 
of c:: these figures relate to the gamma and beta distributions respectively. The 
figures show that redistribution policy becomes increasingly effective at changing 
ll1 as c: --t oo. But the more reasonable assumption is that the mpc diminishes with 
resources, which suggests c: < 1 under the DH: from Figure 4.1a, this suggests that 
maximum sensitivity to ll1 is associated with a value of c: of just under a half (it 
5 Menchik and David (1983) and Diamond and Hausman (1983) have provided some evidence that 
rope's decrease with resources. 
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will, however, be shown in the following that overall policy effectiveness varies in 
a slightly more complex way with e). 
A numerical example may best serve to show this and clarify the ideas so 
far. Suppose earnings inequality is measured by the Gini coefficient, G, which is 
initially 0.33; and that the government is interested in measuring the effects on 
aggregate consumption of amending the tax-benefit system. Suppose further that 
the government is considering four policy options, which have the following effects 
on inequality: 
1. Decrease G (increase equality) by 10% 
2. Decrease G by 50% 
3. Increase G (decrease equality) by 10% 
4. Increase G by 50%. 
We invoke the ceteris paribus assumption that variables other than the shape 
of the earnings distribution, a:, are unaffected by changes in this distribution. Thus 
we are interested only in changes in the term 
caused by changes in a:. We assume in the following example that Y is at its 1979 
value of £28625 m. (see section 5.1, chapter 5). For estimates of E and /33, we use 
the most reliable results from our empirical work in section 5.2. Although these 
parameters are not well-defined, since only limited non-linearity is detected in the 
IGH consumption function, we use them here for illustrative purposes. They are: 
e = 0.90, and6 /33=44.190. From Table 4.1, we see that these results are consistent 
with the Davies Hypothesis and a diminishing marginal propensity to consume. 
We use our estimates to calculate f33.YE= £453310 m. 
6 Strictly speaking, 44.19 is /33 weighted by a particular constant, but this need not concern us here. 
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We clearly need a relationship between G and a in order to investigate changes 
in consumption brought about by changes in the Gini coefficient. Such a relation-
ship exists: it is simply 
G f(a + !) 
(a)= r(a + 1)y'7r. 
This relationship enables us to translate unique Gini coefficients into unique a 
estimates and vice-versa - indeed, this technique is used to estimate some ac-
tual at values in section 5.1. Some iterative search technique is needed to do the 
transformation, since analytical solution of the relationship is impossible. Using 
a golden-section search routine, we found the a coefficients corresponding to the 
four options above to be 3.39, 11.44, 2.15, and 1.03, respectively. Substituting 
these into the W function given c = 0.9 gave the following \lf-function values: 
0.987, 0.996, 0.981, and 0.963, respectively (the W-value corresponding to the 
initial situation is 0.984). This bears out the result of Figure 4.1a, that the W 
function increases for given c < 1 when equality increases. The initial value of the 
third term of the consumption function- before any policies are implemented -is 
453310x w( a, c )=453310x0.984=446057. 
Calculating the same quantity after the four policies have been implemented 
yields the following results: 
1. C increases by £1 338m. 
2. C increases by £5 353 m. 
3. C decreases by £1 338 m. 
4. C decreases by £9 367 m. 
An interesting feature of these numbers is that changes in inequality have quite 
powerful effects on overall consumption. For instance, policy 1 raises consumption 
by over £1.3 billion -roughly the revenue the government receives from inheritance 
tax. This supports Borooah and Sharpe's conjecture that redistribution policy may 
be a powerful extra tool of demand management. 
Notice also that although policies are roughly symmetric for small changes, 
they are asymmetric for large ones. This reflects the slightly slewed dish shape of 
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the IJ! function illustrated earlier. It means that, for large changes in redistribution 
policy, it is easier to reduce consumption by increasing inequality in this example 
than it is to raise consumption by reducing inequality. This observation is true 
irrespective of the parameterisation chosen. Of course, the other findings are sensi-
tive to the given parameterisation, and so the poor determination of /33 and c: urge 
caution in their interpretation. Furthermore, even if the above parameterisation 
was to be accepted as a realistic one, the effects on consumption suggested could 
be offset, possibly quite heavily, by second-round effects, especially those relating 
to discouraged labour supply. We take up this point below. 
First, however, we examine the sensitivity of these results to the chosen pa-
rameterisation. Suppose E was not 0.9, but was 0.5- close to the point of maximal 
sensitivity of IJ! to changes in the earnings distribution (see Figures 4.1a and 4.2a). 
Then, initially f33.YE= £7476 m. The initialiJ! value is now 0.954; those for policies 
1 through 4 are now 0.964, 0.989, 0.944 and 0.889. This bears out the result that IJ! 
is more variable when c: = 0.5, as illustrated. Hence the leverage for redistribution 
policy, that is the change in consumption expressed as a proportion of the third 
term initially, is highest in this case. However, the effects of the policies under the 
new parameterisation are now: 
1. C increases by £75 m. 
2. C increases by £262 m. 
3. C decreases by £75 m. 
4. C decreases by £486 m. 
Despite the greater variability of IJ!, the overall magnitude of the effect on 
consumption is lower, because the scale factor YE is obviously greatly reduced 
when c: falls. This explains why the apparent effects of redistribution policy are 
greatest for high c:, even though the \.ll-function is less sensitive to policy changes 
in this case. 
It has been mentioned above how the numerical values generated using these 
examples ought to be treated with some care. Apart from sensitivity to parameter-
isation, at least four caveats need to be mentioned. These apply also to the policy 
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guide in general. The most important is that the policy guide only applies if the 
DH holds, since unlike the DH, the BH and LH are steady-state theories; income 
redistribution is inconsistent with all individuals' incomes being in a steady-state. 
The second recognises that the IGH consumption function may be mis-specified: 
if true, coefficient bias could result, so jeopardising consumption-based redistribu-
tion policies. The third recognises the point made by Bernheim and Bagwell (1985, 
1988) that agents may be altruistically inter-connected. If true, this would mean a 
further reduction in the effectiveness of redistribution policy, because agents in the 
Bernheim and Bagwell scenario neutralise government policy to maintain desired 
consumption/bequest patterns within their 'clan'. The fourth caveat is that agents 
may adjust their behaviour in response to a redistribution programme, for example 
by reducing their labour supply if taxes on labour incomes are raised. This last 
caveat seems especially important, so we now proceed to discuss it further. 
In the foregoing, it was implicitly assumed that agents passively accept any 
redistribution exercise that a government chooses to impose. This assumption 
was made in order to simplify the analysis of the effects of redistribution policy 
implied by the IGH consumption function. However, the assumption is not a 
particularly good one, since agents often possess sufficient power to alter their 
behaviour in response to government policy. In general, government policies which 
fail to allow for this eventuality are vulnerable to the Lucas Critique (Lucas 1976). 
We will briefly consider the relevance of the critique with respect to labour supply 
adjustments 7 ; the effects of higher consumption (lower saving) on investment and 
thereby economic growth will be ignored in the following. 
A redistribution exercise which involves higher taxation of those in work risks 
discouraging labour supply. If in response to a reduction of work incentives indi-
viduals substitute leisure for work, or switch their labour supply to alternative 'sec-
ond choice' employment in reaction to the tax distortion, then it may be expected 
that total labour earnings and overall economic efficiency will be reduced. The 
'equity-efficiency' tradeoff this implies will therefore be of direct practical interest 
to governments trying to choose a preferred redistribution programme. Although 
7 Adjustments may also be made, for example, by parents who invest less in the human capital of their 
children as a consequence of the reduced rate of return resulting from the redistribution programme 
(Becker and Tomes 1979). Long-term equalisation may therefore be in1paired by redistribution 
policies. 
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the chosen point on the tradeoff is a political decision, the shape of the tradeoff 
is of considerable interest because it is this which determines the efficacy of fol-
lowing the 'policy guide' given in the foregoing. The greater the 'efficiency' which 
must be traded in for a given percentage gain in equality, the greater the 'second 
round' effects on aggregate income and its distribution. This will in turn affect 
aggregate consumption in a way not comprehended by the IGH, whose parameters 
will then be prone to instability, and whose predictions of aggregate consumption 
could cease to be accurate. 
The IGH can give us no help in quantifying the equity-efficiency tradeoffS. We 
must therefore consult extraneous theory and evidence on the issue. The former 
has been copious from an historical perspective9 ; the latter has been scarcer. Some 
authors have stressed the tradeoff idea quite forcefully: eg Taubman (1978) and 
Gilder (1982), who asserted that redistribution is always at the expense of national 
income. However, others ( eg Pahl (1984), Piachaud (1987) and Borooah 1988) 
have disputed the 'pessimistic' view that a tradeoff necessarily exists. Borooah, 
for example, cites several reasons why the existence of a tradeoff might not be 
clear-cut: a persuasive one relates to the 'efficiency wage' idea that rewarding low 
paid workers increases their efficiency and hence national income in the aggregate. 
The transmission of higher pay to greater efficiency may arise from better nutrition 
and health (especially in LDC's), or higher morale (more likely in DC's). 
Some evidence on the issue of the equity-efficiency tradeoff does exist. Gevers 
and Rouyer (1979) proposed, in a study using US data for 1961 and 1970, that 
a 5.4% reduction in the Gini coefficient 'cost' only 1% of output. Moreover, in a 
study using cross-section data from 30 countries (DC's and LDC's), Lee and Koo 
(1988) found no statistical evidence of an 'equity-efficiency' tradeoff. However, 
in a recent paper Lambert (1990) used a simple model to show that the equity-
efficiency tradeoff is approximately unity over a wide range of output levels: ie a 
1% reduction in the Gini coefficient costs 1% of output. Thus the question of the 
precise magnitude of the tradeoff is still essentially unresolved. This means that it 
is very difficult to guage the true value of the policy implications outlined in this 
section. 
8 By Assumption 6 of section 3.1. 
9 See eg Breit (1974). 
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4. 2 Implications of the Three Bequest Functions 
This section spells out some of the implications of the three bequest functions 
explained in Section 3.3. Sub-section 4.2.1 is concerned with implications of the 
functions for inequality; sub-section 4.2.2 takes a look at implications for Ricardian 
Equivalence; and sub-section 4.2.3 contains a brief discussion about the various 
merits and demerits of the functions. 
4.2.1 Implications for Inequality 
As stated in sub-section 3.3.2 of chapter 3, the earnings rule used in the Davies 
Hypothesis is a variant of a widely-used intergenerational earnings function. The 
implications of the rule for inequality depend on the value taken by the intergen-
erational earnings parameter E, formerly written as 1 (this symbol is replaced by E 
because it is the latter which is estimated in empirical work not the former; also, 
we want to use 1 in later work to refer to Hall's (1978) autoregression parameter 
without ambiguity). If E lies between zero and unity, lifetime earnings will tend 
to regress to the mean (ie inequality of lifetime earnings will tend to decrease over 
time); if E is greater than unity, however, inequality will tend to increase over time. 
With regression to the mean being the likelier case in practice (Becker 1974), the 
issue then becomes the speed of regression to the mean. The closer to zero is E, the 
quicker this will be. 
Estimates of E in the literature tend to relate to earnmgs functions where 
childrens' lifetime earnings are a function of parental lifetime incomes (not earnings 
as in Section 3.3)10 • Perhaps the best recent estimate of E in this case is that of 
Behrman and Taubman (1990), who were able to exploit the longitudinal aspect of 
their data to average out transitory influences on earnings and incomes. Averaging 
over ten years yielded sets of earnings and incomes with more of a permanent, 
or 'lifetime', character than single years. Without controlling for gender, race, 
or other factors, these authors reported E: = 0.8. This is a considerably higher 
estimate than previous studies have generated11 , though as Behrman and Taubman 
10 An exception to this is Atkinson et al (1978). 
11 Eg using a number of cross-section samples drawn from five countries, Becker and Tomes (1986) 
found a median estimate of E of 0.17. This implies a relatively fast regression to the mean. However, 
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observed, it is largely due to the use of more 'permanent' measures of earnings and 
mcomes. 
What are the effects of the DH bequest rule on inequality? It was seen in 
sub-section 3.3.2 how optimal bequests varied negatively with childrens' earnings: 
that is, the DH bequest rule is 'compensatory'12 • This feature of the bequest rule 
is equalising, and offsets, to some extent, the disequalising reaction by rich families 
of giving greater bequests in order to thwart regression to the mean. The impact 
of bequests is therefore ambiguous in the DH. Not surprisingly, the same intuition 
can be applied to the BH; in a series of simulations, Bevan (1979) has produced 
some results which confirm this. 
Evidence on the implications of Bevan's earnings rule for lifetime earnings 
inequality is limited. Bevan was only able to estimate the speed of regression to 
the mean, A, using socioeconomic data. Assuming that ordering by class can be 
taken as a rough proxy for orderings by lifetime earnings, Bevan (1979, p.387-
388) used maximum likelihood methods to estimate A using two data-sets: the 
Oxford Mobility Survey (covering England and Wales) and data from Brittain 
(1977, Table 3.11), relating to Cleveland, Ohio, USA. The estimates of A were 
0.46 and 0.53 respectively. Bevan found his intergenerational earnings rule fitted 
the data quite well for the Ohio sample but not for the Oxford survey. Hence the 
evidence supporting Bevan's rule is inconclusive. 
As far as the Laitner hypothesis is concerned, the variance of lifetime earnings 
is fixed by assumption: inequality measured at any one particular time may fluc-
tuate due to stochastic variation, but the 'expected' degree of inequality will not. 
Evidence of even only limited intergenerational regression to the mean therefore 
casts considerable doubt on the LH. However, where the LH does throw up an 
interesting result is in its (implied) role for bequests. Laitner (1979) rigorously 
demonstrated that in an economy where goods are not perishable, where money 
exists, and where earnings are not heritable, bequests will either increase or leave 
unchanged the degree of equality of the (stationary) distribution of consumption. 
Davies (1982) had earlier used a value of E of I1J2 based on a supposition due to Griliches (1979). 
12 The reader should not confuse this term with its specific use by Tomes (1981 ), who referred to 
parents compensating poorly endowed members of their offspring by leaving them larger bequests. 
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A similar point about the potential equalising role of bequests has also been made 
by other authors, including Stiglitz (1978) and Bevan and Stiglitz (1979). How-
ever, the rationale for this equalising role under the Laitner hypothesis is especially 
appealing intuitively. Consider the following scenario, where an individual is well 
endowed with resources, and so (according to the LH bequest function) leaves a 
large bequest: if his child is poor, this bequest clearly performs an equalising role. 
If his child is rich, its large inheritance makes it even richer; but the increasing non-
linear form of the LH bequest function ensures that a proportionately even larger 
bequest is left than the parent's, thereby mitigating consumption inequality. The 
latter process therefore equalises consumption even in spite of a string of 'lucky' 
(high earning) generations: and when the string is broken with an 'unlucky' (low 
earning) generation, the latter's lifetime wealth is brought up to the mean by the 
large accumulated inheritance received courtesy of its (rich) ancestors. 
4.2.2 Implications for Ricardian Equivalence 
The recent evolution of thought on Ricardian Equivalence can be traced back 
to a seminal paper by Barro (1974). This paper, which has since generated a 
considerable amount of theoretical and empirical work13 , used a model of intergen-
erational altruism to demonstrate that government debt issue14 has no real effects 
in an economy when people have operative bequest motives. This proposition (also 
known as the Debt Neutrality Proposition) is simple and intuitively appealing: any 
future tax increases required to finance the debt issue will be anticipated by the 
beneficiaries, whose behaviour will adjust accordingly. When the tax increase is 
levied on their offspring, an altruistic individual with an operative bequest mo-
tive will simply adjust his or her bequest to maintain the real value of its impact. 
In short, debt issue does not enlarge individuals' possibility sets; and people will 
always try to choose the same optimal outcome from these opportunity sets. 
Do the bequest rules possess the properties of Ricardian Equivalence? The 
DH bequest rule does, at least in its 'primary' form (equation 3.13, Section 3.3) 
before the earnings rule is specified. This is easily demonstrated, assuming r = 0 
13 Two recent surveys include Bernheim (1987) and Barro (1989). 
14 Or social security transfers: since the principle is the same, we can talk about either. 
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for simplicity15 so that ~ = 'lj; = 1. Then 
( 1 ) ( .\ -1/f3 ) D..kg = 1 + _\-1/{3 D..wg- 1 + _\-1/{3 D..yg+l· 
But the inheritance kg-1 is fixed, so that D..wg = D..yg. However, a new debt issue 
increases yg by the same amount that YQ+ 1 decreases, so we also have D..yg = 
-D..yg+l· Therefore 
ilk - D..-(
1 + .\-1/!3) 
g - 1 + _\-1/{3 YQ 
= D..yg. 
This demonstrates Equivalence: individuals increase bequests 'one-for-one' with 
the debt issue to maintain the real value of the bequest to their offspring. 
The earnings rule (3.14), by which childrens' earnings are correlated with those 
of their parents, destroys 'one for one' Equivalence in an interesting manner. Debt 
issue increases individuals' earnings, thereby increasing their childrens' earnings 
automatically via the earnings rule. To see how this may overcome one for one 
neutralisation, consider the case where intergenerational earnings are linked by a 
family background effect. The payment of social security to the parents of a child 
may improve the family background, and thus also the eventual lifetime earnings, 
of the child. One for one neutralisation is destroyed because bequest adjustments 
by parents will compensate for only a fraction of the increase in the child's earnings: 
the 'one for one' (linear) correspondence between the generations' lifetime earnings 
is replaced by a new (non-linear) relationship. 
Neither the BH nor the LH bequest rules can be seen to exhibit Equivalence. 
In the case of the LH, this follows directly from the informational limitations 
of the hypothesis. Information about future tax hikes which is required for the 
Equivalence property to hold are absent from the Laitner world where no more 
precise information exists about future generations than a probability distribution 
of lifetime earnings. 
15 The result also holds for r > 0, but the interpretation is complicated by the need to adjust 
variables in order to represent them in present value terms. 
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4.2.3 The Three Hypotheses Assessed 
Which of the three information hypotheses offers the best description of reality? 
There does not appear to be a clear a priori answer to this question. One reason for 
this is the absence of a well-established body of empirical work on intergenerational 
information sets. Another is the paucity of use of these hypotheses in the literature. 
Nevertheless, it is possible to make a few tentative guesses about the relative 
merits and demerits of the hypotheses at this stage, before estimating the IGH 
consumption function and thereby testing their relative performances. 
Arguably a major drawback of the LH is the way it rules out specific parental 
information about offspring. This does not seem realistic because in view of the 
contribution to utility that such information may account for, it is to be expected 
that parents would have a powerful incentive to acquire it. Moreover, if parents 
are living with their offspring during the latter's childhood (the norm), the costs 
of gathering this information are negligible or zero. Parents should be able to 
generate a good estimate of a child's earnings abilities from a young age. 
It is in fact a restriction on the stochastic distribution of lifetime earnings 
which raises a strong objection to the LH bequest function. This is the 'zero 
growth' restriction: ie the assumed fixity of the distribution from which individual 
samplings are 'drawn'. Since this thesis's version of the BH also assumes zero 
growth (though Bevan's original paper did not), it too is vulnerable to this objec-
tion. Given the fact that economic growth tends to reduce bequests ceteris paribus 
(Bevan and Stiglitz 1979), the LH and BH bequest functions would be expected 
to over-predict bequests if their parameters were known. 
In a practical sense, the au thor believes that the zero growth restriction is 
so strong that it alone is able to suggest the DH, which does not impose it, as 
the most realistic a priori bequest function. The DH also has the advantage 
over the other hypotheses of allowing use of the redistribution policy guide set 
out in the previous section. However, the information hypothesis underpinning 
the DH bequest function is not beyond reproach. For although it may be more 
realistic than the Laitner information hypothesis, it does not compare particularly 
favourably with aspects of the BH. The BH has (what is arguably) the advantage of 
being consistently 'rational': the intergenerational earnings rule is known and used 
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explicitly by the optimising individual, even though the rule may turn out to be 
'wrong'. In contrast the DH is slightly less 'rational', in the sense that individuals 
are assumed to mistakenly believe that their offspring will not leave a bequest; 
furthermore, individuals do not believe, understand, or know about the earnings 
rule sufficiently well for them to use it in predicting future lifetime earnings and 
bequests. On one hand this might be more realistic than the Bevan scenario (agents 
cannot look further ahead than their own and their childrens' lifetimes); but on 
the other hand, it might not. After all, the earnings rule should impart some 
information to rational altruists; and the expectation of parents that childrens' 
bequests will be zero whilst their own are non-zero does not seem consistent. 
To conclude, it would seem that of the three information hypotheses, the LH 
is the least realistic, with the DH lagging or leading the BH according to how 
much intergenerational information individuals actually use. The author believes, 
however, that out of the three bequest functions, the Davies function is the most 
realistic. This is because it is the only one which does not impose zero economic 
growth. 
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Chapter V 
Estimation of the IGH Consumption Function 
5.1 The Data 
This section provides a summary of the raw data sources and data transfor-
mations used to create a data-set for estimating the IGH consumption function. 
Sub-section 5.1.1 deals with the real aggregate consumption series; sub-section 
5.1.2 describes the construction of a nominal net earnings series with a distribu-
tional breakdown; and sub-section 5.1.3 discusses the inheritance series. 
5.1.1 Real Aggregate Consumption 
The real aggregate consumption senes was taken directly from a paper by 
Patterson (1989)1 . This annual series covers the period 1964-1986: more recent 
observations have not yet been constructed. Patterson's series relates specifically 
to the (estimated) consumption of goods and services rather than to consumer ex-
penditure - an important distinction, and one which ensures that the theoretically 
correct dependent variable is used in the econometric work. Patterson also derived 
a price deflator series derived on a consumption rather than an expenditure basis; 
this was later used to deflate the nominal earnings and (the relevant stretches of) 
the two nominal inheritance series. 
Although the superiority of a consumption over an expenditure series has been 
apparent for a long time (see eg Friedman (1957), Mayer (1972)), much applied 
work has utilised consumer expenditure data instead. This is not unreasonable in 
view of the large proportion of expenditure taken up by non-durables; but the use 
of expenditure data in applied work surely owes more to the lack of availability of 
a suitable aggregate consumption time series. Therefore Patterson's series is an 
especially welcome contribution to the applied consumption area. 
1 The author is grateful to Dr. Patterson for permitting him to use these data. 
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Patterson used a disaggregated CSO data-set to construct his (Divisia) con-
sumption index. Quantitatively, it seems to be fairly similar to the expenditure 
series, although it is slightly smoother, indicating a slightly smaller fall in personal 
savings in the 1980's than implied by the CSO data. 
5.1.2 Nominal Net Earnings with a Distributional Breakdown 
Two principal sources of data were used to construct a time series of nominal 
net earnings with a distributional breakdown. These were: aggregated Central 
Statistical Office (CSO) data, whose distributional breakdowns are based on the 
Family Expenditure Survey (FES); and the Inland Revenue's Survey of Personal 
Incomes (SPI). We will first describe how an estimated aggregate net earnings 
series was constructed, and then we will discuss the pedigree of the distributional 
senes. 
Aggregate nominal net earnings were defined as the sum of incomes from em-
ployment and self-employment, less a certain proportion of income taxes. This pro-
portion was defined as the ratio of incomes from employment and self-employment 
to the difference between total personal income and current government transfers. 
This definition of aggregate net earnings is similar to Muellbauer's (1983, p.41-42), 
which multiplied the sum of incomes from employment and self-employment by the 
'retention ratio': the principal difference is that Muellbauer regards national in-
surance contributions as a form of taxation, whereas we argue that they should 
be treated as a form of saving out of income. This is because employee national 
insurance contributions are simply earnings which are 'forced' into savings: these 
savings are of course realised later in the life cycle (ie in retirement). The estimates 
of aggregate real net earnings, Yt, are given in the last column of Table 5.1 (which 
appears at the end of this sub-section). 
The distributional data were harder to generate and involved using data of 
doubtful quality. The central problem here was that both sources of available raw 
data - the FES and the SPI - suffer from serious drawbacks. The problems with 
the FES stem chiefly from the survey nature of the data: they include 
• the under-recording of top and self-employment incomes - see eg Atkinson and 
Micklewright (1983), who cite an unpublished CSO study which suggests that 
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the top 1% of taxable income recipients are under-represented in the FES by 
about 30%; and that self-employment income is under-recorded by about 25%; 
• the collected data relate to incomes rather than earnings; 
• compilation at the household level, where a household is not a family but any 
group of people living under the same roof: this unit is clearly inconsistent 
with the IGH theory; 
• the short time span of the Gini series, which dates back only as far as 1975: 
furthermore, the CSO has stopped reporting Gini coefficients for unequivalised 
households after 1987; 
• unreliability, arising from an incomplete and biased response rate. In compar-
ing the FES with the SPI and New Earnings Survey, Rendall and Wolf (1983) 
conclude: "Although the {FES} results may be sufficiently reliable for the pur-
pose it serves, ie, in establishing weights for the RPI, it is questionable whether 
really meaningful income distribution results can be obtained". (p.175); 
• numerous changes in definition over time. 
Despite these shortcomings, especially the fact that total income rather than 
earnings is measured, it would seem that FES distributional data is preferable to 
that of the SPI. This is chiefly because the SPI only contains data relating only 
to taxpayers' incomes: non-taxpayers (who amount to about one quarter of the 
tax unit population2 ) are ignored. The reason for this is that the tax office does 
not need to know the incomes of those whose personal allowances exceed their 
mcomes. This property biases estimates of overall distribution considerably. For 
example, it is widely known that income inequality increased between 1979 and 
1986: estimates of the Gini coefficient based on FES data bear this trend out, 
being 0.33 in 1979 and 0.36 in 1986 (qv later). Yet the implied Gini coefficients 
computed from SPI data using the gamma distribution (see Table 5.1) were 0.35 
in 1979, 0.18 in 1982, and 0.16 in 1986! Such a dramatic apparent increase in 
equality can be attributed to the large increase in unemployment arising from the 
2 Under the system of joint taxation (which was replaced by independent taxation in April 1990), 
single people and married couples were both treated as one unit for tax purposes - hence the term 
'tax unit'. Of course, the IGH theory is framed in terms of individual decision making, not tax-unit 
decision making; however, these units may be viewed as being suitably close. 
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1979-1981 recession- this removed much of the lower tail of the taxpayers' earnings 
distribution. Other problems with the SPI include: 
• the data is compiled on a financial rather than a calendar year basis (unlike 
the consumption series used in the IGH); 
• changes in coverage and composition have occurred over time, a recent example 
being the inclusion in 'income', from 1985 onwards, of estimates of employees' 
superannuation contributions. 
• no data were published in 1980 and 1981, due to a Civil Service strike. 
However, the SPI does have some compensating advantages: these include 
• a detailed breakdown of earnings by earnings class, stretching back to the early 
1960's; 
• the ability to generate fairly accurate estimates of net earned income, for all 
earnings classes, relying on the minimum of assumptions. For example, it is 
relatively straightforward to allocate tax liabilities on earned income to each 
class. Also, the distribution of 'non-investment' income is broken down into use-
ful component categories. This enables the researcher, for example, to remove 
pensions from 'earned income', which in an intertemporal optimising model 
should be regarded as realised savings not earnings. The SPI also correctly 
treats national insurance contributions as earnings (see the second paragraph 
of this sub-section?; 
• the reliability of the data, coming as it does directly from tax offices. 
On balance, however, the drawbacks of the SPI data were felt to greatly out-
weigh the advantages. It is worth noting that the shortcomings of the SPI are 
not readily amenable to correction by adjusting the raw data series. Filling in the 
'missing' tax unit population would not be straightforward, since this would entail 
estimating distributions of personal tax allowances (which vary with individual 
circumstances). Another drawback is that the unit of account is the tax unit not 
the individual (see footnote 2); however, sufficient data does not exist to effect 
3 Blinder and Deaton (1985) also excluded these contributions, though it is not clear from their 
paper why they did so. 
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a ready transformation from the tax unit to the individual level. It would also 
not have been straightforward to adjust for the financial year compilation of the 
data: especially problematical would have been the application of this procedure 
to the distributional parameters estimated from the data. We therefore used the 
SPI data when we had no better data: this is for the period 1964-1974. 
FES estimates of the Gini coefficient for disposable income are used as raw 
data for 1975-1986: estimates for alternate years starting in 1975 can be found in 
Table 3 on page 118 of the Redistribution oflncome article in May 1990's Economic 
Trends. Interpolation is used for the missing years. Recall from the structure of 
the IGH consumption function (3.29) that estimation work requires estimates of 
the shape parameter of the gamma distribution of earnings, a, for each year. Since 
the implied Gini coefficient is related to a by the formula 
r(a + ~) 
G(a) = f(a + l)J?f' 
a simple iterative search can be used to generate estimates of a from observed 
values of G. These estimates and their corresponding Gini values for 1975-1986 
are as follows: &: 2.849, 2.948, 3.053, 2.849, 2.662, 2.662, 2.662, 2.662, 2.662, 2.492, 
2.337, 2.194; G(&): 0.32, 0.315, 0.31, 0.32, 0.33, 0.33, 0.33, 0.33, 0.33, 0.34, 0.35, 
0.36. 
For the years 1964-1974, the raw SPI data were transformed by first, creating 
two vectors for each year, one giving the average net earnings of each earnings 
class, and the other listing the proportions of the earnings population in each 
class. Distributional breakdowns of net earnings were estimated by allocating tax 
payments to each distributional class (in any year) in proportion to the class's ratio 
of earned to total income in that year. The assumption implicit in this procedure 
is that earned and investment income are taxed equally, an assumption which has 
only strictly been true in the UK since 1984 (setting aside the distributional effects 
of the composite rate tax, abolished in April 1991). However, this assumption 
seems to be a fairly good one: adjustments for years prior to 1984, to reflect the 
relatively higher taxation of investment income, were not deemed to be worthwhile. 
A few examples using the pre-1973 system with earned income and small income 
reliefs bore this out - the amendments made to the 'proportions' defined above 
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are very small, and are themselves subject to caveats. Furthermore, coping with 
the investment income surcharge system which applied between 1973 and 1984 
requires making assumptions about income ranges which are not judged to be 
secure enough to merit confidence in the improved accuracy they might provide. 
Finally, the estimated tax payed on earned income was then deducted from each 
class of pre-tax earned income to obtain the estimated distribution of post-tax 
earnmgs. 
The above procedure produced the required two vectors for each year. Gamma 
distributions were then fitted to these data for each year, and the parameters of 
the distributions were estimated. The fitting of the gamma distribution involved 
minimising the sum of squared residuals between the observed number of members 
for each earnings class, and the 'predicted' number of members arising from the 
functional form of the gamma distribution for some estimate of its two parameters 
(a, J..L ). The Hooke and Jeeves (1961) pattern search algorithm was used to search 
the parameter space for the (a, P,) which minimised the sum of squared residuals4 • 
The Hooke and Jeeves method was chosen because of its robustness with respect 
to parameter 'starting positions'; it also has the desirable feature that it tends to 
successfully follow ridges in the parameter space5 • The Hooke and Jeeves estimates 
always converged; furthermore, checking by perturbing the solutions seemed to 
suggest that these were located at global rather than local minima. 
The results of fitting the post-tax SPI earnings distribution for the years 1964-
1986 appear in Table 5.1. For each year's distribution, the following information 
is presented: estimates of the shape (a) and scale (J..L) parameters; the associated 
(implied) Gini coefficient G(a); the residual sum of squares of the fit (rss); and the 
number of observations ( n) used to estimate the two parameters. Comparing the 
a and G( a) values derived from the FES (above) with those presented in Table 
5.1 (on page 95) illustrates the enormous differences between the two data-sets 
- and their poor quality and unreliability. They almost seem to describe two 
4 The Hooke and Jeeves algorithm was programmed by the author in the high-level programming 
language APL using APL*PLUS PC on a Commodore personal computer; programs are available 
from the author on request. 
5 See eg Goldfeld and Quandt (1972, pp.27-38). A more regularly used technique to fit the gamma 
distribution is the Newton-Raphson algorithm, which is used to solve the maximum likelihood 
equations. This technique was tried but rejected due to excess sensitivity to starting positions. 
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completely different earnings distributions. Hence the o: estimates must be treated 
with considerable caution. 
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TABLE 5.1 
THE SPI (GAMMA) EARNINGS DISTRIBUTION DATA ESTIMATES 
AND CSO AGGREGATE EARNINGS SERIES 
a J-l G(&) rss n y (£m) 
1964 0.592 105.478 0.603 0.020 28 19625 
1965 0.739 51.223 0.559 0.017 25 20400 
1966 0.798 41.055 0.544 0.017 25 20871 
1967 0.862 32.954 0.529 0.018 25 21181 
1968 0.921 27.594 0.516 0.019 25 21471 
1969 0.947 24.417 0.511 0.022 24 21767 
1970 0.636 59.989 0.589 0.018 24 22907 
1971 0.831 31.431 0.536 0.021 24 23018 
1972 0.526 20.311 0.627 0.032 17 25315 
1973 0.843 12.160 0.533 0.041 17 27977 
1974 1.266 7.143 0.455 0.050 17 27875 
1975 3.648 1.433 0.285 0.049 17 27684 
1976 1.255 7.247 0.457 0.016 17 27771 
1977 1.702 5.053 0.402 0.014 17 26679 
1978 2.232 3.683 0.357 0.010 17 28180 
1979 2.338 3.991 0.350 0.006 17 28675 
1980 28269 
1981 27787 
1982 9.519 1.015 0.181 0.004 17 27005 
1983 10.176 1.009 0.175 0.005 17 27846 
1984 11.705 0.896 0.163 0.007 16 28467 
1985 12.792 0.884 0.156 0.014 16 28859 
1986 12.509 0.969 0.158 0.022 16 29739 
Notes. Distributional data for 1980 and 1981 are unavailable due to a Civil Service strike. 
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5.1.3 The Inheritance Data 
This series proved the most difficult to construct. Two measures of inheritance 
were used for It, the first being a direct but cumbersome method of adding up 
past inheritances. This method utilises many tenuous assumptions and so the 
measure based on it is at best of highly questionable accuracy. The second, and 
we believe more reliable, measure is a total net wealth proxy for ft. However, there 
are problems with this measure too, and we discuss these together with the data 
sources. 
We start by describing the direct 'adding up' measure. This measure utilised 
Inland Revenue inheritance data combined with a battery of simplifying assump-
tions. Recall from section 3.4 that It is the sum of inheritances received or to be 
received by every living adult at time t. This therefore includes adults (of eco-
nomic age less than TJ) who are still to come into their bequest, yet who form 
intergenerational consumption plans taking their future inheritances into account. 
An immediate practical problem becomes apparent if 7] > 0, since data on inheri-
tances received in future periods (t + 1, t + 2, ... ) will be needed to construct It for 
any t. Such data obviously does not exist, and so we are forced to adopt a 'second 
best' strategy for estimating this measure. 
Two approaches for estimating an approximate series stand out. One involves 
collecting survey data on intentions to bequeath, factoring the results up to the 
macro level, and then adding them to historical macro inheritance data. Although 
this approach is closest to the spirit of the IGH, this author is unaware of any UK 
survey of this type, and so a second approach is followed. This entails assuming 
that 7] = 0, ie that individuals inherit when they reach adulthood. Recourse to this 
assumption obviates the need to consult future inheritance data: all that is needed 
is data on current aggregate inheritance and a vector of inheritance aggregates 
stretching back T- 1 periods into the past (recall that Tis adult longevity). Past 
inheritance data is required because adults alive at t include all those reaching 
adulthood from period t- T + 1 up tot. The 'adding up' estimate of ft is just the 
sum of all these inheritances. 
An immediate problem with the assumption of 7] = 0 is that it is flatly con-
tradicted by Blomquist's (1979) evidence that people tend to inherit at around 
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human age 50. It also implies unrealistic childbirth-timing decisions: if individuals 
are of economic age zero when they inherit, then with a childhood of 20 years and 
a human lifespan of 70 years, (all) parents are aged 50 when they give birth. Hence 
the assumption is deeply flawed. However, ignoring this for the moment, consider 
the case when parents bequeath before they die, ie 17 < T. Then appropriate in-
heritance data will look at inter vivos transfers only. That is, estate data will be 
inappropriate. However, the scope for measurement error with inter vivos bequest 
transfer data is quite substantial, and no sufficiently detailed or reliable series cur-
rently exists in the UK. Therefore we make an additional simplifying assumption, 
that 17 = T, so that bequests are terminal and estate data is appropriate. The 
reliability and length of the inheritance series in the UK makes this assumption 
particularly convenient. The Inland Revenue has collected estate data since the 
1894 Finance Act, and it is readily available in Inland Revenue Commissioner's 
Reports and Inland Revenue Statistics. Taking T = 516 , and noting that the sam-
ple starts in 1964, inheritance data was needed for as far back as 1914. Total 
inheritance in a year was defined as the total net capital value of estates passing at 
death in that year7 ; the values for 1964-1986 were deflated using Patterson's series, 
and earlier data were deflated by the old 'Cost of Living' index suitably adjusted 
to splice with Patterson's series. Nominal inheritance data were interpolated for 
the years 1914-1919. 
The resulting measure of It is therefore an attempt at direct estimation, but 
it suffers from obvious shortcomings. The assumptions used to construct it -
including people inheriting when they reach adulthood and the non-existence of 
inter-vivos transfers - are almost certainly seriously wrong. Consequently, the 
constructed. series is probably of marginal usefulness. We therefore considered a 
second possible measure of It which made no such unrealistic assumptions. An 
appropriate proxy was felt to be total net wealth, since it contains both bequests 
made in the past, and the wherewithall to provide for bequests to be made in the 
future, as required. Therefore, net wealth is likely to move in the same direction as 
6 If 'childhood lasts for 15-20 years, T=51 implies a lifespan of about 66-71, which seems quite 
reasonable. 
7 Incomplete coverage of the raw data should be noted: until the 104th Commissioner's Report, 
estates whose value was less than the then exemption limit were not analysed. Other problems 
include: prior to 1974-75 the data relate to Great Britain not the United Kingdom; and the fact 
that data are in financial not calendar year terms. 
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the stock of inheritances received or be received. The recent increase in popularity 
of inter vivos transfers in order to minimise tax loss will not distort this measure 
because the wealth out of which these transfers are made, or will be made (in the 
case of living adults waiting for their bequest), is fixed regardless. However, the 
direct 'adding up' measure will fail to register this trend, and so will be biased 
downwards, an especially important point to bear in mind when data from recent 
years is being used (see Figure 5.2 in section 5.2). 
Total net wealth estimates are readily available from the personal sector bal-
ance sheets published in the Blue Book and Financial Statistics: these are annual 
and relate to stocks held at calendar year end. Apart from questions of accuracy 
which must beset any official estimate of wealth8 , there is an important reason to 
treat the series with caution. This relates to the closeness of wealth as a proxy for 
the 'true' total inheritance, ft. Specifically, total wealth includes life-cycle savings, 
which should ideally be separated from wealth accumulated by inheritance. Of 
course, the published series do not do this. 
8 As testimony to this, the wealth series is constantly being revised. 
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5.2 Empirical Results 
This section reports empirical results arising from the estimation and testing 
of the IGH consumption function 
(3.29) 
After estimation of its parameters is undertaken, the function is compared to 
two rival specifications, the Euler equation model of Hall (1978) and the wealth-
augmented Euler equation model of Molana (1991)9 • The object of this exercise is 
to determine which model (if any) is consistent with the UK data described in the 
previous section. 
The time series of aggregate consumption and labour earnings are graphed 
for the 1964-1986 sample in Figure 5.1. The two time series designed to measure 
It are graphed in Figure 5.2: INHDIV3 and WDIV3 are the 'direct' and proxy 
measures described in the previous section, divided by a factor of three for ease of 
graphical presentation. It is apparent from Figure 5.1 that there is little obvious 
non-linearity in the relationship between consumption and earnings. However, 
earnings do not seem to track consumption very closely over this sample. From 
Figure 5.2, it would appear that wealth rather than the direct measure of It tracks 
consumption the closest. This is as we would expect, given the discussion about 
the measures contained in sub-section 5.1.3. An implication of this is that we 
should expect the empirical work to favour the wealth over the direct measure 
in terms of successful econometric performance. These points should be borne in 
mind as the econometric results of this chapter are presented. 
The fact that (3.29) is non-linear raises several immediate problems. What is 
the most appropriate estimation technique? What are the properties of the chosen 
estimator, including small sample behaviour? How sensitive to starting positions 
is the chosen estimator? The commonest approach to dealing with a function like 
(3.29) is to assume an identically and independently distributed error term, and 
to choose the non-linear least squares (NLLS) estimator. As its name suggests, 
the NLLS estimator attempts to find the coefficient estimates which are consistent 
9 See sections 2.1 and 2.3 respectively for more details about these models. 
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with minimisation of the sum of squared residuals (ssr) of the model. The word 
'attempts' is used because unlike OLS, there is no neat analytical formula with 
NLLS for calculating the optimum coefficient estimates. Minimisation of the sum 
of squared residuals involves using some iterative, or direct search, routine which 
keeps adjusting coefficient estimates until it is no longer possible to reduce the ssr10 • 
One of the perils of non-linear estimation is that there is never any guarantee that 
global, rather than local, optima are reached by a search routine. Related to this 
is common problem that the 'solution' to a search program can often be highly 
dependent on the starting values of the search. Lack of convergence of the ssr in 
applied work often suggests some oddity of the function being estimated. 
The NLLS estimator, while probably the best available, does not possess par-
ticularly encouraging small sample properties. Unlike the OLS estimator, which 
is always unbiased (but only asymptotically efficient), the NLLS estimator is only 
asymptotically unbiased; and test statistics with known distributions for diagnostic 
checking are limited in number11 • These are important caveats which any applied 
researcher undertaking non-linear estimation should be aware of. 
We turn now to the sample period used for estimation of (3.29). Recall from 
the previous chapter that the source of raw data for the distribution parameter a 
changed in 1975. So pronounced was the effect of this change on a (see sub-section 
5.1.2), that we thought it advisable to consider four separate sample periods. The 
first is 1964-1974, for which the SPI (taxpayer) data was utilised. The second 
is 1975-1986, based on the FES data source. The third sample combines both 
sub-samples, despite the discontinuity; and the fourth uses just SPI data for the 
longest available period 1964-1986, with 1980 and 1981 omitted. Corresponding 
to each of these samples are the econometric results presented in columns 1 to 4 
respectively of Table 5.2 and 6 to 9 of Table 5.3. Table 5.2 describes results using 
the direct inheritance measure; Table 5.3 presents results using the wealth measure 
instead. Column 5 of Table 5.2 and column 10 of Table 5.3 are regressions which 
do not use any of the distributional data. The idea here was to try to detect non-
linearity whilst avoiding the distortions caused by the error-prone distributional 
data. Results for all 10 regressions were generated using TSP version 4.1B. 
10 In actual fact, algorithms invariably reduce the ssr to within some given accuracy scalar. 
11 See eg Amemiya {1983). 
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Figure 5.1 
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The results contained in the tables are uniformly disappointing for the IGH, al-
though the validity of the results is highly questionable given the likelihood of small 
sample biases of the NLLS estimator. This caveat is especially important for the 
sub-samples, ie the first two columns of each table. There is very little difference 
between the tables, and so the following comments should suffice to summarise the 
essential features of both. The non-linear term is insignificantly different from zero 
in all of these regressions: the highest t-statistic on the non-linear term is around 
0. 7. The poor Durbin-Watson statistics indicate pervasive, and in some cases, se-
vere mis-specification problems. Hence these regressions are probably worthless for 
practical policy purposes. They are also useless for inferring bequest hypothesis 
applicability and speed of 'regression to the mean' (see chapter 4). 
The limited variation in the FES a estimates probably accounts for why both 
regressions (2) and (5) (and (7) and (10)) indicate zero non-linearity, where the 
latter holds a perfectly constant in order to investigate whether any residual non-
linearity exists. These results bear out the implication of Figure 5.1, that the 
relationship between consumption and aggregate earnings is linear in this sample. 
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TABLE 5.2 
THE COEFFICIENT ESTIMATES OF EQUATION (3.29) 
('Direct' Inheritance measure) 
Dependent Variable: Ct 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
1964-1974 1975-1986 1964-1986 1964-1986t 1964-1986t* 
(SPI) (FES) (FES & SPI) (SPI) (none) 
f3o -12706.950 -167576.400 -41040.530 -41544.840 -36193.10 
(2513.46) (13635.16) (16094.07) (76051.68) (13704.88) 
/31 0.459 2.507 1.045 1.040 0.909 
(0.06) (0.23) (0.41) (1.87) (0.34) 
/32 0.344 0.716 1.473 1.316 0.056 
(0.31) (0.21) (1.84) (7.21) (0.37) 
!33 -0.007 0 -3.202 -2.264 0 
(0.19) (0) ( 4.57) (15.24) (0) 
1.180 0.933 0.939 
(1.86) (0.07) (0.37) 
-LL 66.60 87.11 195.12 209.34 195.52 
se 139.63 450.10 1322.30 5917.88 1345.32 
DW 1.16 1.43 0.25 0.01 0.19 
t Years 1980 and 1981 omitted. 
* Treating the llt as a constant. 
Notes. Method of estimation: NLLS. Estimated standard errors are given in parentheses be-
neath coefficients; LL is the log-likelihood function; and se is the standard error of the regres-
SIOn. 
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TABLE 5.3 
THE COEFFICIENT ESTIMATES OF EQUATION (3.29) 
(Wealth measure) 
Dependent Variable: Ct 
(6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
1966-1974 1975-1986 1966-1986 1966-1986t 1966-1986t* 
(SPI) (FES) (FES & SPI) (SPI) (none) 
f3o 7131.206 26124.610 3269.949 3328.873 7346.50 
(2968.03) (9013.61) (2062.58) (2015.16) (3823150) 
/31 0.016 0.117 0.090 0.089 0.016 
(0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.04) 
/32 0.115 -0.495 0.825 1.902 -0.545 
(0.84) (0.38) (1.32) (1.24) ( 47908) 
!33 2.426 0 -0.019 -1.295 2.126 
(5.07) (0) (0.26) (1.82) (34862) 
0.854 1.282 1.010 0.946 
(0.15) (0.97) (0.06) (2201) 
-LL 63.14 90.35 168.05 154.26 184.92 
se 404.07 589.76 828.35 946.33 1849.85 
DW 0.90 1.16 1.00 1.50 0.08 
t Years 1980 and 1981 omitted. 
• Treating the at as a constant. 
Notes. Method of estimation: NLLS. 
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Whilst treating the NLLS results with great caution, the fact that we cannot 
identify any significant non-linearity in these regressions prompts us to ask: how 
does a linear version of the IGH perform (ie with the non-linear term excluded)? 
Specifically, since at least some of the variables in the function seem to be trended, 
do the variables C, I, and Y cointegrate? If the linear special case of the IGH is 
data-coherent, this would support the BH rather than the non-linear form of the 
DH. The principles of cointegration were briefly described in Section 2.3 of chapter 
2 earlier, when some recent empirical work on the UK consumption function was 
discussed. As stated there, the first task when testing for cointegration is to 
establish the time series properties of the data. The tests of the principal variables 
for I(O) and I(l) characteristics are reported in Table 5.4 below. Just the ADF(p) 
statistic is reported, since it is more powerful than the DF: p, the number of lags, 
is determined by the data. Clearly, p=O corresponds to the DF statistic. 
TABLE 5.4 
TESTS FOR STATIONARITY 
I(O) I(l) 
ADF(p) p ADF(p) p 
c 0.83 2 -3.07* 3 
w 0.64 2 -3.79* 1 
y 
-1.40 0 -3.63* 0 
In -3.45* 1 
Notes: 
Annual data 1964-1986 for all variables, except W, for which the sample is 1966-1986. 
Critical values are -1.95; an asterisk indicates stationarity after differencing d times. 
Here, In denotes the 'direct' measure of I, and W wealth (the alternative mea-
sure of I). Asterisks indicate that the 'alternative hypothesis' of I( d) is accepted 
by the data. Hence consumption, income, and the wealth measure all appear to 
be I(l) variables, whilst the inheritance measure appears to be I(O). The intuitive 
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meaning of this can be understood by referring back to Figures 5.1 and 5.2, where 
all variables except In were seen to trend definitely upwards over time, though 
with a fairly constant rate of change. 
The implication of all this is that only Y and W may potentially cointegrate 
with C: it is impossible for In to be a member of the cointegrating vector. This 
is not altogether surprising given our discussion in sub-section 5.1.3 of section 
5.1: In suffers from serious measurement problems, including omission of lifetime 
inheritance transfers. Since such transfers have become increasingly popular in 
recent years, this may well explain why the In measure displays I(O) rather than 
I( 1) characteristics (we would expect the true series to be I( 1), like wealth - see the 
bequest hypotheses of section 3.3). On the basis of this reasoning, we interpret the 
above result as evidence that In is too poor a measure to warrant further empirical 
use. Thus we do not utilise It any further in this thesis: only the alternative 
measure W will be used hereafter. 
We now proceed to test whether C, Y and W cointegrate, as the IGH under 
the Bevan Hypothesis (BH) predicts. Table 5.5 on page 109 contains the results 
of the cointegration exercise. Three regressions have been run, all based on the 
linear version of the IGH function 
Column (11) in the table is for the completely unrestricted case; (12) reports the 
special case where /32 is constrained to zero - this is a test in levels of Molana's 
(1991) model (originally formulated in logs). Finally, regression (13) is for the 
special case where /31 is constrained to zero - this is a test of the assumed long run 
relationship underpinning the ECM. 
Critical values for N-variable cointegrating regressions for a sample size of 
n=25 are not published; however, using those of Engle and Yoo (1987) for n=50 
give the following 5% critical values. For regression (11), tabulated DF is -4.11; 
ADF(4) is -3.75; and tabulated CRDW is unavailable. For regressions (12) and 
(13), tabulated DF is -3.67; ADF(4) is -3.29; and CRDW is either 0.78 or 1.03, 
depending on the degree of underlying serial correlation. Hence the results in Table 
5.5 indicate that neither wealth nor income, nor both together, cointegrate with 
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consumption (there is a possibility in (11 ), however, that an undetected cointe-
grating vector may exist; but we do not test for this here). On the basis of this 
evidence we reject the IGH, Molana's generalisation of Hall's REPIH in levels, 
and the ECM approach which suggests a stable 'long run' relationship between 
consumption and income. The latter two results are not very surprising: similar 
results have been obtained by other authors, as shown in section 2.3 of chapter 2. 
However, the failure of the pure IGH, is a new and, we believe, important result 
deserving further investigation. 
Our route of investigation involves going back to one of the more tenuous 
IGH auxiliary assumptions, and modifying it. However, before we follow this 
line of enquiry, we first find it interesting to assess the performance of the pure 
REPIH of Hall. We therefore estimated the simple consumption autoregression 
Ct = I· Ct-1 + Ut, where 1 is a constant and u is an error term. If the REPIH were 
correct, the autoregression would fit the data well, be well specified, and fail to 
admit other regressors on the right-hand side as signficant explanatory variables. 
Regression (14) in Table 5.6 reports the results using our data-set. 
Column (14) of Table 5.6 shows quite clearly that the pure REPIH is rejected 
by the data. There is marked serial correlation and heteroschedasticity in the 
residuals, as evidenced by failures of the h, LM and H statistics at 5% significance. 
Furthermore, a quick glance at the other regressions presented in this table shows 
that the REPIH fails simple exclusion tests. 
Koskela and Viren (1984) have observed that serial correlation may be caused 
m REPIH regressions by breakdowns in the auxiliary assumptions, eg imper-
fect labour market information and constraints, real interest rate variability, and 
non-separable consumption-leisure preferences. However, given extensive evidence 
about the limited responsibility of these assumptions for REPIH test failure (see 
section 2.1), it is possible that there is a different reason for this failure. We devote 
the remainder of this chapter to considering two candidates. Both hypothesise that 
population heterogeneity exists; the difference between them relates to the type of 
presumed heterogeneity. 
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TABLE 5.5 
TESTS FOR COINTEGRATION 
Dependent Variable: Ct 
(11) (12) (13) 
f3o 2095.7 8566.8 250.273 
(2027.6) (1833.6) (2448.0) 
/31 0.083 0.136 
(0.02) (0.01) 
!32 0.527 1.039 
(0.12) (0.09) 
R2 0.93 0.85 0.85 
se 992.11 1364.50 1475.60 
BJ(2) 7.68* 0.76 0.33 
CRDW 0.73 0.63 0.20 
ADF(p) -2.85 -2.94 0.07 
p 1 1 0 
Notes. Method of estimation: OLS. Annual data 1966-1986 except regression (13), which is 
1964-1986. BJ(·) is the Jarque-Bera statistic (distributed as a x2 variate) which tests normality 
of the residuals; an asterisk indicates non-normality. To give a rough idea of the contribution of 
coefficients to the regressions, standard errors are given in parentheses; however, t-ratios are not 
distributed as a Student's t, and so conventional hypothesis testing cannot be undertaken. CRDW 
is the cointegrating Durbin-Watson statistic, another test of stationary residuals. 
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TABLE 5.6 
REPIH AND HYBRID REGRESSIONS 
(14) (15) (16) (17) (18) 
f3J 659.864 10383.500 
(368.36) (10908.80) 
it 1.023 0.996 0.780 0.778 0.778 
(0.004) (0.08) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
!3{ 0.039 0.038 0.038 
(0.003) (0.004) (0.004) 
f3J 0.028 0.016 -4.356 22.091 
(0.08) (0.03) ( 4.90) (22.50) 
(I 0.394 -4.331 
(0.44) ( 4.45) 
(2 0.213 
(0.22) 
R2 0.982 0.982 0.998 0.998 0.998 
se 482.00 492.42 177.71 178.79 178.62 
h 2.17* 2.50* 0.32 0.26 0.25 
LM(1) 3.69* 4.33* 0.02 0.04 0.03 
RESET(1) 0.24 0.55 1.48 0.50 0.47 
BJ(2) 0.90 0.69 5.84 5.17 5.14 
H 5.63* 6.82* 0.14 0.12 0.12 
t For regressions (14) and (15), /3J is /3o; It is 1; and /3J is /12- all as before. For regressions 
( 16), ( 17) and ( 18), /3J, 1 t, 13{ and /3J are functions of their respective non- t coefficients: these 
are defined later in the text. 
Notes. Method of estimation: OLS. Annual data 1966-1986 except regressions (14) and (15), 
which are 1964-1986. h is Durbin's serial correlation statistic for regressions with a lagged 
dependent variable; LM(1) is the Lagrange Multiplier statistic for first order serial correlation 
(distributed as x2 (1)); RESET is Ramsey's test of functional form (distributed as x2 (1)); BJ is 
the Jarque and Bera test for normality of the residuals (distributed as x2 (2)); and His an F-test 
for heteroschedasticity. An asterisk indicates that the regression fails the referenced diagnostic 
test. 
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In a popular modification of the REPIH, it is suggested that the population 
consists of the following two groups. In the first are people who obey the REPIH, 
and in the second, a minority who are 'Keynesian', or 'liquidity constrained', con-
sumers. The latter do not separate their consumption and income streams in the 
usual life-cycle manner; instead, they passively consume their current income in 
each period. One reason for such behaviour may be the presence of liquidity con-
straints, which bind income and consumption paths together (Hall (1978), Flavin 
(1981), Hayashi (1982), Summers (1982), DeLong and Summers (1986), Campbell 
and Mankiw (1987, 1989); see also Appendix A). Hence the second group may be 
thought of as liquidity constrained. Modifying the REPIH to account for this form 
of population heterogeneity is quite straightforward: the usual representation is 
where .A2 measures the proportion of the population who are liquidity constrained. 
As stated in Appendix A, US evidence suggests that this proportion is at most 
20%. Estimation of .A2 under this liquidity constraint interpretation should involve 
use of an instrumental variables (IV) procedure, because we expect the error term 
u to be related to Y under this interpretation. If OLS is used instead, A2 will be 
a biased estimator of the proportion liquidity constrained. But in this thesis we 
are not interested in examining the liquidity constraint rationale behind the above 
equation: that is, we do not want to estimate .A2 for these purposes. What we 
are interested in is the econometric performance of the augmented specification, in 
particular, whether such a model is well-specified (data coherent). Hence we use 
OLS to investigate this and therefore stress that the .A2 coefficient should not be 
interpreted as a 'proportion liquidity constrained' parameter. 
The results of estimating the above equation are presented as regression (15) 
in Table 5.6. The coefficients AI and A2 correspond to It and ,8~ in the table. 
A reasonable fit notwithstanding, the equation exhibits severe mis-specification 
problems: autocorrelation and heteroschedasticity. Hence we conclude that the 
REPIH-Keynesiau heterogeneity rationale does not explain the data. 
We can however suggest an alternative source of heterogeneity which relates 
directly to the IGH. This involves returning to the IGH auxiliary assumption about 
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homogenous preferences, and modifying it to make it more realistic. Specifically, 
we suggest the following modification to assumptions 3 and 7 of section 3.1: 
The population can broadly be divided into two groups, the first of which follow 
Hall's REPIH, and the second of which follows the IGH. 
This hypothesis is based on suggestions by some authors, including Kurz (1984, 
1985) and Baskin and Lau (1984), that the majority of the population (say q) 
behave according to the REPIH, whilst the remainder, 1- q, behave intergenera-
tionally. Kurz (1985) suggests that richer, dynastically-orientated, consumers are 
more likely to be intergenerational planners, while more modestly endowed indi-
viduals (the bottom 70% of the income distribution) are probably less obviously 
altruistic towards their offspring12 • Another convenient fact which supports the im-
plementation of a hybrid REPIH-IGH specification concerns the role of assumed 
uncertainty about the future in these theories. The IGH posits certainty about 
the future whereas the REPIH does not: this corresponds to the breakdown of the 
population into rich IGH consumers, who are likely to be more certain about their 
futures and who therefore find it easier to intergenerationally plan; and poorer 
REPIH consumers, who are likely to face greater uncertainty about the future 
and who may therefore be less able (and perhaps willing) to intergenerationally 
plan. In other words, the breakdown into richer and poorer sectors matches the 
certainty-uncertainty assumptions of the models relating to these sectors. 
With a fraction q behaving according to the REPIH, and (1 - q) behaving 
according to the IGH under the BH, we have the following component equations: 
Hence aggregate consumption will be a simple linear regressiOn of current con-
sumption on lagged consumption, current income and the wealth measure, and a 
constant term. Notice that we expect smaller coefficients in this regression than 
we have been used to seeing hitherto, because the usual coefficients have now been 
12 Interestingly in this respect, Wolff (1990,p.l51) has found from US cross-section data that families 
below the poverty line have hump-shaped asset holdings (which suggests the LCH), while those 
above it have continually increa~ing asset holdings as they age (which suggests the IGH). 
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multiplied by fractions (of the population). In particular, we expect the coefficient 
on lagged consumption to be considerably below unity, in contrast to the straight-
forward REPIH autoregression. The greater the degree of intergenerational altru-
ism in the population, the lower q, and hence the lower the coefficient on lagged 
consumption. Notice also how this aggregate consumption regression encompasses 
the REPIH-Keynesian (liquidity constrained) hybrid model we considered a short 
while ago. 
The estimates of this regression are listed as column (16) of Table 5.6. In this 
column, !36 = (1 - q)f3o; It = q1; !3{ = (1 - q)/31; and /3J = (1 - q)/32. This 
is a data-coherent model since every diagnostic test is passed 13 • Also, coefficient 
values are indeed lower than they have been hitherto. Interestingly, It (the REPIH 
autocorrelation coefficient multiplied by q) is 0. 78 - which is consistent with an 
independent conjecture of Kurz (1985) if we accept that the interest rate, r, and 
the discount rate, 8, should be very nearly equal under REPIH. The reason for 
this is that Hall's autoregression parameter 1 is unity if r = 8: hence we have 
q=O. 78 (ie only about 22% of the population are intergenerational planners). Kurz 
conjectured that the top 30% of the income distribution belong to this category 
- and the UK figure is likely to be lower than this (Britain has proportionately 
fewer millionaires )14 • An important feature of (16) is that neither the pure REPIH 
nor the pure IGH can be accepted as parsimonious special cases in this regression, 
since exclusion tests based on W (for REPIH) and Ct-1 (for IGH) fail. Hence the 
data would seem to support a hybrid REPIH-IGH specification (under the Bevan 
Hypothesis), as hypothesised. 
It is worth noting before we go on that exclusion test failure has formerly been 
rationalised by Hall (1978) (and others, including Nelson 1987) by appealing to the 
role of 'news', as proxied by the significant additional regressors in an exclusion 
test equation. The idea here is that the additional variables represent news whose 
effect on permanent income valuations was not apparent at t - 1 and hence whose 
13 Although the test statistic for normality of the residuals is close to its critical value- but see later. 
The DF and ADF statistics for the residuals are -4.38, which suggests stationarity. However, we 
cannot be certain of this, because no tabulated critical values for cointegrating regressions with 
lagged dependent variables exist at the current time. 
14 These conclusions should however be tempered by realisation of the fact. that the OLS estimator 
suffers from small sample bias in the presence of a lagged dependent variable. 
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effect on Ct could not be picked up by Ct-1· Hence the REPIH can justify the 
addition of such variables to the autoregression. Does this interpretation square 
with the results in (16)? The answer is almost certainly not, because the coefficient 
on Ct-1 is too low in regression (16) (significantly lower than unity: t*=6.58) to 
be consistent with this story. We expect Hall's 1 to be close to unity in theory 
(and empirics bear this out), because (a) 1 = ( 1 + r) / ( 1 + 5) and (b) consumers are 
only in equilibrium when their marginal rate of substitution of present for future 
consumption (1 + 8) equals the relative price of future to current consumption (1 + 
r ). That is, equilibrium implies 1 = 1; so a value of 1=0. 78 is plainly inconsistent 
with this theoretical condition. Furthermore, no plausible reason exists as to why 
making allowance for 'news' could produce such a dramatically low 1 value anyway. 
We are therefore left with the conclusion that the only cause for the dramatic 
change in the observed constant is multiplication of Hall's 1 by the fraction q. The 
latter, we have argued, takes on a very realistic value under the hybrid REPIH-IGH 
specification. 
Before we conclude this section, we make one last effort to test for non-linearity 
in the consumption function. We do this because the small sample limitations of 
the NLLS estimator could be obscuring a 'true' non-linear functional form. The 
idea here is to construct a linear approximation to the non-linear term fhYE so that 
OLS estimation (which is unbiased in small samples) can be used15 • In order to 
use an approximation, we effectively have to ignore the distributional parameter a 
(or assume it constant) as we did in regressions (5) and (10). We choose Taylor's 
expansion, which expands the function of interest around a given point. Since 
NLLS estimates of c earlier suggested that E is in the region of unity, we decided 
to expand the function around one. Taylor's expansion of a function f ( c + a-) is 
0"2 
f ( E + 0") = f (E) + 0" f' (E) + 2 f" (E) + · · · , 
15 I am grateful to .Jonathon Rougier for this suggestion. 
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where in our case, /(c)= yc-. Hence 
f' (E) = yc- ln Y 
f"(c) = ln Y(Yc- ln Y) 
Expanding the function around one (ie putting E = 1) yields 
(J2 
/(1 + CJ) = Y + CJ(Y ln Y) + 2 (Y ln
2 Y) + ... , 
ie E = 1 + CJ. Hence considering just the first three terms, Taylor's approximation 
to 
lS 
Ct = (1- q)f3o + q/Ct-I + (1- q)f3I Wt + (1- q) ((32 + f33)yt 
(J2 
+ (1- q)f33CJ(yt ln Yt) + (1- q)f332(Yt ln2 Yt), 
which may be re-written as 
where 
Ct = f3J +It Ct-I + f3{Wt + (3~yt + (I(Yt ln yt) + (2(Yt ln2 Yt), (5.1) 
f3J = (1- q)f3o 
,t = q, 
f3{ = (1- q)f3I 
(3~ = (1 - q) (f32 + f33) 
(I = (1- q)f33(E- 1) 
(2 = (1- q)f33 (c -1)2/2. 
We first estimated a version of ( 5.1) where only the first two terms of the Taylor 
expansion, Y and yt ln yt, were added to regression (16). The results, which are 
given as regression (17) in Table 5.6, are encouraging. The t-statistic of (I is now 
0.90, suggesting that slightly more non-linearity exists than is implied by Tables 
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5.2 and 5.3. Since /33 is positive in this scenario (see below) and t: is less than 
unity, reference to Table 4.1 in section 4.1 tells us that this result is consistent 
with the Davies Hypothesis and a diminishing marginal propensity to consume. 
As mentioned in chapter 4, this is what we expected. 
More important than this result, however, is the fact that the model specifi-
cation improves relative to (16), with greater apparent normality of the residuals. 
Regression (18) in the same table includes the third term of the Taylor's expansion 
as well as the first two. Since there is a non-linear restriction on the (I and (2 
coefficients, a restricted least squares estimator should ideally be used here. How-
ever, since that would remove the desirable property of small sample unbiasedness 
which OLS enjoys, we decided to estimate the full version of (18) without imposing 
the restriction (we test for it afterwards). In any case, the purpose of running this 
regression is primarily to check on the accuracy of the two-term approximation. 
The fact that the difference between (17) and (18) is negligible suggests that the 
two-term approximation is a good one. 
Parameters are very stable between (17) and (18) as expected, except for ,BJ. 
The difference here primarily reflects the exclusion of a constant term in (18), 
which was removed in order to avoid collinearity. It also reflects the variability of 
,83, since ,BJ is a function of this, as defined above. 
In summary, the results seem to support the hybrid REPIH-IGH formulation, 
which is consistent with a population mix where most people are 'selfish' REPIH 
consumers and a rich minority are intergenerationally altruistic IGH consumers. 
There also seems to be a small element of non-linearity present, although a joint 
variable deletion test for (I and (2 produced a likelihood ratio statistic of only 4.69 
- which is lower than the critical value x2(2)5% = 5.99 (16although not at 10% 
significance: x2(10)w% = 4.605). 
We conclude the discussion of the results by briefly testing the validity of two 
assumptions underpinning regressions (17) and (18). For these regressions, which 
use the Taylor expansion, we want to check (a) the choice of expanding around 
16 The F-version of this test produced a test statistic of only 2.00, which is lower than the critical 
value F(2, 16)5%=3.63. 
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c = 1, and (b) the non-linear restriction between (I and (2. To check (a), note 
from regression (18) in Table 5.6 that we have 
(1- q) (!32 + !33) = 22.091 
(1- q)f33(c- 1) = -4.3306 
(1- q)/33 (c- 1)2 /2 = 0.2127. 
There are three equations in three unknowns: since these equations are linear, 
there is exact identification. Solving the last two yields E = 0.902, which is fairly 
close to unity as required. The fact that we chose a point of expansion close to 
the true point explains why our second-order approximation (17) was so accurate: 
the closer the chosen point is to the 'true' point, the fewer terms in the expansion 
are needed to attain any given level of accuracy. 
To check (b), we solve the equations above for (1- q)/33 = 44.190. This gives a 
'theoretical value' of the third equation above of 0.2122 -which compares with the 
'actual' (2 value of 0.2127. Therefore, the restriction between the two (coefficients 
holds almost exactly, as required. 
Although the results of the hybrid REPIH-IGH specification seem promising, 
we believe that more work is needed before we can advocate this hypothesis with 
the confidence we would like. It should not be forgotten that we have been using 
proxies for It - and the wealth proxy, while probably better than our constructed 
Inland Revenue measure, is not perfect. In particular, the usefulness of this proxy 
is weakened by its wrongful inclusion of lifetime saving. We conclude by making a 
plea for better data generally (including that relating to the earnings distribution), 
and further testing of the hybrid REPIH-IGH model. It is open to question whether 
any better data can be found in the UK at the present time. 
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Chapter VI 
Conclusions 
This thesis presents a new theory of the consumption function called the IGH. 
This theory is built up from the hypothesis that individuals are altruistic utility 
maximisers. The foundations of the IGH were shown in chapter 3 to possess two 
distinct strands: the choice by individuals of the optimum bequest to be left to 
their offspring; and the allocation over their own (mortal) lifetimes of the remaining 
resources. When these two strands are brought together, it was demonstrated that 
a tractable consumption function at the individual level may be derived, although 
the bequest decision will in general embody elements of non-linearity, the latter 
property carrying over into the consumption function. Consistent aggregation of 
this function over all living agents also preserves the non-linearity of the consump-
tion relationship and furthermore introduces a new distributional term into the 
consumption function. The greater part of chapter 4 was devoted to examining 
some implications for redistribution policy arising from this feature of the IGH: 
some comments on the limitations of this policy were also mentioned. Despite 
potentially serious limitations, UK data were used, in chapter 5, to estimate the 
aggregate IGH consumption function. The results did not support the IGH in its 
basic form; but nor did it support rival specifications, including those of Hall's 
(1978) REPIH; Molana's (1991) wealth-augmented REPIH; and a hybrid REPIH-
Keynesian (liquidity constrained) model. We then proceeded to test whether an 
auxiliary assumption underpinning the IGH was at fault. Specifically, we exam-
ined whether relaxing the assumption that everyone is intergenerationally altruistic 
was able to produce a modified model consistent with the data. The conclusion 
reached in the previous chapter was that a modified model where a proportion 
of the population behave according to the 'selfish' Hall theory, and where the re-
mainder behave according to the intergenerationally altruistic IGH, was supported 
by the data. The model passed all of its diagnostic tests and produced realistic 
parameter values. 
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Interestingly, the data could not identify a significant role for the non-linear 
distributional term of the IGH function. A visual inspection of the time series of 
consumption and income suggests that this is a genuine description of the aggregate 
consumption characteristics of the UK economy, rather than any intrinsic failing 
in the earnings distribution data series. However, it is acknowledged that the 
shortcomings of the latter are serious and that better data are needed. Echoing 
the findings of van Doorn (1975), also in the case of the UK, the current data 
suggest that there is practically no scope for using earnings redistribution policy 
as a demand management tool in the UK at the present time (see Borooah and 
Sharpe 1986). The failure to establish a non-zero coefficient on the non-linear term 
in the IGH consumption function implies acceptance of Bevan's hypothesis about 
bequest formation, in which there is no role for distributional factors to affect 
aggregate consumption. 
Of course, the above results were derived using a particular data-set, and there 
is no reason to suppose that the experience of other countries will replicate that 
reported for the UK. The principal reason for this- one emphasised in the chapter 
describing the empirical work - is the rather poor quality of some of the data 
used to estimate and test the IGH. The earnings distribution parameter estimates 
and the inheritance series are especially prone to error. However, in view of the 
coherent results attained using the wealth proxy for the latter, it would seem that 
the empirical results are not worthless. Indeed, the author would argue that the 
results are sufficiently well-founded for them to form the basis of future research. 
However, a problem with the results which were derived is the smallness of the 
data set. The desire to use only theory-consistent consumption data- ie that relat-
ing to the flow of consumption services rather than consumer expenditure- meant 
that the sample ran from 1984-1986 only. The availability of only 23 observations 
for each series was especially serious when estimating equations using NLLS: as 
stated in section 5.2, this estimator is only asymptotically unbiased and efficient. 
Hence the failure to detect significant non-linearity in the NLLS equations could 
conceivably have been caused by bias in the estimates. However, further examina-
tion of the data using OLS in conjunction with Taylor's expansion, confirmed the 
conclusions following from the NLLS results. 
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We stress that despite the avowed data problems, we do not believe that the 
empirical results are useless. Caution only is urged. A danger with pointing out 
sample-based problems is that creators of fundamentally mis-specified models can 
take refuge in data-insufficiency 'explanations' of poor performance instead of tack-
ling the real shortcomings of the models themselves. To prove that we are aware of 
this danger, we now proceed to consider some potentially serious theoretical prob-
lems with the IGH. Each suggested problem is discussed in turn, together with our 
thoughts about their likely individual importance. It will ultimately be seen that 
the problem we claim to be the most serious is consistent with the interpretation 
of the chapter 5 results that envisages a population split between those who follow 
the IGH, and those who follow the REPIH. 
• Binding intragenerational (lifetime) liquidity constraints. Appendix 
A explains how the existence of binding liquidity constraints can cause ac-
tual consumption to diverge from desired consumption plans over individuals' 
lifetimes. This explanation has been used to account for the empirical short-
comings of a number of consumption functions in the past, especially that of 
the lifetime model of Hall1 - does it also apply to the IGH? Apart from the 
fact that the precise importance of liquidity constraints is open to question 
(see Appendix A), there are at least two reasons to suppose that they would 
play less of a role in the IGH than in, say, the LCH. One reason is that indi-
viduals may be more interested in saving for bequests over their lifetimes than 
in borrowing (Deaton 1989). Hence they will be less susceptible to liquidity 
constraints which restrict consumption rather than saving. Another reason is 
that intergenerational transfers of wealth can be expected to at least partially 
offset the occurrence of binding constraints. For example, someone inheriting 
when young may be able to use their newly-found wealth to maintain actual 
consumption at the same level as desired consumption. Therefore, we doubt 
whether the IGH's neglect of this type of constraint will greatly jeopardise the 
IGH specification. 
• Binding intergenerational (dynastic) liquidity constraints. It is as-
sumed in the IGH that bequests will always be non-negative. This constraint 
1 See chapter 2, section 2.1. 
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is assumed rather than imposed in section 3.3 in order to simplify the consumer's 
optimisation problem. How accurate is this assumption likely to be? As Bevan 
and Stiglitz (1979) have pointed out, the assumption of positive bequests will 
only be correct if, in the absence of a bequest, children would be worse off than 
the parent. Of course, technical progress can be expected to reduce the fre-
quency of cases where this applies; and in model simulations, Bevan (1979) and 
Bevan and Stiglitz found that negative bequests would be widespread if they 
were permissible. Although these points do not apply to the Laitner hypothe-
sis of bequest behaviour (because precise information about childrens' lifetime 
earnings is unavailable), they do apply to the Bevan and Davies hypotheses. It 
is easy to see in these latter hypotheses how those with low lifetime wealth but 
high-earning children would want to leave negative bequests (see section 3.3). 
At higher levels of lifetime wealth for any fixed lifetime wealth of the offspring, 
bequests become positive and increase monotonically. 
But offsetting the tendency of technical progress to increase the likelihood of 
individuals wishing to leave a negative bequest, is the effect of inheritance playing 
a smaller role in individuals' overall lifetime wealth as the population grows. The 
idea here is that the lifetime wealth of children can remain smaller than that of 
parents if smaller inheritances offset larger incomes arising from technical progress. 
Hence positive bequests may still be made, despite technical progress. Yet despite 
the importance of total inheritance as a component of aggregate lifetime wealth 
(Menchik 1980), the majority of individuals do not seem to receive an inheritance 
of material wealth; furthermore, bequests seem to be predominantly the preserve 
of the rich (Lansing and Sonquist (1969), Blomquist (1979), Menchik 1980). Un-
fortunately, the possibility that individuals are at bequest corner solutions may 
have serious implications for the IGH consumption function:· continuity could be 
destroyed, and IGH parameters could be susceptible to mis-specification bias. Pa-
rameter bias may arise, for example, if the incidence of corner solutions is negatively 
related to the size of lifetime resources - which seems a reasonable proposition. 
• The neglect of other forms of transfers. The IGH assumes that all in-
dividuals are altruistic, and it restricts manifestations of altruism to offspring 
only. Could this be an important cause of IGH mis-specification bias? Ev-
idence on the existence of intergenerational altruism is mixed. For example, 
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Hurd (1986) found that parents decumulated assets at the same rate as they 
aged, regardless of whether they had children or not. This contradicts the 
hypothesis of the IGH, which suggests that parents with children would decu-
mulate assets slower, in order to leave a bequest. Furthermore, Cox and Raines 
(1985) have cited evidence emphasising the importance of inter vivos transfers 
between unrelated adults; Kurz (1985) independently found that at least 40% 
of intergenerational transfers went outside the extended family. However, other 
studies have supported the notion of intergenerational planning. For example, 
Friedman and Spivak (1986) have discovered that people with more children 
buy fewer annuities (although this result could be explained simply by poorer, 
less well-informed members of the population being more fertile). In addition, 
casual anecdotal evidence supports the notion that rich families are more con-
cerned about passing wealth on to their heirs. Hence the evidence about the 
veracity of the intergenerational altruism assumption is inconclusive. 
This should not of itself cast doubt on the hybrid REPIH-IGH specification, 
however, which is consistent with some individuals being selfish and others altru-
ists. Therefore this model should be immune to the above criticisms. However, 
transfers of material wealth are only form of admissible transfer. As Davies (1982, 
p.4 76, footnote 4) has pointed out, intergenerational models invariably focus ei-
ther on material transfers between generations (ie bequests) or on non-material 
transfers ( eg human capital, family values). The IGH has been true to this pat-
tern, modelling bequests but omitting a rigorous treatment of human capital. It 
cannot be doubted that the neglect of human capital is a serious shortcoming of 
the IGH: investment in human capital may constitute the only transfers made by 
the poor. The argument here is that parents will only augment human capital 
investment with material transfers when the rate of return on the former (which 
starts out very high) falls to the point where bequest-making becomes optimal. 
Although some elements of human capital and family background factors enter 
the IGH via the lifetime earnings 'rules' of the Davies and Bevan bequest func-
tions, the treatment of human capital here is clearly superficial. The impact of 
this on the empirical performance of the IGH consumption function is hard to 
evaluate. As in the case of binding dynastic liquidity constraints, the inclusion of 
human capital investment decisions may induce a discontinuity in the consump-
tion function. A continuous model such as the IGH might then be vulnerable to 
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some mis-specification bias. Furthermore, since the IGH component of a hybrid 
REPIH-IGH specification would then be vulnerable to bias, the whole specifica-
tion would be similarly afflicted. However, the evidence presented in the previous 
chapter detected no such mis-specification problems with the hybrid formulation. 
This casts doubt on the force of the above objections. 
• Omission of the distribution of aggregate inheritance. A case can be 
made for both the DH and the LH bequest functions to contain a non-linear 
inheritance term. Concerning the DH, sub-section 3.3.2 of section 3.3 points out 
that lifetime earnings may be related to parental lifetime incomes (not earnings) 
in the intergenerational earnings rule, if family background effects are strong. 
Income may consist in part of the return on wealth, and wealth may include 
inherited wealth: hence there is a possible role of inheritance in the non-linear 
intergenerational earnings rule. The case for a non-linear inheritance term in 
the LH bequest function is stronger. Recall from sub-section 3.3.4 of section 3.3 
that the bequest function ( 3.17) was only an approximation to Laitner's general 
form kg( wg -1). The approximation took kg ( wg_1) to be a non-linear function 
of parental lifetime earnings, not parental lifetime earnings and inheritance (as 
it should have been). 
In both cases, a non-linear inheritance term was omitted on the grounds of 
tractability. Given that consistent aggregation would have introduced a non-linear 
inheritance term into the aggregate IGH consumption function in just the same 
way as it introduced a non-linear earnings term, how serious is the omission of such 
a term? As far as the DH is concerned, the relation between childrens' and parents' 
earnings in the earnings rule was justified in sub-section 3.3.2 as a valid alternative 
to a relationship between childrens' earnings and parental incomes. The idea here 
was that an earnings link better conveyed the idea of genetic ability transmission 
than an earnings-income link. Therefore the omission of a non-linear inheritance 
term may not be very serious in the case of the DH. The same may be true for the 
LH in view of the fact that inherited wealth is a small component of lifetime wealth 
for most people - see the evidence referred to in sub-section 3.3.4. To conclude, 
we doubt whether the inclusion of a non-linear inheritance term would constitute 
much of an improvement, especially when the measurement problems encountered 
with the variable It are considered (see sub-section 5.1.3). 
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• Irrationality. If individuals are unable to even subconsciously formulate life-
time and intergenerational plans, then the IGH will not describe real-world 
consumption behaviour. It is important to distinguish irrationality, which im-
plies the mis-use or non-use of information, from uncertainty and inadequate 
information. If it were known that all the necessary information for consump-
tion optimisation existed with certainty, and if it were also observed that actual 
consumption was poorly predicted by the optimising model, then it would be 
sensible to start questioning the rationality predicate. However, when perfect 
lifetime information does not exist with certainty, it becomes impossible to as-
sess the accuracy of the rationality predicate from the IGH results alone. Clues 
can only be found in studies which have tested rationality explicitly. As the 
discussion of Assumption 1 in section 3.1 indicates, these studies do not refute 
rationality, but nor do they provide overwhelming support for it; the question 
therefore remains open. However, we do not believe that altering the ratio-
nality assumption is a particularly promising route to follow. Any problems 
attributed to the IGH from this source must also be attributed to its theoretical 
rivals, eg the REPIH. 
• Imperfect information and uncertainty. The assumptions of perfect life-
time information and certainty, possibly more than any other, do not seem to 
accord well with reality. And yet these assumptions are crucial ingredients of 
the IGH, which, if removed, open up all sorts of alternative patterns of inter~ 
and intra-generational resource allocation. The implications of this for the IGH 
consumption function are serious indeed: the less people are able to plan ahead 
in their lifetimes, the less likely it is that they will behave in accordance with 
the IGH. In extreme cases, the IGH will become an inappropriate model: it 
will be mis-specified and unable to track actual consumption decisions with any 
degree of accuracy. In this sense, the stochastic selfish REPIH, which explicitly 
models uncertainty, enjoys an important advantage over the IGH. This accords 
with the final conclusions of chapter 5, that the population is split between 
IGH and REPIH consumers. Arguably those most prone to uncertainty about 
their future are those with the fewest resources, who are least able, and will-
ing, to intergenerationally plan. These consumers could behave according to 
the REPIH. Conversely, those who are wealthy are likely to be more secure, 
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altruistic, and better able to plan far into the future: these are potential IGH 
consumers. 
The foregoing comments are especially important given our belief that the 
greatest theoretical problem with the IGH as it currently stands is its certainty 
assumption. The possibility exists that a generalisation of the IGH to deal with un-
certainty might remove any traces of REPIH-like behaviour- assuming, of course, 
that everybody is intrinsically intergenerationally altruistic, not just the rich. If 
some people are not intergenerationally altruistic under any circumstances, then 
a generalisation of this sort may not effect a dramatic improvement in the IGH: 
in other words, we may always need a combination of the REPIH and the IGH. 
Such people may include the childless and the unflinchingly misanthropic. Is the 
existence of people like this sufficient to frustrate any attempt at successfully gen-
eralising the IGH to take account of uncertainty? We doubt it, given our belief 
in the intrinsic strength of cross-generational altruism in human nature; but we 
are also under no illusions about the modelling difficulties involved in analysing 
intergenerational planning under uncertainty. Not the least of these difficulties is 
the specification of an expectations-generating process. A risk here is that the par-
ticular process chosen could mistakenly mis-specify the model, which in all other 
respects could be correct. Other extensions of the IGH, while doubtless desirable 
in themselves, might also face formidable modelling obstacles. Such extensions 
relate not only to the above-mentioned weak-spots of the IGH (many of which 
may, as we pointed out, pose no great threat to the theory); but also to a host 
of other assumptions. These include variable and dynamic tastes; variable mor-
tality probabilities; a different specification of the instantaneous utility function; 
and demographic effects. The latter may be especially important in economies 
undergoing rapid population change, although the IGH lends itself in principle to 
an extension to cope with this: f( s) and an age distribution functional form may 
be developed so as to be amenable to consistent aggregation (see eg Murphy and 
Welch (1990) for an examination of age-earnings profiles). Investigations into the 
feasibility of these extensions constitute interesting topics for future research. 
However, instead of concentrating on theoretical extensions of the IGH, we 
believe that future research would be better directed at effecting data improve-
ments. The top priorities here include generating inheritance estimates more in 
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line with the IGH theory, and collecting consistent, reliable earnings distribution 
estimates. We regard the former as the most urgent task. This might be addressed 
by constructing survey data on bequest intentions, or by improving the applica-
bility of the specific wealth measure used to proxy ft. Unfortunately, however, 
the prospects for improvements in the data do not look very promising in the UK 
at the present time. Perhaps our research suggestion could be more successfully 
prosecuted in the immediate future by utilising data from overseas. 
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Appendix A 
Lifetime Liquidity Constraints 
The purpose of this appendix is to describe and highlight some of the salient 
points about liquidity constraints, especially as they relate to consumer behaviour. 
The material here is not intended to be an exhaustive or even complete survey of 
the enormous literature on these constraints: for a more thorough treatment, the 
reader is referred to, for example, Hayashi (1987). 
When people talk about a 'liquidity constraint', they usually refer to a situation 
where an individual is unable to borrow all (or even any) of what they wish to 
in the credit market. A common reason for individuals being denied access to 
loans is imperfect information combined with an adverse selection problem: lenders 
cannot always be sure about the trustworthiness of the potential borrower, even 
if the borrower genuinely can finance a desired consumption plan out of future 
earnings. Consequently, some borrowers will be restricted to loans of a certain 
size (and possibly at higher rates of interest than average, to reflect the lender's 
perceived increased exposure to risk), while others will be refused a loan of any 
size. Individuals restricted access to credit in this way are referred to as 'liquidity 
constrained'. 
In the following, the type of liquidity constraints considered will be of the 'life-
time' variety. This term is used to refer to individuals encountering some obstacle 
to borrowing based on command over future resources received during their life-
times. In contrast, intergenerationalliquidity constraints refer to restricted funds 
which the individual could be eligible to borrow against the resources of future 
generations. The existence of intergenerationalliquidity constraints seems well es-
tablished in the legal systems of most countries (see the discussion of Assumption 
10 in section 3.1, chapter 3). However, the scale and prevalence of lifetime liq-
uidity constraints is rather more a matter of dispute: we will shortly review some 
evidence on this issue. The issue is especially important in the way it relates to 
consumption theory. 
The implications of liquidity constraints for neoclassical consumption theories 
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are rather serious. These theories usually rely on an assumption of perfect capi-
tal markets to permit rational individuals to separate their optimal consumption 
paths from the timing of their command over resources. The existence of liquidity 
constraints therefore jeopardises this result when individuals' desired consumption 
paths exceed their current command over resources. In the extreme case where 
the individual is refused access to any credit, actual consumption will follow a 
discontinuous time path, being the minimum of desired consumption and current 
resources. In any case, smooth neoclassical consumption functions premised on 
perfect capital markets are susceptible to mis-specification bias, because factors 
inhibiting unconstrained lending are omitted from the list of explanatory variables 
and may disrupt the functional form of the consumption function. Hence the latter 
could break down altogether, especially if constraints vary with changes in financial 
regimes1 . 
There is evidence about the importance of liquidity constraints, but, because 
of the difficulty of observing liquidity constrained households, much of it is indi-
rect. An example of this is the finding of 'excess sensitivity' of consumption to 
current income. As Hall (1978) and Flavin (1981) have suggested, excess sensi-
tivity may be a natural consequence of liquidity constraints, which serve to bind 
income and optimal consumption paths closer together. This would suggest that 
current income yt is a good predictor of Ct, in contrast to Hall's REPIH model 
which postulates that only lagged consumption is a relevant explanatory variable 
(see section 2.1). A measure of the excess sensitivity may be provided by dividing 
the population into two groups: (a) a minority of liquidity constrained 'Keynesian' 
consumers who always consume their current period income, and (b) a majority for 
whom the Hall (1978) REPIH equation holds. Hence the value of the parameter 
.X2 in the equation 
is a measure of the degree of liquidity constrainedness in the economy. Evidence 
from studies of the above type suggests that at most 20% of US households are liq-
1 There are other implications of liquidity constraints, for human capital theory, labour markets and 
social insurance/tax policy (to name a few). See eg Becker and Tomes (1986), Baily (1974) and 
Hubbard and Judd (1986). Liquidity constraints may increase the stabilising properties of tax cuts, 
and may also violate Ricardian equivalence (Bernheim (1987), Yotsuzuka 1987). 
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uidity constrained (see, for example, the surveys of Hayashi (1987), Zeldes (1989), 
and Wilcox 1989). 
However, evidence from the above equation needs to be treated with some 
caution. Excess sensitivity could arise because of poor forecasting by consumers, 
or inconsistent aggregation, or even the separability of consumption and leisure 
in utility functions. A more telling objection, however, is that it is surely naive 
to model liquidity constraints as an 'all or nothing' phenomenon: the timing and 
severity of constraints are likely to vary across lifetimes, and ideally this needs 
to be modelled rigorously. Following Zeldes (1989), individuals' behaviour itself 
may be affected by the presence of liquidity constraints, so that the fraction of 
people who are liquidity constrained is an endogenous variable, which may vary 
over time2 • Furthermore, the parameters of the above equation are likely to exhibit 
instability in view of the finding of Fissel and Jappelli (1990) that the proportion 
of individuals in the two assumed groups varies significantly over time. This casts 
doubts on the accuracy of the estimates of liquidity constrainedness in the economy 
derived from these studies. 
It should be noted that the theoretical case for liquidity constraints has not 
gone unchallenged. Cox (1990), for example, has made the point that groups 
of individuals may be able to overcome each others' liquidity constraints either 
by making altruistically-motivated loans, or by exploiting their informational edge 
over banks and lending to the credit-worthy. The informational edge is presumed to 
derive from (informal) knowledge about the personal characteristics of the credit-
worthy, which professional lenders do not have. However, the strength of Cox's 
argument is impaired by the possibility that individuals in the lowest income classes 
(who are arguably the prone to liquidity constraints) will be linked only to similarly 
constrained members of their own class. And evidence from J appelli and Pagano 
(1989) has shown how altruistically motivated inter vivos transfers are not large 
enough to overcome borrowing constraints3 • 
2 Zeldes has also raised the possibility that individuals may reduce consumption when future labour 
incomes are uncertain because of the risk of future liquidity constraints. 
3 Using cross-section data from Italy and the USA, they found that the proportion of households 
receiving transfers from relatives or friends was 9.8% in the US (in 1983) and 4% in Italy (in 1988). 
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There is also a body of evidence disputing the importance of liquidity con-
straints. A glance at the time series of consumption and income is sufficient to 
confirm the noticeably greater smoothness of the former than the latter. This 
suggests that capital markets are operating well enough to allow consumption 
smoothing to take place. In a careful panel study, Altonji and Siow (1986) found 
that the 'perfect capital market' assumption was quite well supported. Caution 
in assessing the importance of liquidity constraints is therefore needed on both 
theoretical and empirical grounds. 
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Appendix B 
The Alternative View of Bequests as Non-Altruistic 
B.l Introduction 
In contrast to the IGH, the Life Cycle Hypothesis (LCH) is a non-altruistic 
(selfish) theory of human behaviour. According to the LCH, individuals or house-
holds are concerned with maximising utility only over their own lifetimes: they 
are not interested in the utility or consumption accruing to others, such as de-
scendants and other close relatives. Consequently, evidence of widespread and 
important intergenerational transfers has induced LCH theorists to search for es-
sentially non-altruistic explanations of bequests, explanations which are consistent 
with the selfish premise of the LCH. This appendix provides a short survey of 
these explanations, together with a critical discussion. The survey is meant to be 
illustrative, not exhaustive. 
The LCH explanations of bequest behaviour have been grouped into two cate-
gories for convenience. These are: bequests as planned selfish transfers (Part B.2) 
and bequests as unplanned 'accidental' transfers (Part B.3). Additionally, as a 
point of interest, some implications about the role of bequests in national savings 
are also briefly discussed (Part B.4). 
B.2 Bequests as Planned Selfish Transfers 
Early versions of the LCH 1 ignored bequests in their development of a con-
sumption function. This was done in order to simplify their analysis of 'selfish' 
optimising consumers. Later generalisations of the LCH which explicitly modelled 
bequests2 essentially continued in this tradition: bequests were regarded merely as 
'terminal' consumption, which generated utility to the benefactor in the form of 
a 'warm glow' effect. The basic life cycle premise of the selfish consumer was left 
intact. 
1 Brumberg and Modigliani (1954), Modigliani and Ando (1963). 
2 Eg Yaari (1964), Atkinson (1971), Blinder (1974). 
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Since the publication of these studies, several other 'selfish' models of bequests 
have been suggested. One of the most popular (Bernheim et al 1985) postulates 
bequests arising from game-theoretic interactions between selfish individuals. So, 
for example, parents may use bequests as a device to induce children to behave in 
a desired way3 • This might take the form of dutiful and obedient offspring being 
'rewarded' by inclusion into their parents' will; less compliant offspring could be 
bequeathed less or even excluded altogether (the 'King Lear' effect). The central 
point of the Bernheim et al thesis is that parents who only care about their own 
utility may still find it optimal to leave bequests. However, a problem with this 
thesis is that if children form part of a market for services, wages rather than 
bequests may be the appropriate means of payment (Barro 1989). 
A similar story to Bernheim et al's has been suggested by Kotlikoff and Spivak 
(1981 ). According to these authors, parents and children may enter into implicit 
risk-sharing arrangements, under which parents trade bequests for a guarantee 
that they will be looked after by their children for the remainder of their lifetimes 
(which are of uncertain duration). Kotlikoff et al (1986, 1987) have demonstrated 
that this could be an important bequest motive in practice. 
It is also possible that selfish consumers reach a point of 'consumer satiation', 
where they are unable to consume the value of all the resources they acquire. 
Bequests are 'left over', and are non-altruistic. 
B.3 Bequests as Unplanned 'Accidental' Transfers 
Another possibility is that bequests are accidental (Abel 1985). The idea here 
is that risk-averse individuals save against uncertain future health expenditures and 
an uncertain date of death, but die before all their savings can be realised4 • The 
accidental bequest hypothesis clearly hinges on the existence of imperfect annuities 
markets or imperfect rental markets for housing and other durable assets5 • For if 
3 Becker has called this the 'enforcement theory of giving'. 
4 Some authors have cited this as an explanation for the LCH's well-known over-prediction of asset-
decumulation by the elderly - see eg Davies (1981), King and Dicks-Mireaux (1982) and King 
(1985). 
5 Bevan and Stiglitz ( 1979). 
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annuity markets were well developed, risk averse individuals would be expected to 
use them, so dispensing with the need to accumulate precautionary savings. 
In favour of the accidental bequest hypothesis, Kotlikoff, Shaven and Spivak 
(1986,1987) and Davies (1981) have illustrated that imperfect insurance markets 
can account for a potentially large share of intergenerational transfers. However, 
the demand for actuarially fair annuities appears in practice to be weak6 • Under 
one interpretation (eg Barra 1989), this supports the altruism hypothesis, since a 
choice not to annuitise implies that people prefer to bequeath instead. However, 
a rival interpretation due to Bernheim et al (1985) suggests that this militates 
against the altruism hypothesis, since according to these authors, this hypothesis 
should actually predict annuitisation!7 • It is therefore difficult to reach any clear-
cut conclusions about the role of altruism from the fact that annuitisation is a 
fairly rare occurrence. 
However, it would seem that the accidental bequests hypothesis suffers quite 
a setback from the finding of limited annuitisation8 • It is certainly hard to agree 
with LCH theorists who assert that the demand for annuities is weak because 
annuity markets are poorly developed. A number of substitutes for annuities do 
seem to exist: eg unemployment and disability insurance; there is also a case to 
be made that public pensions compensate for the any shortfall in the supply of in-
dexed annuities (see Diamond 1977). And although adverse selection may restrict 
the supply of annuities relative to the demand for them, families can effectively 
self-insure by forming an implicit self-insurance market to spread risk (Kotlikoff 
and Spivak 1981 ). The fact that there is evidence of under-annuitisation even after 
the possibility of family annuitisation points to a weakness with the accidental be-
quest hypothesis9 . Surely if the utility gains from annuitisation were great enough, 
6 Bernheim et a/ (1985), Friedman and Wahrshawsky (1985a). 
7 Their argument is that rational benefactors should prefer lifetime gifts to terminal bequests, for 
reasons of minimising tax liabilities; minimising liquidity constrai.nedness of young beneficiaries; 
and allowing young beneficiaries to annuitise early. 
8 See Friedman and Walushawsky (1985b), for example, who concluded from their life-cycle model of 
saving and portfolio behaviour with empirically observed annuity prices that an intentional bequest 
motive must be operative to explain the observed low degree of participation in annuity markets. 
9 Note, however, Kotlikoff's (1988) point that the possibility oflarge future medical expenses may de-
ter people from committing all of their assets to the relatively illiquid form of annuities. This seems 
a more satisfactory explanation of limited annuitisation than others commonly advanced, which 
include the suppositions that individuals are unable to understand annuities, or are irrationally 
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widespread annuity markets would have developed by now (Kurz 1985). 
B.4 The Role of Bequests in Capital Accumulation 
An interesting footnote to the above discussion is the quantitative importance 
of intergenerational transfers. Given the relative weakness of some of the LCH 
'explanations' of bequests, it is probably the case that the greater are bequests 
as a component of total savings, the greater is the inaccuracy of the LCH. Not 
surprisingly then, there has been a fierce debate in the literature about the mag-
nitude of bequests, whose two main protagonists are Laurence J. Kotlikoff and 
Franco Modigliani. 
The debate began in earnest with a paper by Kotlikoff and Summers (1981), 
which claimed that intergenerational transfers accounted for up to 80% of total 
US capital formation. This figure, which seemed very high, was challenged by 
Modigliani (1985), whose own estimate was closer to 20%. The debate continued 
in the Spring 1988 issue of the Journal of Economic Perspectives, with both Kot-
likoff and Modigliani maintaining their positions with little apparent possibility of 
resolution in sight. 
The very next year, the same journal published an article by Kessler and Mas-
son (1989) which attempted to explain the large disparity between the estimates 
of Kotlikoff and Modigliani. Kessler and Masson pointed out that the disparity 
could be traced to different definitions of what should be treated as an intergener-
ational transfer, and to different computations of inherited wealth resulting from 
a given transfer. Since the two disputants both took up extreme positions in both 
cases, it seemed likely to Kessler and Masson that the 'true' contribution of inter-
generational transfers to total savings would lie somewhere inbetween these two 
positions. The authors were able to back up this point with a range of evidence 
from France and Canada. An estimate by Davies and St-Hilaire (1987), for exam-
ple, put the share of savings due to inheritance at 42% - an intermediate value 
between Modigliani and Kotlikoff, though somewhat closer to the former than the 
latter. 
afraid of 'betting' on a long life. 
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Appendix C 
The Aggregate Consumption-Income Distribution 
Literature 
C.l Introduction 
This appendix discusses the relationship between aggregate consumption and 
the distribution of income. Since this is a question which has been accorded some 
importance in the literature, and on which this thesis claims to make a contribu-
tion, the previous literature relating to this issue is examined in some depth. 
It is a matter of surprise to some researchers - for example Blinder (1975) 
and Borooah and Sharpe (1986) - that there is such a paucity of work on the 
aggregate consumption-income distribution relationship. Indeed, this author has 
been able to identify only a few 1 pieces of research in this area. All of them fail, 
for reasons outlined below, to treat the aggregate consumption-income distribution 
relationship in a satisfactorily rigorous way. 
Before the state of the literature is summarised, some necessary groundwork 
about the distribution of income is introduced. This has been kept deliberately 
short for the sake of brevity - a more detailed discussion of aspects of income 
distributions are contained in such standard texts as Pen (1971), Atkinson (1975), 
Sen (1973), and Cowell (1977). 
There are broadly two ways in which an income distribution can be numerically 
described. The first (adopted by the IGH) assigns a functional form to the observed 
density (or frequency) function of the distribution; the second condenses all of 
the information encapsulated by the former into a single number or index. Such 
numbers or indices are meant to vary in a well-defined way with some interesting 
feature of the distribution - typically, implied income inequality. 
There is a small but growing literature on the econometrics of fitting functional 
forms to observed distributions: see section 3.4. Suffice it to say here that most 
1 Two additional studies which were known of, but unavailable at the time of writing, were Kesenne 
(1980) and Tahir (1981). Borooah (1991) is a partial survey of a handful of the more recent 
contributions to this literature. 
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functional forms in general usage are flexible enough to convey at least the broad 
outlines of most real-world distributions, if not their exact shapes. The shape of 
an income distribution is almost always characterised by a high degree of positive 
skew, meaning that many people are bunched in the low income tail, and relatively 
few are located in the high income tail. Two moments of especial interest to 
researchers are the mean of the distribution, and the variance (which is a measure 
of the "spread" of incomes). 
In contrast to the functional approach to income distribution, the usage of 
summary measures involves compressing the information of the former into a much 
simpler form. The chief advantage of summary measures is their ease of handling 
and interpretation. Whereas a change in an income distribution can alter the pa-
rameters of a functional form in a less than straightforward manner, such a change 
causes a simple and unambiguous shift in a summary measure. The principal 
summary measures include the Gini coefficient, transformations of the variance, 
Dalton's (1920) measure, Atkinson's (1970) welfare-based measure, Pareto's a, and 
Paukert's (1973) measures. Quantile shares form another set of measures. What 
the measures all try to capture is the inequality of incomes. Their mathemati-
cal forms are therefore crucial in determining just how a distributional change is 
picked up and translated into a change in inequality. A discussion of the mathe-
matical forms themselves is beyond the scope of this study - the interested reader 
is therefore referred to eg Nyard and Sandstrom (1981) for more details. 
As Metcalf (1972,p.9-10) has pointed out, inequality measures can be mislead-
ing indicators of income inequality. Also, while they are undoubtedly useful in 
certain applications, it will be argued in the following that they are inappropri-
ate for analysing the aggregate consumption-income distribution relationship. If a 
model of this relationship is not to be ad hoc and biased, the whole distribution 
must be considered, not some artificially condensed version of it. 
It is now appropriate to evaluate the various efforts in the literature to account 
for the impact of the income distribution on aggregate consumption. Much of the 
work takes Keynes's Absolute Income Hypothesis (AIH) Ct =a+ byt as a starting 
point of a working modeL It will therefore be useful to mention what Keynes had 
to say about the importance of income distribution on consumption. 
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It is clear that in the simple linear AIH consumption function, no role can be 
ascribed to the distribution of income in determining aggregate consumption. Dis-
tributional effects are synonymous with non-linearity, not linearity (see eg Stoker 
1986). Keynes did, however, acknowledge the importance of income distribution; 
and the idea that a strong relationship between the two variables exists at all can be 
traced back directly to his General Theory (1936). Therein, Keynes stated (p.90-
91) that "the amount that a community spends on consumption depends partly on 
... the principles on which income is divided between them" (members of the popu-
lation). The reason why the distribution of income may have an effect on aggregate 
consumption relates to Keynes's supposition that an individual's savings ratio will 
vary positively with the individual's disposable income. This supposition is equiv-
alent to the statement that c~ > 0; c~ < 0, where c~ is an individual's consumer 
expenditure differentiated with respect to his or her personal disposable income -
the marginal propensity to consume (mpc ). With a variable mpc, a redistribution 
from rich to poor individuals will result in the rich reducing their consumption, 
but not by as much as the poor will increase theirs. Hence Keynes's propositions 
attribute to the distribution of incomes a direct role in explaining consumption. 
Specifically, if income were "progressively" redistributed from rich to poor, then 
consumption in the aggregate would increase. This mechanism has been the (often 
unstated) rationale behind the studies claiming that the distribution of income 
affects aggregate consumption. 
Since Keynes, efforts to explore the relationship have manifested themselves in 
four broad approaches. These are now discussed in turn. 
C.2 The First Approach: Augmenting with Summary Measures 
The first approach arbitrarily augments some "standard" (usually AIH) ag-
gregate consumption function with a summary measure G of the type mentioned 
above. A typical AIH specification of this sort is 
where Ydt is personal disposable income. If the coefficient b1 turns out to be signifi-
cantly different from zero, then it is inferred that income inequality (and hence the 
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distribution of income) is an important determinant of aggregate consumption. A 
recent example of the first approach is the study of Khan (1987). Khan estimated 
the two equations 
C* 
Y* = ao + a1.G 
C* 
Y* = ao + a1.G + a2.Y* 
(C.1) 
(C.2) 
on cross-section data from twenty developing countries for each of the years 1975-
1979. Because of data limitations, C* was defined as real per capita consumption 
and Y* was defined as real per capita (rather than disposable) income. Averaging 
over 1975-1979, Khan reported the following results using Ordinary Least Squares 
estimation: 
C* 
Y* = 0.97- 0.37 G R2 = 0.12 (C.1') 
(9.46) (1.67) 
C* -2 
Y* = 1.01 - 0.44 G - 0.00004 Y* R = 0.30, (C.2') 
(10.02) (2.11) (1.91) 
where t-ratios are given in parentheses. Evidently, the Gini coefficient is a signif-
icant regressor in these equations (though only at 10% significance in (C.1')); it is 
also signed in accordance with Keynes's propositions. 
Khan's paper is typical of the studies comprising the first approach. Other 
studies (which account for the majority of studies in the literature) include Staehle 
(1937), Polak (1939), Ferber (1953), Metcalf (1972), Blinder (1975), Della Valle and 
Oguchi (1976), Cramer (1976), Musgrove (1980) and three papers associated with 
Drobny and Hall's (1989) recent Economic Journal article. The summary measures 
used by these authors actually vary quite widely. For example, Staehle related 
consumption to his own index for the concentration of labour income; Polak used 
Pareto's a on U.S. data; and Blinder related the average propensity to consume 
to five variance terms and the Gini coefficient (in current period and lagged form, 
also on U.S. data). Metcalf regressed consumption on several variables, including 
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the upper and lower quantile tails of the income distribution relative to the mean. 
Della, Valle and Oguchi supplemented the Gini coefficient with Paukert's (1973) 
inequality measures in their regressions on the average propensity to consume 
(international data); and Musgrove supplemented the Gini coefficient with a term 
designed to capture the asymmetry of the Lorenz curve (also international data). 
Finally, Drobny and Hall (1989), Hall (1991) and Cuthbertson and Barlow (1991) 
are three papers which use a variable, originally suggested by Drobny and Hall 
(1989), which measures tax rate differentials (see section 2.3 of chapter 2). 
It hardly needs to be stated that studies employing the first approach are very 
ad hoc. This must inevitably cast doubts on the value of the results derived from 
them. Perhaps not surprisingly, given the degree of ad hoc-ery involved, the results 
themselves tell conflicting stories. Staehle; Cramer; Khan; Della Valle and Oguchi; 
and the three papers associated with Drobny and Hall's method all concluded that 
the distribution of income significantly affects aggregate consumption, and that 
an increase in inequality will reduce aggregate consumption. Polak, Blinder and 
Musgrove, however, have concluded that distributional effects are either weak or 
non-existant2 ; and Blinder and Metcalf found evidence of a positive relationship 
between inequality and consumption. 
C.3 The Second Approach: Empirical Studies 
The second approach looks purely at the empirical aspect of the aggregate 
consumption- income distribution relationship. The papers of Lubell (194 7) and 
Borooah and Sharpe (1986) exemplify this approach. In neither of these papers is 
the theoretical rationale behind this relationship discussed. Borooah and Sharpe 
estimated a form of the Davidson et al (1978) consumption function (see section 
2.2) for each of five quintiles on their U.K. data set of 1963-1982. They then 
reported that use of Zellner's (1962) seemingly unrelated regression technique in-
dicated the existence of significant coefficient differences. This result implies that 
aggregation bias will be a serious problem in consumption studies which ignore the 
impact of the income distribution (see part C.5 of this appendix). Interestingly, 
Borooah and Sharpe went on to use an aggregated form of the Davidson function 
2 Though Musgrove found distributional effects to be significant when a sub-group of developed 
countries were examined separately. 
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to forecast that a simulated equalisation of incomes would increase aggregate con-
sumption in the future. However, extrapolating results up to seventeen years in 
the future and assuming that the U.K. growth rate is constant until the year 2000 
is arguably not the most reliable way of measuring the impact of the income dis-
tribution on aggregate consumption. Furthermore, the results are model-specific 
in the sense that the consumption function chosen at the outset determines to a 
large extent the precise predictions about the effects of hypothetical redistribu-
tions. For example, a model with unstable parameters would be of little use for 
predictive work of this type. It should be noted in this context that instability 
has been observed in Davidson et al-type equations (see section 2.3 of chapter 2). 
The model-specificity of the Borooah and Sharpe results did not receive sufficient 
attention from the authors. 
C.4 The Third Approach: Analysis by Income Class 
The third approach splits the income distribution into classes, making each 
income class a seperate regressor in a consumption function. If differences between 
estimated coefficients are significant, it is inferred that the income distribution 
affects consumption. As we have just seen, Borooah and Sharpe's (1986) paper 
utilises this approach; so do the recent papers by Moulaert and de Canniere (1987) 
and Bunting (1991). In some ways, this third approach could be regarded as a 
direct descendant of the work of Kaldor (1956,1966) and Pasinetti (1962), which 
dwelt on the importance of the composition of income3 • Moulaert and de Canniere's 
paper exemplifies the third approach. These authors sub-divided a year of Belgian 
cross-section household data into ten income-earning classes (Yj ), ranged from 
lowest to highest. They first estimated the (arbitrary) non-linear equation4 
Cj =a+ b.Yj + c.Y} 
and found that c was negative(= -1.59 x 107) and statistically significant (ltl = 
34.295). This result, which suggests that the marginal propensity to consume out 
3 Several authors have attempted to test the hypothesis that the composition of income is a deter-
minant of aggregate consumption. For a survey, see eg Hadjimatheou (1987), chapter 9. 
4 The same equation estin1ated by Husby (1971 ), although Husby estimated it for all income classes. 
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of income decreases as income rises, is of course the basic Keynesian premise for 
income redistribution. 
Next, Moulaert and de Canniere split the income distribution into classes. 
Rather arbitrarily, they regrouped the two lowest classes into one sub-group; all 
other groups constituted the second sub-group. The AIH equation was then speci-
fied and estimated for both sub-groups. The parameters representing the marginal 
propensities to consume of the two groups were found to be different5 : this differ-
ence turned out to be significant. 
An immediate objection to the third approach is that the choice of income 
class regrouping is a matter of purely personal judgement (as is the choice of the 
consumption function used). Thus the approach, like the one described in the pre-
vious section, is ad hoc. The process of condensing the entire income distribution 
into a small number of classes is unsatisfactory, because important inter-group 
differences and changes can be ignored or mis-represented. Ideally, a researcher 
should look at the entire distribution, without splitting up and manipulating it. 
Finally, the Fourth Approach involves consistently aggregating over all indi-
viduals in order to derive an aggregate consumption function. This is the ideal 
theoretical approach and, since it is adopted by the IGH, it will now be examined 
in some detail. Part C.5 of this appendix clarifies what is meant by the term 'con-
sistent aggregation'; and Part C.6 considers the study of van Doorn (1975), who 
has attempted to use this approach. 
C.5 On Consistent Aggregation 
Ideally, a theory of consumer expenditure should start at the micro level, ex-
plaining how much a rational individual will spend out of, say, his or her personal 
disposable income at any point in time. With Cjt and Yjt denoting the consumption 
and personal income respectively of an individual j at time t, consider the model 
(C.3) 
5 These were: 0.741 for the first group; 0.509 for the second group; and 0.541 for the combined 
groups. 
141 
Appendix C. Consumption €3 Income Distribution 
where fJ is some particular function pertaining to individual j. Now "consistent 
aggregation" exists when aggregate consumption Ct is obtained by summing the 
individual consumer expenditures Cjt directly over all individuals. That is, consis-
tent aggregation means that 
Ct = L /j(Yjt)· 
j 
(C.4) 
With consistent aggregation, any differences in the way that individuals spend 
out of income will be reflected without distortion by equation (C.4). That is, the 
income distribution comes through into the aggregate consumption function with-
out any bias or distortion. Terms capturing an "income distribution" or "income 
inequality" effect - such as were employed by the First Approach described above 
- are irrelevant in the context of a consistently aggregated consumption function. 
In contrast, aggregation bias will occur with inconsistent aggregation, which arises 
when aggregate consumption is obtained by summing over individual incomes, 
even though the "micro" function /j does not permit this. That is, inconsistent 
aggregation occurs when /j is non-linear and the aggregation used is described by 
Ct = /j(LYjt) 
j 
= /j(Yt), 
(C.5) 
where Yt is total disposable income. Although (C.4) and (C.5) can sometimes be 
the same ((C.5) is a special case of (C.4)), in general they will not be. They will 
only be the same if (a) the /j are identical for all individuals j, and (b) if the 
fJ are linear functions. In a practical context, they will also be observationally 
equivalent if the distribution of income is constant over time. 
Crucial though the aggregation problem is, few studies in the consumption-
income distribution literature pay sufficient attention to it. We now turn to one 
study which has attempted to address the problem directly. 
C.6 The Fourth Approach: van Doorn (1975) and the IGH 
Van Doorn's paper enjoys the advantage of representing the income distribu-
tion by a function, as opposed to a summary measure of the sort discussed in Part 
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C.2. Van Doorn's use of a distribution function is therefore a significant advance. 
He started with the logarithmised Keynesian AIH micro consumption equation 
(C.6) 
where a:, (3, 1 are constants, and where Ci, Yi and Zi are the consumption, income 
and size respectively, of a household i. The above equation is non-linear, suggesting 
a decreasing marginal propensity to consume as income rises when (3 < 1. Van 
Doorn tried to aggregate his micro consumption function in the following way. By 
taking logarithms of (C.6), summing over all n households and dividing by n, the 
following equation is derived: 
{ 1 n } {1 n } {1 n } ; ?= ln Ci = a + (3 ; ?= ln Yi + 1 ; ?= ln Zi . 
z=l l=l z=l 
(C.7) 
Now a convenient property of a lognormally distributed variable is that the log-
arithm of its geometric mean value can be expressed as a linear combination of 
its arithmetic mean and variance. Since the values in curly brackets in (C. 7) are 
logarithms of geometric mean values, the above property can be exploited to yield 
This assumes, of course, that household size, and household income, and household 
consumption are alllognormally distributed. Assuming further that the variance of 
consumption, a;, is directly proportional to the variance of household size a;, with 
proportionality parameter 1, van Doorn obtained the final consumption function 
(C.8) 
where the effect of income distribution is picked up by the variance of income a~. 
Van Doorn contrasted (C.8) with the special 'no distribution effects' case where 
a~ = 0. Using 1970-1 UK cross-section data, regressions were run on both specifi-
cations. However, van Doorn was able to detect only a weak (statistically insignif-
icant) negative relationship between consumer spending and income inequality. 
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There are several obvious problems with van Doorn's model. To start with, 
no rationale was given for the rather unusual 'micro' consumption function cho-
sen6. In addition, van Doorn's choice of representing the income distribution by 
the lognormal distribution can be criticised at both a theoretical (Aitchison and 
Brown (1957), Metcalf 1972) and an empiricaF level. And van Doorn's assump-
tions that (a) household size, and household income, and household consumption 
are all lognormally distributed; and (b) a~ = 1a~ are very strong and lacking any 
justification. It would seem that the only rationale for them - and the lognor-
mal and logarithmised AIH specifications - is mathematical expedience: ie, they 
make consistent aggregation possible. Hopefully, the IGH consumption presented 
in the main text of the thesis indicates a slightly less restrictive way of consistently 
aggregating a micro consumption function. 
C. 7 Conclusion 
To conclude, the majority of the work to date on the aggregate consumption-
income distribution relationship suffers from important drawbacks. These include: 
the use of ad hoc consumption functions; the use of inequality measures instead of 
income distributions; and a failure to aggregate consistently. The literature seems 
to have tolerated a remarkable degree of ad hoc-ery for a remarkably long time. 
Part of the reason for this is the popularity of what we have termed the 'First 
Approach' to modelling the consumption-income distribution relationship. How-
ever, this survey should have demonstrated that a better approach to modelling ex-
ists, one which offers greater hope for the accurate estimation of the consumption-
income distribution relationship. This is the Fourth Approach of van Doorn (1975) 
and the IGH (see section 3.4 of chapter 3). 
6 And, rather surprisingly, the mechanism by which income distribution was supposed to affect 
aggregate consumption (ie diminishing mpc's) was not explicitly mentioned. 
7 Aitchison and Brown (1957,p.l16) report that the lognormal distribution consistently underesti-
mates the number of members in the lowest and highest income classes. Metcalf (1972,p.14) has 
also criticised it for over-correcting for positive skew in income distribution data, and forcing a 
symmetric treatment of movements in the two tails of the distribution. Additionally, see Salem 
and Mount (1974), McDonald and Ransom (1979), McDonald (1984) and Atoda eta! (1988) for 
evidence of the poor performance of the lognormal in describing real world income distributions. 
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Appendix D 
Derivation of the IGH Consumption Function Using the 
Beta Distribution 
Using the beta density stated in section 3.4 of chapter 3, the integral in (3.22) 
becomes 
-(N lnwt Pt+c:-l( )Qt-l d 
B( ) Pt+Qt-l Yt Wt - Yt Yt· Pt,qt Wt 0 
(3.231) 
By Euler's First Integral, 
Hence (3.23') becomes 
However, average aggregate earnings is defined as 
B(Pt + E, qt) wft+c:+qt-1 
B(pt, qt) wft+Qt-1 
c: f(Pt + qt)f(Pt +E) 
= wt f(pt)f(Pt + E + qt). 
(3.24') 
(3.251) 
(3.26') 
using the beta distribution. The right-hand side of equation (3.261) is clearly a 
special case of the left-hand side of (3.24') where E = 1: hence (3.261) may be 
evaluated by putting E = 1 into the right-hand side (result) of (3.24'). This yields 
Therefore, Yt = WtPt!Pt + qt, or, since Yt = Yt/N, we have NWtPt/Pt + qt = Yt. 
Hence 
(3.271) 
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and so, substituting (3.27') into (3,25'), 
-(N { f(Pt + qt)f(Pt +c)} wf = -(Nl-e"Ytcf(Pt + qt)f(Pt +c) (Pt + qt)c 
f(Pt)f(pt + c + qt) f(pt)f(Pt + qt +c) Pt 
(3.28') 
Now putting (3.28') into equation (3.22) (see the text of section 3.4) yields the 
aggregate IGH consumption function 
(3.29') 
where the !33 is defined in the text of section 3.4, and where 
•T•( ) _ f(pt+qt)f(pt+c) (Pt+qt)E 
'.l'Pt,qt,c -r( )( ) Pt f Pt + qt + c Pt (3.30') 
Clearly the only difference between using the beta instead of the gamma distribu-
tion to aggregate the consumption function is the structure of the W function. 
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